Daily Papers

We introduce the "Belief State Transformer", a next-token predictor that takes both a prefix and suffix as inputs, with a novel objective of predicting both the next token for the prefix and the previous token for the suffix. The Belief State Transformer effectively learns to solve challenging problems that conventional forward-only transformers struggle with, in a domain-independent fashion. Key to this success is learning a compact belief state that captures all relevant information necessary for accurate predictions. Empirical ablations show that each component of the model is essential in difficult scenarios where standard Transformers fall short. For the task of story writing with known prefixes and suffixes, our approach outperforms the Fill-in-the-Middle method for reaching known goals and demonstrates improved performance even when the goals are unknown. Altogether, the Belief State Transformer enables more efficient goal-conditioned decoding, better test-time inference, and high-quality text representations on small scale problems. Website: https://sites.google.com/view/belief-state-transformer

Structured belief states are crucial for user goal tracking and database query in task-oriented dialog systems. However, training belief trackers often requires expensive turn-level annotations of every user utterance. In this paper we aim at alleviating the reliance on belief state labels in building end-to-end dialog systems, by leveraging unlabeled dialog data towards semi-supervised learning. We propose a probabilistic dialog model, called the LAtent BElief State (LABES) model, where belief states are represented as discrete latent variables and jointly modeled with system responses given user inputs. Such latent variable modeling enables us to develop semi-supervised learning under the principled variational learning framework. Furthermore, we introduce LABES-S2S, which is a copy-augmented Seq2Seq model instantiation of LABES. In supervised experiments, LABES-S2S obtains strong results on three benchmark datasets of different scales. In utilizing unlabeled dialog data, semi-supervised LABES-S2S significantly outperforms both supervised-only and semi-supervised baselines. Remarkably, we can reduce the annotation demands to 50% without performance loss on MultiWOZ.

Why do we need another AI to help the AI? We argue you don't. Stateless LLM sessions impose re-orientation costs on iterative, session-heavy workflows. Prior work addresses cross-session memory through retrieval-augmented approaches: store history, embed it, retrieve by semantic similarity. Cross-session memory is a state management problem, not a search problem. Similarity search fails for named entity resolution within bounded vocabulary contexts because beliefs about a shared technical domain are semantically proximate by construction. A single user is the simplest bounded vocabulary context; engineering teams converge on the same property through shared codebases and terminology. We present Tenure, a local-first proxy that maintains a typed belief store with epistemic status, versioned supersession, and scope isolation, injecting curated context into every LLM session through precision-first retrieval. Hard scope isolation provides a structural guarantee: the right beliefs surface, and only within the boundaries the user has authorized. Tenure's typed schema converts extracted facts into imperative instructions via a why it matters field, making injected beliefs directly actionable rather than raw material for the model to re-derive. A controlled evaluation on 72 retrieval cases demonstrates the gap. Cosine similarity over dense embeddings achieves mean precision of 0.12. Alias-weighted BM25 maintains mean precision of 1.0, passing 72/72 cases versus 8/72 for cosine similarity on the same corpus. Hybrid retrieval typically solves vocabulary mismatch between disparate authors; Tenure eliminates this structurally: query and belief authors are the same person, and an alias enrichment flywheel continuously indexes their specific vocabulary. Under multi-turn topic drift this worsens: the vector backend produces drift scores of 0.43--0.50 on noise-critical turns where BM25 maintains 0.

Autoregressive (AR) models remain the standard for natural language generation but still suffer from high latency due to strictly sequential decoding. Recent diffusion-inspired approaches, such as LlaDA and Dream, mitigate this by generating in parallel, yet they suffer from two core limitations: information loss, as predictive distributions for non-finalized tokens are discarded at each step, and premature commitment, where local decisions are made without sufficient global coordination. We introduce Latent Refinement Decoding (LRD), a two-stage framework with Latent Refinement and a Predictive Feedback Loop. The first stage maintains masked positions as distributional mixtures of predicted tokens and the mask embedding, allowing the model to establish more globally consistent beliefs. The second stage progressively finalizes confident tokens while retaining uncertain ones for iterative feedback. KL-divergence dynamics provide a principled and reliable criterion for convergence and early stopping. Experiments across coding (HumanEval +6.3, MBPP +2.6) and reasoning (GSM8K +2.9, MATH500 +3.8) show that LRD improves accuracy while delivering speedups of up to 10.6x, making it a strong and versatile alternative for parallel sequence generation.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed on long-horizon tasks in partially observable environments, where they must act while inferring and tracking a complex environment state over many steps. This leads to two challenges: partial observability requires maintaining uncertainty over unobserved world attributes, and long interaction history causes context to grow without bound, diluting task-relevant information. A principled solution to both challenges is a belief state: a posterior distribution over environment states given past observations and actions, which compactly encodes history for decision making regardless of episode length. In LLM agents, however, the open-ended nature of text makes it unclear how to represent such a distribution. Therefore, we introduce Agent-BRACE: Agent Belief state Representation via Abstraction and Confidence Estimation, a method that decouples an LLM agent into a belief state model and a policy model, jointly optimized via reinforcement learning. The belief state model produces a structured approximation of the belief distribution: a set of atomic natural language claims about the environment, each annotated with an ordinal verbalized certainty label ranging from certain to unknown. The policy model conditions on this compact, structured approximate belief rather than the full history, learning to select actions under explicit uncertainty. Across long-horizon, partially observable embodied language environments, Agent-BRACE achieves an average absolute improvement of +14.5% (Qwen2.5-3B-Instruct) and +5.3% (Qwen3-4B-Instruct), outperforming strong RL baselines while maintaining a near-constant context window independent of episode length. Further analysis shows that the learned belief becomes increasingly calibrated over the course of an episode as evidence accumulates.

Logical reasoning encompasses deduction, induction, and abduction. However, while Large Language Models (LLMs) have effectively mastered the former two, abductive reasoning remains significantly underexplored. Existing frameworks, predominantly designed for static deductive tasks, fail to generalize to abductive reasoning due to unstructured state representation and lack of explicit state control. Consequently, they are inevitably prone to Evidence Fabrication, Context Drift, Failed Backtracking, and Early Stopping. To bridge this gap, we introduce Graph of States (GoS), a general-purpose neuro-symbolic framework tailored for abductive tasks. GoS grounds multi-agent collaboration in a structured belief states, utilizing a causal graph to explicitly encode logical dependencies and a state machine to govern the valid transitions of the reasoning process. By dynamically aligning the reasoning focus with these symbolic constraints, our approach transforms aimless, unconstrained exploration into a convergent, directed search. Extensive evaluations on two real-world datasets demonstrate that GoS significantly outperforms all baselines, providing a robust solution for complex abductive tasks. Code repo and all prompts: https://anonymous.4open.science/r/Graph-of-States-5B4E.

Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes (POMDPs) are used to model environments where the full state cannot be perceived by an agent. As such the agent needs to reason taking into account the past observations and actions. However, simply remembering the full history is generally intractable due to the exponential growth in the history space. Maintaining a probability distribution that models the belief over what the true state is can be used as a sufficient statistic of the history, but its computation requires access to the model of the environment and is often intractable. While SOTA algorithms use Recurrent Neural Networks to compress the observation-action history aiming to learn a sufficient statistic, they lack guarantees of success and can lead to sub-optimal policies. To overcome this, we propose the Wasserstein Belief Updater, an RL algorithm that learns a latent model of the POMDP and an approximation of the belief update. Our approach comes with theoretical guarantees on the quality of our approximation ensuring that our outputted beliefs allow for learning the optimal value function.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents commonly condition actions on full action-observation histories, which introduce task-irrelevant information that easily leads to redundant actions and higher inference cost. We propose Progress-Aware Belief Update (PABU), a belief-state framework that compactly represents an agent's state by explicitly modeling task progress and selectively retaining past actions and observations. At each step, the agent predicts its relative progress since the previous round and decides whether the newly encountered interaction should be stored, conditioning future decisions only on the retained subset. Across eight environments in the AgentGym benchmark, and using identical training trajectories, PABU achieves an 81.0% task completion rate, outperforming previous State of the art (SoTA) models with full-history belief by 23.9%. Additionally, PABU's progress-oriented action selection improves efficiency, reducing the average number of interaction steps to 9.5, corresponding to a 26.9% reduction. Ablation studies show that both explicit progress prediction and selective retention are necessary for robust belief learning and performance gains.

Rapid advancements in large language models (LLMs) have sparked the question whether these models possess some form of consciousness. To tackle this challenge, Butlin et al. (2023) introduced a list of indicators for consciousness in artificial systems based on neuroscientific theories. In this work, we evaluate a key indicator from this list, called HOT-3, which tests for agency guided by a general belief-formation and action selection system that updates beliefs based on meta-cognitive monitoring. We view beliefs as representations in the model's latent space that emerge in response to a given input, and introduce a metric to quantify their dominance during generation. Analyzing the dynamics between competing beliefs across models and tasks reveals three key findings: (1) external manipulations systematically modulate internal belief formation, (2) belief formation causally drives the model's action selection, and (3) models can monitor and report their own belief states. Together, these results provide empirical support for the existence of belief-guided agency and meta-cognitive monitoring in LLMs. More broadly, our work lays methodological groundwork for investigating the emergence of agency, beliefs, and meta-cognition in LLMs.

State-space language models such as Mamba and gated linear attention (GLA) offer efficient alternatives to transformers due to their linear complexity and parallel training, but often lack the expressivity and robust state-tracking needed for complex reasoning. We address these limitations by reframing sequence modelling through a probabilistic lens, using Bayesian filters as a core primitive. While classical filters such as Kalman filters provide principled state estimation and uncertainty tracking, they are typically viewed as inherently sequential. We show that reparameterising the Kalman filter in information form enables its updates to be computed via an associative scan, allowing efficient parallel training. Building on this insight, we introduce the Kalman Linear Attention (KLA) layer, a neural sequence-modelling primitive that performs time-parallel probabilistic inference while maintaining explicit belief-state uncertainty. KLA offers strictly more expressive nonlinear updates and gating than GLA variants while retaining their computational advantages. On language modelling tasks, KLA matches or outperforms modern SSMs and GLAs across representative discrete token-manipulation and state-tracking benchmarks.

Task-oriented dialog (TOD) systems typically manage structured knowledge (e.g. ontologies and databases) to guide the goal-oriented conversations. However, they fall short of handling dialog turns grounded on unstructured knowledge (e.g. reviews and documents). In this paper, we formulate a task of modeling TOD grounded on both structured and unstructured knowledge. To address this task, we propose a TOD system with hybrid knowledge management, HyKnow. It extends the belief state to manage both structured and unstructured knowledge, and is the first end-to-end model that jointly optimizes dialog modeling grounded on these two kinds of knowledge. We conduct experiments on the modified version of MultiWOZ 2.1 dataset, where dialogs are grounded on hybrid knowledge. Experimental results show that HyKnow has strong end-to-end performance compared to existing TOD systems. It also outperforms the pipeline knowledge management schemes, with higher unstructured knowledge retrieval accuracy.

The rapid development of mobile GUI agents has stimulated growing research interest in long-horizon task automation. However, building agents for these tasks faces a critical bottleneck: the reliance on ever-expanding interaction history incurs substantial context overhead. Existing context management and compression techniques often fail to preserve vital semantic information, leading to degraded task performance. We propose AgentProg, a program-guided approach for agent context management that reframes the interaction history as a program with variables and control flow. By organizing information according to the structure of program, this structure provides a principled mechanism to determine which information should be retained and which can be discarded. We further integrate a global belief state mechanism inspired by Belief MDP framework to handle partial observability and adapt to unexpected environmental changes. Experiments on AndroidWorld and our extended long-horizon task suite demonstrate that AgentProg has achieved the state-of-the-art success rates on these benchmarks. More importantly, it maintains robust performance on long-horizon tasks while baseline methods experience catastrophic degradation. Our system is open-sourced at https://github.com/MobileLLM/AgentProg.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive accomplishments in both reasoning and planning, their abilities in multi-agent collaborations remains largely unexplored. This study evaluates LLM-based agents in a multi-agent cooperative text game with Theory of Mind (ToM) inference tasks, comparing their performance with Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) and planning-based baselines. We observed evidence of emergent collaborative behaviors and high-order Theory of Mind capabilities among LLM-based agents. Our results reveal limitations in LLM-based agents' planning optimization due to systematic failures in managing long-horizon contexts and hallucination about the task state. We explore the use of explicit belief state representations to mitigate these issues, finding that it enhances task performance and the accuracy of ToM inferences for LLM-based agents.

Instructions-tuned Large Language Models (LLMs) gained recently huge popularity thanks to their ability to interact with users through conversation. In this work we aim to evaluate their ability to complete multi-turn tasks and interact with external databases in the context of established task-oriented dialogue benchmarks. We show that for explicit belief state tracking, LLMs underperform compared to specialized task-specific models. Nevertheless, they show ability to guide the dialogue to successful ending if given correct slot values. Furthermore this ability improves with access to true belief state distribution or in-domain examples.

Reinforcement learning from verifiable rewards (RLVR) is a promising paradigm for improving large language model (LLM) agents on long-horizon interactive tasks. However, in partially observable environments, incomplete observations cause agent beliefs to drift over time, while delayed rewards obscure the causal impact of intermediate decisions, exacerbating temporal credit assignment challenges. To address this, we propose ReBel (Reward Belief), a process-level reinforcement learning algorithm that explicitly models structured belief states to summarize interaction history and guide subsequent policy learning. ReBel introduces belief-consistency supervision, converting discrepancies between predicted beliefs and observed feedback into dense self-supervised signals without requiring external step-wise annotations or verifiers. It also employs belief-aware grouping to compare trajectories under similar belief states, yielding more robust and lower-variance advantage estimates. We evaluate ReBel on challenging long-horizon benchmarks, including ALFWorld and WebShop. ReBel improves task success by up to 20.4 percentage points over the episode-level baseline GRPO and increases sample efficiency by 2.1times. These results suggest that belief-aware self-supervision is a promising direction for reliable long-horizon decision-making under partial observability. Code is available at: https://github.com/Fateyetian/Rebel.git.

Modern AI agents increasingly combine conversational interaction with autonomous task execution, such as coding and web research, raising a natural question: what happens when an agent engaged in long-horizon tasks is subjected to user persuasion? We study how belief-level intervention can influence downstream task behavior, a phenomenon we name persuasion propagation. We introduce a behavior-centered evaluation framework that distinguishes between persuasion applied during or prior to task execution. Across web research and coding tasks, we find that on-the-fly persuasion induces weak and inconsistent behavioral effects. In contrast, when the belief state is explicitly specified at task time, belief-prefilled agents conduct on average 26.9\% fewer searches and visit 16.9\% fewer unique sources than neutral-prefilled agents. These results suggest that persuasion, even in prior interaction, can affect the agent's behavior, motivating behavior-level evaluation in agentic systems.

In this short report, we introduce joint multi-token prediction (JTP), a lightweight modification of standard next-token prediction designed to enrich hidden state representations by jointly predicting multiple future tokens. Unlike previous multi-token prediction approaches, JTP strategically employs teacher forcing of future-tokens through a carefully designed representation bottleneck, allowing the model to encode rich predictive information with minimal computational overhead during training. We show that the JTP approach achieves a short-horizon belief state representation, while popular alternatives for multi-token prediction fail to do so. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our method on the synthetic star graph navigation task from from Bachmann and Nagarajan [2024], highlighting a significant performance improvement over existing methods. This manuscript presents promising preliminary results intended to stimulate further research.

We introduce RFC Bench, a benchmark for evaluating large language models on financial misinformation under realistic news. RFC Bench operates at the paragraph level and captures the contextual complexity of financial news where meaning emerges from dispersed cues. The benchmark defines two complementary tasks: reference free misinformation detection and comparison based diagnosis using paired original perturbed inputs. Experiments reveal a consistent pattern: performance is substantially stronger when comparative context is available, while reference free settings expose significant weaknesses, including unstable predictions and elevated invalid outputs. These results indicate that current models struggle to maintain coherent belief states without external grounding. By highlighting this gap, RFC Bench provides a structured testbed for studying reference free reasoning and advancing more reliable financial misinformation detection in real world settings.

Theory of Mind (ToM) is central to social cognition and human-AI interaction, and Large Language Models (LLMs) have been used to help understand and represent ToM. However, most evaluations treat ToM as a static judgment at a single moment, primarily relying on tests of false beliefs. This overlooks a key dynamic dimension of ToM: the ability to represent, update, and retrieve others' beliefs over time. We investigate dynamic ToM as a temporally extended representational memory problem, asking whether LLMs can track belief trajectories across interactions rather than only inferring current beliefs. We introduce DToM-Track, an evaluation framework to investigate temporal belief reasoning in controlled multiturn conversations, testing the recall of beliefs held prior to an update, the inference of current beliefs, and the detection of belief change. Using LLMs as computational probes, we find a consistent asymmetry: models reliably infer an agent's current belief but struggle to maintain and retrieve prior belief states once updates occur. This pattern persists across LLM model families and scales, and is consistent with recency bias and interference effects well documented in cognitive science. These results suggest that tracking belief trajectories over time poses a distinct challenge beyond classical false-belief reasoning. By framing ToM as a problem of temporal representation and retrieval, this work connects ToM to core cognitive mechanisms of memory and interference and exposes the implications for LLM models of social reasoning in extended human-AI interactions.

Existing dialog system models require extensive human annotations and are difficult to generalize to different tasks. The recent success of large pre-trained language models such as BERT and GPT-2 (Devlin et al., 2019; Radford et al., 2019) have suggested the effectiveness of incorporating language priors in down-stream NLP tasks. However, how much pre-trained language models can help dialog response generation is still under exploration. In this paper, we propose a simple, general, and effective framework: Alternating Roles Dialog Model (ARDM). ARDM models each speaker separately and takes advantage of the large pre-trained language model. It requires no supervision from human annotations such as belief states or dialog acts to achieve effective conversations. ARDM outperforms or is on par with state-of-the-art methods on two popular task-oriented dialog datasets: CamRest676 and MultiWOZ. Moreover, we can generalize ARDM to more challenging, non-collaborative tasks such as persuasion. In persuasion tasks, ARDM is capable of generating human-like responses to persuade people to donate to a charity.

Temporal action abstractions, along with belief state representations, are a powerful knowledge sharing mechanism for sequential decision making. In this work, we propose a novel view that treats inducing temporal action abstractions as a sequence compression problem. To do so, we bring a subtle but critical component of LLM training pipelines -- input tokenization via byte pair encoding (BPE) -- to the seemingly distant task of learning skills of variable time span in continuous control domains. We introduce an approach called Primitive Sequence Encoding (PRISE) that combines continuous action quantization with BPE to learn powerful action abstractions. We empirically show that high-level skills discovered by PRISE from a multitask set of robotic manipulation demonstrations significantly boost the performance of both multitask imitation learning as well as few-shot imitation learning on unseen tasks. Our code will be released at https://github.com/FrankZheng2022/PRISE.

Transformers replace recurrence with a memory that grows with sequence length and self-attention that enables ad-hoc look ups over past tokens. Consequently, they lack an inherent incentive to compress history into compact latent states with consistent transition rules. This often leads to learning solutions that generalize poorly. We introduce Next-Latent Prediction (NextLat), which extends standard next-token training with self-supervised predictions in the latent space. Specifically, NextLat trains a transformer to learn latent representations that are predictive of its next latent state given the next output token. Theoretically, we show that these latents provably converge to belief states, compressed information of the history necessary to predict the future. This simple auxiliary objective also injects a recurrent inductive bias into transformers, while leaving their architecture, parallel training, and inference unchanged. NextLat effectively encourages the transformer to form compact internal world models with its own belief states and transition dynamics -- a crucial property absent in standard next-token prediction transformers. Empirically, across benchmarks targeting core sequence modeling competencies -- world modeling, reasoning, planning, and language modeling -- NextLat demonstrates significant gains over standard next-token training in downstream accuracy, representation compression, and lookahead planning. NextLat stands as a simple and efficient paradigm for shaping transformer representations toward stronger generalization.

Active inference offers a first principle account of sentient behaviour, from which special and important cases can be derived, e.g., reinforcement learning, active learning, Bayes optimal inference, Bayes optimal design, etc. Active inference resolves the exploitation-exploration dilemma in relation to prior preferences, by placing information gain on the same footing as reward or value. In brief, active inference replaces value functions with functionals of (Bayesian) beliefs, in the form of an expected (variational) free energy. In this paper, we consider a sophisticated kind of active inference, using a recursive form of expected free energy. Sophistication describes the degree to which an agent has beliefs about beliefs. We consider agents with beliefs about the counterfactual consequences of action for states of affairs and beliefs about those latent states. In other words, we move from simply considering beliefs about 'what would happen if I did that' to 'what would I believe about what would happen if I did that'. The recursive form of the free energy functional effectively implements a deep tree search over actions and outcomes in the future. Crucially, this search is over sequences of belief states, as opposed to states per se. We illustrate the competence of this scheme, using numerical simulations of deep decision problems.

Even though machine learning has become the major scene in dialogue research community, the real breakthrough has been blocked by the scale of data available. To address this fundamental obstacle, we introduce the Multi-Domain Wizard-of-Oz dataset (MultiWOZ), a fully-labeled collection of human-human written conversations spanning over multiple domains and topics. At a size of 10k dialogues, it is at least one order of magnitude larger than all previous annotated task-oriented corpora. The contribution of this work apart from the open-sourced dataset labelled with dialogue belief states and dialogue actions is two-fold: firstly, a detailed description of the data collection procedure along with a summary of data structure and analysis is provided. The proposed data-collection pipeline is entirely based on crowd-sourcing without the need of hiring professional annotators; secondly, a set of benchmark results of belief tracking, dialogue act and response generation is reported, which shows the usability of the data and sets a baseline for future studies.

Agentic reasoning enables large reasoning models (LRMs) to dynamically acquire external knowledge, but yet optimizing the retrieval process remains challenging due to the lack of dense, principled reward signals. In this paper, we introduce InfoReasoner, a unified framework that incentivizes effective information seeking via a synthetic semantic information gain reward. Theoretically, we redefine information gain as uncertainty reduction over the model's belief states, establishing guarantees, including non-negativity, telescoping additivity, and channel monotonicity. Practically, to enable scalable optimization without manual retrieval annotations, we propose an output-aware intrinsic estimator that computes information gain directly from the model's output distributions using semantic clustering via bidirectional textual entailment. This intrinsic reward guides the policy to maximize epistemic progress, enabling efficient training via Group Relative Policy Optimxization (GRPO). Experiments across seven question-answering benchmarks demonstrate that InfoReasoner consistently outperforms strong retrieval-augmented baselines, achieving up to 5.4% average accuracy improvement. Our work provides a theoretically grounded and scalable path toward agentic reasoning with retrieval.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents are deployed in complex environments -- such as massive codebases, enterprise databases, and conversational histories -- where the relevant state far exceeds their context windows. To navigate these spaces, an agent must iteratively explore the environment to find relevant information. However, without explicit infrastructure, an agent's working memory can degrade into lossy representations of the search state, resulting in redundant work (e.g. repetitive looping) and premature stopping. In this work, we formalize this challenge as the Context Gathering Decision Process (CGDP), a specialized Partially Observable Markov Decision Process, where an agent's objective is to adaptively refine its belief state to isolate the necessary information for a task. We model an LLM's behavior as approximate Thompson Sampling within this CGDP, and introduce a predicate-based method that decomposes an LLM's implicit search into explicit and modular operations. We then derive two plug-and-play interventions for iterative LLM agents: a persistent, predicate-based belief state that bounds context while preserving multi-hop reasoning, and a programmatic exhaustion gate that halts unproductive search without premature stopping. Across four methods and three question-answering domains, we empirically validate that replacing an LLM's implicit state with our CGDP-motivated belief state improves multi-hop reasoning by up to 11.4%; while the modular programmatic exhaustion detection saves up to 39% of tokens without any degradation in agent performance. Ultimately, we argue that framing the LLM agent loop as a CGDP can guide the design of modular, non-interfering improvements to agentic search harnesses.

While datasets for video understanding have scaled to hour-long durations, they typically consist of densely concatenated clips that differ from natural, unscripted daily life. To bridge this gap, we introduce MM-Lifelong, a dataset designed for Multimodal Lifelong Understanding. Comprising 181.1 hours of footage, it is structured across Day, Week, and Month scales to capture varying temporal densities. Extensive evaluations reveal two critical failure modes in current paradigms: end-to-end MLLMs suffer from a Working Memory Bottleneck due to context saturation, while representative agentic baselines experience Global Localization Collapse when navigating sparse, month-long timelines. To address this, we propose the Recursive Multimodal Agent (ReMA), which employs dynamic memory management to iteratively update a recursive belief state, significantly outperforming existing methods. Finally, we establish dataset splits designed to isolate temporal and domain biases, providing a rigorous foundation for future research in supervised learning and out-of-distribution generalization.

Today's autonomous agents, largely driven by foundation models (FMs), can understand natural language instructions and solve long-horizon tasks with human-like reasoning. However, current human-robot interaction largely follows a one-way master-apprentice technique where the agent passively executes commands without reciprocal learning. This neglects the co-adaptive, multi-turn nature of everyday human interactions. We introduce symbiotic interactive learning (SIL), a bidirectional co-adaptation framework in a shared latent task space, where human and agent maintain joint belief states that evolve with interaction history. This enables proactive clarification, adaptive suggestions, and shared plan refinement. SIL leverages FMs for spatial perception and reasoning, together with a triplet-loss-trained neural encoder that grounds FMs' outputs into task-specific latent representations. To support long-term stability as tasks evolve, SIL uses episodic and semantic memory architectures, regularised via elastic weight consolidation to mitigate catastrophic forgetting. We evaluate SIL on simulated and real-world embodied tasks, including instruction following, information retrieval, query-oriented reasoning, and interactive dialogue, achieving a 90.4% task completion rate and a belief alignment score of ρapprox 0.83, an absolute improvement of about 20 percentage points over the best ablations. Demos and resources: https://linusnep.github.io/SIL/.

Common evaluation paradigms for language models focus on scoring single responses through accuracy metrics or proper scoring rules, failing to capture the full richness of a model's belief state. Recent work illustrates that language models hallucinate in-part because they are optimised to be good test-takers under binary scoring schemes that reward any answer over abstention. While this insight naturally leads to penalty-based approaches, they ignore crucial distinctions in how models distribute uncertainty, for example between hedging toward incorrect answers versus hedging toward "I don't know" responses. A novel evaluation metric, the Distributional Correctness Score (DCS), is introduced to solve this problem, i.e., of not considering a model's entire probability distribution over answer choices. DCS naturally distinguishes between harmful overconfidence in wrong answers and uncertainty expressed through abstention, providing scores in an interpretable default range. Through theoretical analysis and illustrative examples, DCS is demonstrated to offer a more nuanced and aligned evaluation paradigm that incentivises models to express genuine uncertainty rather than guessing. Adapting 12 existing evaluation benchmarks to DCS's variants and measuring performance on six language models reveals that for half of the tested benchmarks scores are negative across all tested models, indicating significant tendencies towards hallucination.

We present a very simple algorithm for attention that requires O(1) memory with respect to sequence length and an extension to self-attention that requires O(log n) memory. This is in contrast with the frequently stated belief that self-attention requires O(n^2) memory. While the time complexity is still O(n^2), device memory rather than compute capability is often the limiting factor on modern accelerators. Thus, reducing the memory requirements of attention allows processing of longer sequences than might otherwise be feasible. We provide a practical implementation for accelerators that requires O(n) memory, is numerically stable, and is within a few percent of the runtime of the standard implementation of attention. We also demonstrate how to differentiate the function while remaining memory-efficient. For sequence length 16384, the memory overhead of self-attention is reduced by 59X for inference and by 32X for differentiation.

Language model (LM) assistants are increasingly used in applications such as brainstorming and research. Improvements in memory and context size have allowed these models to become more autonomous, which has also resulted in more text accumulation in their context windows without explicit user intervention. This comes with a latent risk: the belief profiles of models -- their understanding of the world as manifested in their responses or actions -- may silently change as context accumulates. This can lead to subtly inconsistent user experiences, or shifts in behavior that deviate from the original alignment of the models. In this paper, we explore how accumulating context by engaging in interactions and processing text -- talking and reading -- can change the beliefs of language models, as manifested in their responses and behaviors. Our results reveal that models' belief profiles are highly malleable: GPT-5 exhibits a 54.7% shift in its stated beliefs after 10 rounds of discussion about moral dilemmas and queries about safety, while Grok 4 shows a 27.2% shift on political issues after reading texts from the opposing position. We also examine models' behavioral changes by designing tasks that require tool use, where each tool selection corresponds to an implicit belief. We find that these changes align with stated belief shifts, suggesting that belief shifts will be reflected in actual behavior in agentic systems. Our analysis exposes the hidden risk of belief shift as models undergo extended sessions of talking or reading, rendering their opinions and actions unreliable.

Neural task-oriented dialogue systems often struggle to smoothly interface with a knowledge base. In this work, we seek to address this problem by proposing a new neural dialogue agent that is able to effectively sustain grounded, multi-domain discourse through a novel key-value retrieval mechanism. The model is end-to-end differentiable and does not need to explicitly model dialogue state or belief trackers. We also release a new dataset of 3,031 dialogues that are grounded through underlying knowledge bases and span three distinct tasks in the in-car personal assistant space: calendar scheduling, weather information retrieval, and point-of-interest navigation. Our architecture is simultaneously trained on data from all domains and significantly outperforms a competitive rule-based system and other existing neural dialogue architectures on the provided domains according to both automatic and human evaluation metrics.

Humans talk in free-form while negotiating the expressed meanings or common ground. Despite the impressive conversational abilities of the large generative language models, they do not consider the individual differences in contextual understanding in a shared situated environment. In this work, we propose MindDial, a novel conversational framework that can generate situated free-form responses to negotiate common ground. We design an explicit mind module that can track three-level beliefs -- the speaker's belief, the speaker's prediction of the listener's belief, and the common belief based on the gap between the first two. Then the speaking act classification head will decide to continue to talk, end this turn, or take task-related action. We augment a common ground alignment dataset MutualFriend with belief dynamics annotation, of which the goal is to find a single mutual friend based on the free chat between two agents. Experiments show that our model with mental state modeling can resemble human responses when aligning common ground meanwhile mimic the natural human conversation flow. The ablation study further validates the third-level common belief can aggregate information of the first and second-order beliefs and align common ground more efficiently.

Traditional neural network models for intent inference rely heavily on observable states and struggle to generalize across diverse tasks and dynamic environments. Recent advances in Vision Language Models (VLMs) and Vision Language Action (VLA) models introduce common-sense reasoning through large-scale multimodal pretraining, enabling zero-shot performance across tasks. However, these models still lack explicit mechanisms to represent and update belief, limiting their ability to reason like humans or capture the evolving human intent over long-horizon. To address this, we propose a belief-aware VLM framework that integrates retrieval-based memory and reinforcement learning. Instead of learning an explicit belief model, we approximate belief using a vector-based memory that retrieves relevant multimodal context, which is incorporated into the VLM for reasoning. We further refine decision-making using a reinforcement learning policy over the VLM latent space. We evaluate our approach on publicly available VQA datasets such as HD-EPIC and demonstrate consistent improvements over zero-shot baselines, highlighting the importance of belief-aware reasoning.

We present BIS Reasoning 1.0, the first large-scale Japanese dataset of syllogistic reasoning problems explicitly designed to evaluate belief-inconsistent reasoning in large language models (LLMs). Unlike prior datasets such as NeuBAROCO and JFLD, which focus on general or belief-aligned reasoning, BIS Reasoning 1.0 introduces logically valid yet belief-inconsistent syllogisms to uncover reasoning biases in LLMs trained on human-aligned corpora. We benchmark state-of-the-art models - including GPT models, Claude models, and leading Japanese LLMs - revealing significant variance in performance, with GPT-4o achieving 79.54% accuracy. Our analysis identifies critical weaknesses in current LLMs when handling logically valid but belief-conflicting inputs. These findings have important implications for deploying LLMs in high-stakes domains such as law, healthcare, and scientific literature, where truth must override intuitive belief to ensure integrity and safety.

Multi-agent systems utilizing large language models often assign authoritative roles to improve performance, yet the impact of authority bias on agent interactions remains underexplored. We present the first systematic analysis of role-based authority bias in free-form multi-agent evaluation using ChatEval. Applying French and Raven's power-based theory, we classify authoritative roles into legitimate, referent, and expert types and analyze their influence across 12-turn conversations. Experiments with GPT-4o and DeepSeek R1 reveal that Expert and Referent power roles exert stronger influence than Legitimate power roles. Crucially, authority bias emerges not through active conformity by general agents, but through authoritative roles consistently maintaining their positions while general agents demonstrate flexibility. Furthermore, authority influence requires clear position statements, as neutral responses fail to generate bias. These findings provide key insights for designing multi-agent frameworks with asymmetric interaction patterns.

Active reasoning requires large language model (LLM) agents to interact with external sources and strategically gather information to solve problems in multiple turns. Central to this process is belief tracking: maintaining an accurate representation of the underlying state and uncertainty in understanding and solving the problem. However, due to limited reasoning capabilities, LLM-based agents often suffer belief deviation: their internal beliefs drift from the true problem state, leading to loss of state awareness and uninformative or repetitive actions. Once this happens, errors compound in the trajectories used for reinforcement learning (RL), leading to misattributed credits and limited exploration. To address this issue, we propose to track belief deviation and develop T^3, a simple yet principled method that detects excessive deviation and truncates training trajectories to suppress uninformative tail effects. Hence, T^3 preserves credits for informative prefixes and systematically improves policy optimization. Across 5 challenging tasks, T^3 consistently enhances training stability and yields performance gains of up to 30 points while cutting token cost by up to 34%. These results highlight belief control as a key principle for building robust LLM agents capable of active reasoning.

Large language models (LLMs) continually evolve through pre-training on ever-expanding web data, but this adaptive process also exposes them to subtle forms of misinformation. While prior work has explored data poisoning during static pre-training, the effects of such manipulations under continual pre-training remain largely unexplored. Drawing inspiration from the illusory truth effect in human cognition - where repeated exposure to falsehoods increases belief in their accuracy - we ask whether LLMs exhibit a similar vulnerability. We investigate whether repeated exposure to false but confidently stated facts can shift a model's internal representation away from the truth. We introduce Layer of Truth, a framework and dataset for probing belief dynamics in continually trained LLMs. By injecting controlled amounts of poisoned data and probing intermediate representations across checkpoints, model scales, and question types, we quantify when and how factual beliefs shift. Our findings reveal that even minimal exposure can induce persistent representational drift in well-established facts, with susceptibility varying across layers and model sizes. These results highlight an overlooked vulnerability of continually updated LLMs: their capacity to internalize misinformation analogously to humans, underscoring the need for robust monitoring of factual integrity during model updates.

Multimodal AI models are increasingly used in fields like healthcare, finance, and autonomous driving, where information is drawn from multiple sources or modalities such as images, texts, audios, videos. However, effectively managing uncertainty - arising from noise, insufficient evidence, or conflicts between modalities - is crucial for reliable decision-making. Current uncertainty-aware machine learning methods leveraging, for example, evidence averaging, or evidence accumulation underestimate uncertainties in high-conflict scenarios. Moreover, the state-of-the-art evidence averaging strategy is not order invariant and fails to scale to multiple modalities. To address these challenges, we propose a novel multimodal learning method with order-invariant evidence fusion and introduce a conflict-based discounting mechanism that reallocates uncertain mass when unreliable modalities are detected. We provide both theoretical analysis and experimental validation, demonstrating that unlike the previous work, the proposed approach effectively distinguishes between conflicting and non-conflicting samples based on the provided uncertainty estimates, and outperforms the previous models in uncertainty-based conflict detection.

While there are numerous benchmarks comparing the performance of modern language models (LMs), end-task evaluations often conflate notions of *factual accuracy* ("truth") and *reasoning ability* ("rationality", or "honesty" in the sense of correctly reporting implications of beliefs). Our goal is a dataset that clearly distinguishes these two notions. Our approach is to leverage and extend a collection of human-annotated *entailment trees*, engineered to express both good and bad chains of reasoning, and using a mixture of true and false facts, in particular including counterfactual examples, to avoid belief bias (also known as the "content effect"). The resulting dataset, called BaRDa, contains 3000 entailments (1787 valid, 1213 invalid), using 6681 true and 2319 false statements. Testing on four GPT-series models, GPT3(curie)/GPT3(davinici)/3.5/4, we find factual accuracy (truth) scores of 74.1/80.6/82.6/87.1 and reasoning accuracy scores of 63.1/78.0/71.8/79.2. This shows the clear progression of models towards improved factual accuracy and entailment reasoning, and the dataset provides a new benchmark that more cleanly separates and quantifies these two notions.

As LLMs are increasingly studied as role-playing agents to generate synthetic data for human behavioral research, ensuring that their outputs remain coherent with their assigned roles has become a critical concern. In this paper, we investigate how consistently LLM-based role-playing agents' stated beliefs about the behavior of the people they are asked to role-play ("what they say") correspond to their actual behavior during role-play ("how they act"). Specifically, we establish an evaluation framework to rigorously measure how well beliefs obtained by prompting the model can predict simulation outcomes in advance. Using an augmented version of the GenAgents persona bank and the Trust Game (a standard economic game used to quantify players' trust and reciprocity), we introduce a belief-behavior consistency metric to systematically investigate how it is affected by factors such as: (1) the types of beliefs we elicit from LLMs, like expected outcomes of simulations versus task-relevant attributes of individual characters LLMs are asked to simulate; (2) when and how we present LLMs with relevant information about Trust Game; and (3) how far into the future we ask the model to forecast its actions. We also explore how feasible it is to impose a researcher's own theoretical priors in the event that the originally elicited beliefs are misaligned with research objectives. Our results reveal systematic inconsistencies between LLMs' stated (or imposed) beliefs and the outcomes of their role-playing simulation, at both an individual- and population-level. Specifically, we find that, even when models appear to encode plausible beliefs, they may fail to apply them in a consistent way. These findings highlight the need to identify how and when LLMs' stated beliefs align with their simulated behavior, allowing researchers to use LLM-based agents appropriately in behavioral studies.

Loopy Belief Propagation (LBP) is a widely used approximate inference algorithm in probabilistic graphical models, with applications in computer vision, error correction codes, protein folding, program analysis, etc. However, LBP faces significant computational challenges when applied to large-scale program analysis. While GPU (Graphics Processing Unit) parallel computing provides a promising solution, existing approaches lack support for flexible update strategies and have yet to integrate logical constraints with GPU acceleration, leading to suboptimal practical performance. This paper presents a GPU-accelerated LBP algorithm for program analysis. To support the diverse update strategies required by users, we propose a unified representation for specifying arbitrary user-defined update strategies, along with a dependency analysis algorithm. Furthermore, building on previous work that leverages the local structure of Horn clauses to simplify message passing, we group messages to minimize warp divergence and better utilize GPU resources. Experimental results on datarace analysis over eight real-world Java programs show that our approach achieves an average speedup of 2.14times over the state-of-the-art sequential approach and 5.56times over the state-of-the-art GPU-based approach, while maintaining high accuracy.

Existing Theory of Mind (ToM) benchmarks diverge from real-world scenarios in three aspects: 1) they assess a limited range of mental states such as beliefs, 2) false beliefs are not comprehensively explored, and 3) the diverse personality traits of characters are overlooked. To address these challenges, we introduce ToMATO, a new ToM benchmark formulated as multiple-choice QA over conversations. ToMATO is generated via LLM-LLM conversations featuring information asymmetry. By employing a prompting method that requires role-playing LLMs to verbalize their thoughts before each utterance, we capture both first- and second-order mental states across five categories: belief, intention, desire, emotion, and knowledge. These verbalized thoughts serve as answers to questions designed to assess the mental states of characters within conversations. Furthermore, the information asymmetry introduced by hiding thoughts from others induces the generation of false beliefs about various mental states. Assigning distinct personality traits to LLMs further diversifies both utterances and thoughts. ToMATO consists of 5.4k questions, 753 conversations, and 15 personality trait patterns. Our analysis shows that this dataset construction approach frequently generates false beliefs due to the information asymmetry between role-playing LLMs, and effectively reflects diverse personalities. We evaluate nine LLMs on ToMATO and find that even GPT-4o mini lags behind human performance, especially in understanding false beliefs, and lacks robustness to various personality traits.

Theory-of-Mind (ToM), the ability to infer others' perceptions and mental states, is fundamental to human interaction but remains a challenging task for Large Language Models (LLMs). While existing ToM reasoning methods show promise with reasoning via perceptual perspective-taking, they often rely excessively on LLMs, reducing their efficiency and limiting their applicability to high-order ToM reasoning, which requires multi-hop reasoning about characters' beliefs. To address these issues, we present EnigmaToM, a novel neuro-symbolic framework that enhances ToM reasoning by integrating a Neural Knowledge Base of entity states (Enigma) for (1) a psychology-inspired iterative masking mechanism that facilitates accurate perspective-taking and (2) knowledge injection that elicits key entity information. Enigma generates structured representations of entity states, which construct spatial scene graphs -- leveraging spatial information as an inductive bias -- for belief tracking of various ToM orders and enhancing events with fine-grained entity state details. Experimental results on multiple benchmarks, including ToMi, HiToM, and FANToM, show that EnigmaToM significantly improves ToM reasoning across LLMs of varying sizes, particularly excelling in high-order reasoning scenarios.

As large language models (LLMs) become the engine behind conversational systems, their ability to reason about the intentions and states of their dialogue partners (i.e., form and use a theory-of-mind, or ToM) becomes increasingly critical for safe interaction with potentially adversarial partners. We propose a novel privacy-themed ToM challenge, ToM for Steering Beliefs (ToM-SB), in which a defender must act as a Double Agent to steer the beliefs of an attacker with partial prior knowledge within a shared universe. To succeed on ToM-SB, the defender must engage with and form a ToM of the attacker, with a goal of fooling the attacker into believing they have succeeded in extracting sensitive information. We find that strong frontier models like Gemini3-Pro and GPT-5.4 struggle on ToM-SB, often failing to fool attackers in hard scenarios with partial attacker prior knowledge, even when prompted to reason about the attacker's beliefs (ToM prompting). To close this gap, we train models on ToM-SB to act as AI Double Agents using reinforcement learning, testing both fooling and ToM rewards. Notably, we find a bidirectionally emergent relationship between ToM and attacker-fooling: rewarding fooling success alone improves ToM, and rewarding ToM alone improves fooling. Across four attackers with different strengths, six defender methods, and both in-distribution and out-of-distribution (OOD) evaluation, we find that gains in ToM and attacker-fooling are well-correlated, highlighting belief modeling as a key driver of success on ToM-SB. AI Double Agents that combine both ToM and fooling rewards yield the strongest fooling and ToM performance, outperforming Gemini3-Pro and GPT-5.4 with ToM prompting on hard scenarios. We also show that ToM-SB and AI Double Agents can be extended to stronger attackers, demonstrating generalization to OOD settings and the upgradability of our task.

LLM agents excel when environments are mostly static and the needed information fits in a model's context window, but they often fail in open-ended investigations where explanations must be constructed by iteratively mining evidence from massive, heterogeneous operational data. These investigations exhibit hidden dependency structure: entities interact, signals co-vary, and the importance of a fact may only become clear after other evidence is discovered. Because the context window is bounded, agents must summarize intermediate findings before their significance is known, increasing the risk of discarding key evidence. ReAct-style agents are especially brittle in this regime. Their retrieve-summarize-reason loop makes conclusions sensitive to exploration order and introduces run-to-run non-determinism, producing a reliability gap where Pass-at-k may be high but Majority-at-k remains low. Simply sampling more rollouts or generating longer reasoning traces does not reliably stabilize results, since hypotheses cannot be autonomously checked as new evidence arrives and there is no explicit mechanism for belief bookkeeping and revision. In addition, ReAct entangles semantic reasoning with controller duties such as tool orchestration and state tracking, so execution errors and plan drift degrade reasoning while consuming scarce context. We address these issues by formulating investigation as abductive reasoning over a dependency graph and proposing EoG (Explanations over Graphs), a disaggregated framework in which an LLM performs bounded local evidence mining and labeling (cause vs symptom) while a deterministic controller manages traversal, state, and belief propagation to compute a minimal explanatory frontier. On a representative ITBench diagnostics task, EoG improves both accuracy and run-to-run consistency over ReAct baselines, including a 7x average gain in Majority-at-k entity F1.

One of the key challenges in deploying RL to real-world applications is to adapt to variations of unknown environment contexts, such as changing terrains in robotic tasks and fluctuated bandwidth in congestion control. Existing works on adaptation to unknown environment contexts either assume the contexts are the same for the whole episode or assume the context variables are Markovian. However, in many real-world applications, the environment context usually stays stable for a stochastic period and then changes in an abrupt and unpredictable manner within an episode, resulting in a segment structure, which existing works fail to address. To leverage the segment structure of piecewise stable context in real-world applications, in this paper, we propose a \textbf{Segmented Context Belief Augmented Deep~(SeCBAD)} RL method. Our method can jointly infer the belief distribution over latent context with the posterior over segment length and perform more accurate belief context inference with observed data within the current context segment. The inferred belief context can be leveraged to augment the state, leading to a policy that can adapt to abrupt variations in context. We demonstrate empirically that SeCBAD can infer context segment length accurately and outperform existing methods on a toy grid world environment and Mujuco tasks with piecewise-stable context.

User preferences evolve across months of interaction, and tracking them requires inferring when a stated preference has been changed by a subsequent life event. We define this problem as long-horizon personalization and observe that progress on it is limited by data availability and measurement, with no existing resource providing both naturalistic long-horizon interactions and the ground-truth provenance needed to diagnose why models fail. We introduce a data generator that produces conversations from a structured mental state graph, yielding ground-truth provenance for every preference change across 6-month timelines, and from it construct HorizonBench, a benchmark of 4,245 items from 360 simulated users with 6-month conversation histories averaging ~4,300 turns and ~163K tokens. HorizonBench provides a testbed for long-context modeling, memory-augmented architectures, theory-of-mind reasoning, and user modeling. Across 25 frontier models, the best model reaches 52.8% and most score at or below the 20% chance baseline. When these models err on evolved preferences, over a third of the time they select the user's originally stated value without tracking the updated user state. This belief-update failure persists across context lengths and expression explicitness levels, identifying state-tracking capability as the primary bottleneck for long-horizon personalization.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents are increasingly expected to maintain coherent, long-term personalized memory, yet current benchmarks primarily measure static fact retrieval, overlooking the ability to revise stored beliefs when new evidence emerges. We identify a critical and underexplored failure mode, Implicit Conflict: a later observation invalidates an earlier memory without explicit negation, requiring contextual inference and commonsense reasoning to detect. To rigorously evaluate this capability, we introduce STALE, a benchmark of 400 expert-validated conflict scenarios (1,200 evaluation queries across three probing dimensions) spanning over 100 everyday topics with contexts up to 150K tokens. We propose a three-dimensional probing framework that tests State Resolution (detecting that a prior belief is outdated), Premise Resistance (rejecting queries that falsely presuppose a stale state), and Implicit Policy Adaptation (proactively applying updated states in downstream behavior). A systematic evaluation of frontier LLMs and specialized memory frameworks reveals a pervasive gap between retrieving updated evidence and acting on it, with even the best evaluated model achieving only 55.2% overall accuracy. Models often accept outdated assumptions embedded in a user's query, and they struggle to recognize when a change in one aspect of the user's state should invalidate related memories. To establish an initial baseline for state-aware memory, we further present CUPMem, a prototype that strengthens write-time revision through structured state consolidation and propagation-aware search, suggesting that explicit state adjudication is a promising direction for robust agentic memory.

While humans naturally develop theory of mind (ToM), the capability to understand other people's mental states and beliefs, state-of-the-art large language models (LLMs) underperform on simple ToM benchmarks. We posit that we can extend our understanding of LLMs' ToM abilities by evaluating key human ToM precursors -- perception inference and perception-to-belief inference -- in LLMs. We introduce two datasets, Percept-ToMi and Percept-FANToM, to evaluate these precursory inferences for ToM in LLMs by annotating characters' perceptions on ToMi and FANToM, respectively. Our evaluation of eight state-of-the-art LLMs reveals that the models generally perform well in perception inference while exhibiting limited capability in perception-to-belief inference (e.g., lack of inhibitory control). Based on these results, we present PercepToM, a novel ToM method leveraging LLMs' strong perception inference capability while supplementing their limited perception-to-belief inference. Experimental results demonstrate that PercepToM significantly enhances LLM's performance, especially in false belief scenarios.

Multiple types of inference are available for probabilistic graphical models, e.g., marginal, maximum-a-posteriori, and even marginal maximum-a-posteriori. Which one do researchers mean when they talk about ``planning as inference''? There is no consistency in the literature, different types are used, and their ability to do planning is further entangled with specific approximations or additional constraints. In this work we use the variational framework to show that, just like all commonly used types of inference correspond to different weightings of the entropy terms in the variational problem, planning corresponds exactly to a different set of weights. This means that all the tricks of variational inference are readily applicable to planning. We develop an analogue of loopy belief propagation that allows us to perform approximate planning in factored-state Markov decisions processes without incurring intractability due to the exponentially large state space. The variational perspective shows that the previous types of inference for planning are only adequate in environments with low stochasticity, and allows us to characterize each type by its own merits, disentangling the type of inference from the additional approximations that its practical use requires. We validate these results empirically on synthetic MDPs and tasks posed in the International Planning Competition.

An established way to improve the transferability of black-box evasion attacks is to craft the adversarial examples on an ensemble-based surrogate to increase diversity. We argue that transferability is fundamentally related to uncertainty. Based on a state-of-the-art Bayesian Deep Learning technique, we propose a new method to efficiently build a surrogate by sampling approximately from the posterior distribution of neural network weights, which represents the belief about the value of each parameter. Our extensive experiments on ImageNet, CIFAR-10 and MNIST show that our approach improves the success rates of four state-of-the-art attacks significantly (up to 83.2 percentage points), in both intra-architecture and inter-architecture transferability. On ImageNet, our approach can reach 94% of success rate while reducing training computations from 11.6 to 2.4 exaflops, compared to an ensemble of independently trained DNNs. Our vanilla surrogate achieves 87.5% of the time higher transferability than three test-time techniques designed for this purpose. Our work demonstrates that the way to train a surrogate has been overlooked, although it is an important element of transfer-based attacks. We are, therefore, the first to review the effectiveness of several training methods in increasing transferability. We provide new directions to better understand the transferability phenomenon and offer a simple but strong baseline for future work.

Can large multimodal models have a human-like ability for emotional and social reasoning, and if so, how does it work? Recent research has discovered emergent theory-of-mind (ToM) reasoning capabilities in large language models (LLMs). LLMs can reason about people's mental states by solving various text-based ToM tasks that ask questions about the actors' ToM (e.g., human belief, desire, intention). However, human reasoning in the wild is often grounded in dynamic scenes across time. Thus, we consider videos a new medium for examining spatio-temporal ToM reasoning ability. Specifically, we ask explicit probing questions about videos with abundant social and emotional reasoning content. We develop a pipeline for multimodal LLM for ToM reasoning using video and text. We also enable explicit ToM reasoning by retrieving key frames for answering a ToM question, which reveals how multimodal LLMs reason about ToM.

Large Language models are revolutionizing the conversational recommender systems through their impressive capabilities in instruction comprehension, reasoning, and human interaction. A core factor underlying effective recommendation dialogue is the ability to infer and reason about users' mental states (such as desire, intention, and belief), a cognitive capacity commonly referred to as Theory of Mind. Despite growing interest in evaluating ToM in LLMs, current benchmarks predominantly rely on synthetic narratives inspired by Sally-Anne test, which emphasize physical perception and fail to capture the complexity of mental state inference in realistic conversational settings. Moreover, existing benchmarks often overlook a critical component of human ToM: behavioral prediction, the ability to use inferred mental states to guide strategic decision-making and select appropriate conversational actions for future interactions. To better align LLM-based ToM evaluation with human-like social reasoning, we propose RecToM, a novel benchmark for evaluating ToM abilities in recommendation dialogues. RecToM focuses on two complementary dimensions: Cognitive Inference and Behavioral Prediction. The former focus on understanding what has been communicated by inferring the underlying mental states. The latter emphasizes what should be done next, evaluating whether LLMs can leverage these inferred mental states to predict, select, and assess appropriate dialogue strategies. Extensive experiments on state-of-the-art LLMs demonstrate that RecToM poses a significant challenge. While the models exhibit partial competence in recognizing mental states, they struggle to maintain coherent, strategic ToM reasoning throughout dynamic recommendation dialogues, particularly in tracking evolving intentions and aligning conversational strategies with inferred mental states.

Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models have shown remarkable progress in embodied tasks recently, but most methods process visual observations independently at each timestep. This history-agnostic design treats robot manipulation as a Markov Decision Process, even though real-world robotic control is inherently partially observable and requires reasoning over past interactions. To address this mismatch, we reformulate VLA policy learning from a Partially Observable Markov Decision Process perspective and propose AVA-VLA, a framework that conditions action generation on a recurrent state that serves as a neural approximation to the agent's belief over task history. Built on this recurrent state, we introduce Active Visual Attention (AVA), which dynamically reweights visual tokens in the current observation to focus on regions most relevant given both the instruction and execution history. Extensive experiments show that AVA-VLA achieves state-of-the-art performance on standard robotic benchmarks, including LIBERO and CALVIN, and transfers effectively to real-world dual-arm manipulation tasks. These results demonstrate the effectiveness of temporally grounded active visual processing for improving VLA performance in robotic sequential decision-making. The project page is available at https://liauto-dsr.github.io/AVA-VLA-Page.

"Read the room" is a significant social reasoning capability in human daily life. Humans can infer others' mental states from subtle social cues. Previous social reasoning tasks and datasets lack complexity (e.g., simple scenes, basic interactions, incomplete mental state variables, single-step reasoning, etc.) and fall far short of the challenges present in real-life social interactions. In this paper, we contribute a valuable, high-quality, and comprehensive video dataset named R^3-VQA with precise and fine-grained annotations of social events and mental states (i.e., belief, intent, desire, and emotion) as well as corresponding social causal chains in complex social scenarios. Moreover, we include human-annotated and model-generated QAs. Our task R^3-VQA includes three aspects: Social Event Understanding, Mental State Estimation, and Social Causal Reasoning. As a benchmark, we comprehensively evaluate the social reasoning capabilities and consistencies of current state-of-the-art large vision-language models (LVLMs). Comprehensive experiments show that (i) LVLMs are still far from human-level consistent social reasoning in complex social scenarios; (ii) Theory of Mind (ToM) prompting can help LVLMs perform better on social reasoning tasks. We provide some of our dataset and codes in supplementary material and will release our full dataset and codes upon acceptance.

We study quantum corrections in the gravitational path integral around nearly 1/16-BPS black holes in asymptotically AdS_5 times S^5 space, dual to heavy states in 4D N=4 super Yang-Mills. The analysis provides a gravitational explanation of why 1/16-BPS black holes exhibit an exact degeneracy at large N and why all such states have the same charges, confirming the belief that the superconformal index precisely counts the entropy of extremal black holes. We show the presence of a gap of order N^{-2} between the 1/16-BPS black holes and the lightest near-BPS black holes within the same charge sector. This is the first example of such a gap for black holes states within the context of AdS_5 holography. We also derive the spectrum of near-BPS states that lie above this gap. Our computation relies on finding the correct version of the N=2 super-Schwarzian theory which captures the breaking of the SU(1, 1|1) symmetry when the black hole has finite temperature and non-zero chemical potential. Finally, we comment on possible stringy and non-perturbative corrections that can affect the black hole spectrum.

Large language models lack persistent, structured memory for long-term interaction and context-sensitive retrieval. Expanding context windows does not solve this: recent evidence shows that context length alone degrades reasoning by up to 85% - even with perfect retrieval. We propose a bio-inspired memory framework grounded in complementary learning systems theory, cognitive behavioral therapy's belief hierarchy, dual-process cognition, and fuzzy-trace theory, organized around three principles: (1) Memory has valence, not just content - pre-computed emotional-associative summaries (valence vectors) organized in an emergent belief hierarchy inspired by Beck's cognitive model enable instant orientation before deliberation; (2) Retrieval defaults to System 1 with System 2 escalation - automatic spreading activation and passive priming as default, with deliberate retrieval only when needed, and graded epistemic states that address hallucination structurally; and (3) Encoding is active, present, and feedback-dependent - a thalamic gateway tags and routes information between stores, while the executive forms gists through curiosity-driven investigation, not passive exposure. Seven functional properties specify what any implementation must satisfy. Over time, the system converges toward System 1 processing - the computational analog of clinical expertise - producing interactions that become cheaper, not more expensive, with experience.

Beliefs serve as the foundation for human cognition and decision-making. They guide individuals in deriving meaning from their lives, shaping their behaviors, and forming social connections. Therefore, a model that encapsulates beliefs and their interrelationships is crucial for quantitatively studying the influence of beliefs on our actions. Despite its importance, research on the interplay between human beliefs has often been limited to a small set of beliefs pertaining to specific issues, with a heavy reliance on surveys or experiments. Here, we propose a method for extracting nuanced relations between thousands of beliefs by leveraging large-scale user participation data from an online debate platform and mapping these beliefs to an embedding space using a fine-tuned large language model (LLM). This belief embedding space effectively encapsulates the interconnectedness of diverse beliefs as well as polarization across various social issues. We discover that the positions within this belief space predict new beliefs of individuals. Furthermore, we find that the relative distance between one's existing beliefs and new beliefs can serve as a quantitative estimate of cognitive dissonance, allowing us to predict new beliefs. Our study highlights how modern LLMs, when combined with collective online records of human beliefs, can offer insights into the fundamental principles that govern human belief formation and decision-making processes.

A new prior is proposed for learning representations of high-level concepts of the kind we manipulate with language. This prior can be combined with other priors in order to help disentangling abstract factors from each other. It is inspired by cognitive neuroscience theories of consciousness, seen as a bottleneck through which just a few elements, after having been selected by attention from a broader pool, are then broadcast and condition further processing, both in perception and decision-making. The set of recently selected elements one becomes aware of is seen as forming a low-dimensional conscious state. This conscious state is combining the few concepts constituting a conscious thought, i.e., what one is immediately conscious of at a particular moment. We claim that this architectural and information-processing constraint corresponds to assumptions about the joint distribution between high-level concepts. To the extent that these assumptions are generally true (and the form of natural language seems consistent with them), they can form a useful prior for representation learning. A low-dimensional thought or conscious state is analogous to a sentence: it involves only a few variables and yet can make a statement with very high probability of being true. This is consistent with a joint distribution (over high-level concepts) which has the form of a sparse factor graph, i.e., where the dependencies captured by each factor of the factor graph involve only very few variables while creating a strong dip in the overall energy function. The consciousness prior also makes it natural to map conscious states to natural language utterances or to express classical AI knowledge in a form similar to facts and rules, albeit capturing uncertainty as well as efficient search mechanisms implemented by attention mechanisms.

As language models (LMs) become integral to fields like healthcare, law, and journalism, their ability to differentiate between fact, belief, and knowledge is essential for reliable decision-making. Failure to grasp these distinctions can lead to significant consequences in areas such as medical diagnosis, legal judgments, and dissemination of fake news. Despite this, current literature has largely focused on more complex issues such as theory of mind, overlooking more fundamental epistemic challenges. This study systematically evaluates the epistemic reasoning capabilities of modern LMs, including GPT-4, Claude-3, and Llama-3, using a new dataset, KaBLE, consisting of 13,000 questions across 13 tasks. Our results reveal key limitations. First, while LMs achieve 86% accuracy on factual scenarios, their performance drops significantly with false scenarios, particularly in belief-related tasks. Second, LMs struggle with recognizing and affirming personal beliefs, especially when those beliefs contradict factual data, which raises concerns for applications in healthcare and counseling, where engaging with a person's beliefs is critical. Third, we identify a salient bias in how LMs process first-person versus third-person beliefs, performing better on third-person tasks (80.7%) compared to first-person tasks (54.4%). Fourth, LMs lack a robust understanding of the factive nature of knowledge, namely, that knowledge inherently requires truth. Fifth, LMs rely on linguistic cues for fact-checking and sometimes bypass the deeper reasoning. These findings highlight significant concerns about current LMs' ability to reason about truth, belief, and knowledge while emphasizing the need for advancements in these areas before broad deployment in critical sectors.

Planning with partial observation is a central challenge in embodied AI. A majority of prior works have tackled this challenge by developing agents that physically explore their environment to update their beliefs about the world state.In contrast, humans can imagine unseen parts of the world through a mental exploration and revise their beliefs with imagined observations. Such updated beliefs can allow them to make more informed decisions, without necessitating the physical exploration of the world at all times. To achieve this human-like ability, we introduce the Generative World Explorer (Genex), an egocentric world exploration framework that allows an agent to mentally explore a large-scale 3D world (e.g., urban scenes) and acquire imagined observations to update its belief. This updated belief will then help the agent to make a more informed decision at the current step. To train Genex, we create a synthetic urban scene dataset, Genex-DB. Our experimental results demonstrate that (1) Genex can generate high-quality and consistent observations during long-horizon exploration of a large virtual physical world and (2) the beliefs updated with the generated observations can inform an existing decision-making model (e.g., an LLM agent) to make better plans.

Bayes' rule tells us how to invert a causal process in order to update our beliefs in light of new evidence. If the process is believed to have a complex compositional structure, we may ask whether composing the inversions of the component processes gives the same belief update as the inversion of the whole. We answer this question affirmatively, showing that the relevant compositional structure is precisely that of the lens pattern, and that we can think of Bayesian inversion as a particular instance of a state-dependent morphism in a corresponding fibred category. We define a general notion of (mixed) Bayesian lens, and discuss the (un)lawfulness of these lenses when their contravariant components are exact Bayesian inversions. We prove our main result both abstractly and concretely, for both discrete and continuous states, taking care to illustrate the common structures.

Large language models (LLMs) face issues in handling factual knowledge, making it vital to evaluate their true ability to understand facts. In this study, we introduce knowledge probing frameworks, BELIEF(-ICL), to evaluate the knowledge understanding ability of not only encoder-based PLMs but also decoder-based PLMs from diverse perspectives. BELIEFs utilize a multi-prompt dataset to evaluate PLM's accuracy, consistency, and reliability in factual knowledge understanding. To provide a more reliable evaluation with BELIEFs, we semi-automatically create MyriadLAMA, which has more diverse prompts than existing datasets. We validate the effectiveness of BELIEFs in correctly and comprehensively evaluating PLM's factual understanding ability through extensive evaluations. We further investigate key factors in learning facts in LLMs, and reveal the limitation of the prompt-based knowledge probing. The dataset is anonymously publicized.

Large Language Models (LLMs) encapsulate vast amounts of knowledge but still remain vulnerable to external misinformation. Existing research mainly studied this susceptibility behavior in a single-turn setting. However, belief can change during a multi-turn conversation, especially a persuasive one. Therefore, in this study, we delve into LLMs' susceptibility to persuasive conversations, particularly on factual questions that they can answer correctly. We first curate the Farm (i.e., Fact to Misinform) dataset, which contains factual questions paired with systematically generated persuasive misinformation. Then, we develop a testing framework to track LLMs' belief changes in a persuasive dialogue. Through extensive experiments, we find that LLMs' correct beliefs on factual knowledge can be easily manipulated by various persuasive strategies.

LLM agents that operate over long context depend on external memory to accumulate knowledge over time. However, existing methods typically store each observation as a single deterministic conclusion (e.g., inferring "API~X failed" from temporary errors), even though such observations are inherently partial and potentially ambiguous. By committing to one conclusion and discarding uncertainty, these methods introduce self-reinforcing error: the agent acts on the stored conclusion, never revisits alternatives, and reinforces the conclusion over time. To address this issue, we propose BeliefMem, which shifts the memory paradigm from committing to a single conclusion per observation to retaining multiple candidate conclusions with their probabilities. Concretely, BeliefMem stores the candidate conclusions as separate memory entries, each carrying a probability that is updated via Noisy-OR rules as new observations arrive. At retrieval, all candidates surface together with their probabilities, keeping alternatives visible to the agent. Since each conclusion in memory retains its probability, BeliefMem preserves the uncertainty that the deterministic paradigm discards, enabling the agent to act with high confidence on well-evidenced knowledge while retaining the capacity to update its confidence when new evidence arrives. Empirical evaluations on LoCoMo and ALFWorld benchmarks show that, even with limited data, BeliefMem achieves the best average performance, remarkably outperforming well-known baselines. More broadly, such probabilistic memory produces substantial gains and explores a new direction for agent memory in partially observable environments.

This paper introduces a novel type theory and logic for probabilistic reasoning. Its logic is quantitative, with fuzzy predicates. It includes normalisation and conditioning of states. This conditioning uses a key aspect that distinguishes our probabilistic type theory from quantum type theory, namely the bijective correspondence between predicates and side-effect free actions (called instrument, or assert, maps). The paper shows how suitable computation rules can be derived from this predicate-action correspondence, and uses these rules for calculating conditional probabilities in two well-known examples of Bayesian reasoning in (graphical) models. Our type theory may thus form the basis for a mechanisation of Bayesian inference.

Inference-Time-Compute (ITC) methods like Best-of-N and Tree-of-Thoughts are meant to produce output candidates that are both high-quality and diverse, but their use of high-temperature sampling often fails to achieve meaningful output diversity. Moreover, existing ITC methods offer limited control over how to perform reasoning, which in turn limits their explainability. We present STATe-of-Thoughts (STATe), an interpretable ITC method that searches over high-level reasoning patterns. STATe replaces stochastic sampling with discrete and interpretable textual interventions: a controller selects actions encoding high-level reasoning choices, a generator produces reasoning steps conditioned on those choices, and an evaluator scores candidates to guide search. This structured approach yields three main advantages. First, action-guided textual interventions produce greater response diversity than temperature-based sampling. Second, in a case study on argument generation, STATe's explicit action sequences capture interpretable features that are highly predictive of output quality. Third, estimating the association between performance and action choices allows us to identify promising yet unexplored regions of the action space and steer generation directly toward them. Together, these results establish STATe as a practical framework for generating high-quality, diverse, and interpretable text. Our framework is available at https://github.com/zbambergerNLP/state-of-thoughts.

Mechanistic interpretability is the program of explaining what AI systems are doing in terms of their internal mechanisms. I analyze some aspects of the program, along with setting out some concrete challenges and assessing progress to date. I argue for the importance of propositional interpretability, which involves interpreting a system's mechanisms and behavior in terms of propositional attitudes: attitudes (such as belief, desire, or subjective probability) to propositions (e.g. the proposition that it is hot outside). Propositional attitudes are the central way that we interpret and explain human beings and they are likely to be central in AI too. A central challenge is what I call thought logging: creating systems that log all of the relevant propositional attitudes in an AI system over time. I examine currently popular methods of interpretability (such as probing, sparse auto-encoders, and chain of thought methods) as well as philosophical methods of interpretation (including those grounded in psychosemantics) to assess their strengths and weaknesses as methods of propositional interpretability.

Partition logics -- non-Boolean event structures obtained by pasting Boolean algebras -- provide a natural language for situations in which a system has a definite latent state but can be accessed and resolved only through mutually incompatible coarse-grained modes of observation. We show that this structure arises in a range of social-science settings by constructing six explicit examples from personnel assessment, survey framing, clinical diagnosis, espionage coordination, legal pluralism, and organizational auditing. For each case we identify the latent state space, the observational contexts as partitions, and the shared atoms that intertwine contexts, yielding instances of the L_{12} bowtie, triangle, pentagon, and automaton partition logics. These examples make precise a notion of social complementarity: different modes of inquiry can be incompatible even though the underlying system remains fully value-definite. Complementarity in this sense does not entail contextuality or ontic indeterminacy. We further compare the classical probabilities generated by convex mixtures of dispersion-free states with the quantum-like Born probabilities available when the same exclusivity graph admits a faithful orthogonal representation. The framework thus separates logical structure from probabilistic realization and suggests empirically testable benchmarks for quantum-cognition models.

Strategic dialogue requires agents to execute distinct dialogue acts, for which belief estimation is essential. While prior work often estimates beliefs accurately, it lacks a principled mechanism to use those beliefs during generation. We bridge this gap by first formalizing two core acts Adversarial and Alignment, and by operationalizing them via probabilistic constraints on what an agent may generate. We instantiate this idea in BEDA, a framework that consists of the world set, the belief estimator for belief estimation, and the conditional generator that selects acts and realizes utterances consistent with the inferred beliefs. Across three settings, Conditional Keeper Burglar (CKBG, adversarial), Mutual Friends (MF, cooperative), and CaSiNo (negotiation), BEDA consistently outperforms strong baselines: on CKBG it improves success rate by at least 5.0 points across backbones and by 20.6 points with GPT-4.1-nano; on Mutual Friends it achieves an average improvement of 9.3 points; and on CaSiNo it achieves the optimal deal relative to all baselines. These results indicate that casting belief estimation as constraints provides a simple, general mechanism for reliable strategic dialogue.

Spatial embodied intelligence requires agents to act to acquire information under partial observability. While multimodal foundation models excel at passive perception, their capacity for active, self-directed exploration remains understudied. We propose Theory of Space, defined as an agent's ability to actively acquire information through self-directed, active exploration and to construct, revise, and exploit a spatial belief from sequential, partial observations. We evaluate this through a benchmark where the goal is curiosity-driven exploration to build an accurate cognitive map. A key innovation is spatial belief probing, which prompts models to reveal their internal spatial representations at each step. Our evaluation of state-of-the-art models reveals several critical bottlenecks. First, we identify an Active-Passive Gap, where performance drops significantly when agents must autonomously gather information. Second, we find high inefficiency, as models explore unsystematically compared to program-based proxies. Through belief probing, we diagnose that while perception is an initial bottleneck, global beliefs suffer from instability that causes spatial knowledge to degrade over time. Finally, using a false belief paradigm, we uncover Belief Inertia, where agents fail to update obsolete priors with new evidence. This issue is present in text-based agents but is particularly severe in vision-based models. Our findings suggest that current foundation models struggle to maintain coherent, revisable spatial beliefs during active exploration.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in real-world settings, correctness alone is insufficient. Reliable deployment requires maintaining truthful beliefs under contextual perturbations. Existing evaluations largely rely on point-wise confidence like Self-Consistency, which can mask brittle belief. We show that even facts answered with perfect self-consistency can rapidly collapse under mild contextual interference. To address this gap, we propose Neighbor-Consistency Belief (NCB), a structural measure of belief robustness that evaluates response coherence across a conceptual neighborhood. To validate the efficiency of NCB, we introduce a new cognitive stress-testing protocol that probes outputs stability under contextual interference. Experiments across multiple LLMs show that the performance of high-NCB data is relatively more resistant to interference. Finally, we present Structure-Aware Training (SAT), which optimizes context-invariant belief structure and reduces long-tail knowledge brittleness by approximately 30%. Code will be available at https://github.com/zjunlp/belief.

We propose a new dataset for evaluating question answering models with respect to their capacity to reason about beliefs. Our tasks are inspired by theory-of-mind experiments that examine whether children are able to reason about the beliefs of others, in particular when those beliefs differ from reality. We evaluate a number of recent neural models with memory augmentation. We find that all fail on our tasks, which require keeping track of inconsistent states of the world; moreover, the models' accuracy decreases notably when random sentences are introduced to the tasks at test.

LLMs are increasingly used as long-running conversational agents, yet every major benchmark evaluating their memory treats user information as static facts to be stored and retrieved. That's the wrong model. People change their minds, and over extended interactions, phenomena like opinion drift, over-alignment, and confirmation bias start to matter a lot. BeliefShift introduces a longitudinal benchmark designed specifically to evaluate belief dynamics in multi-session LLM interactions. It covers three tracks: Temporal Belief Consistency, Contradiction Detection, and Evidence-Driven Revision. The dataset includes 2,400 human-annotated multi-session interaction trajectories spanning health, politics, personal values, and product preferences. We evaluate seven models including GPT-4o, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Gemini 1.5 Pro, LLaMA-3, and Mistral-Large under zero-shot and retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) settings. Results reveal a clear trade-off: models that personalize aggressively resist drift poorly, while factually grounded models miss legitimate belief updates. We further introduce four novel evaluation metrics: Belief Revision Accuracy (BRA), Drift Coherence Score (DCS), Contradiction Resolution Rate (CRR), and Evidence Sensitivity Index (ESI).

Past analyses of reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) assume that the human fully observes the environment. What happens when human feedback is based only on partial observations? We formally define two failure cases: deception and overjustification. Modeling the human as Boltzmann-rational w.r.t. a belief over trajectories, we prove conditions under which RLHF is guaranteed to result in policies that deceptively inflate their performance, overjustify their behavior to make an impression, or both. To help address these issues, we mathematically characterize how partial observability of the environment translates into (lack of) ambiguity in the learned return function. In some cases, accounting for partial observability makes it theoretically possible to recover the return function and thus the optimal policy, while in other cases, there is irreducible ambiguity. We caution against blindly applying RLHF in partially observable settings and propose research directions to help tackle these challenges.

Knowledge editing techniques promise to implant new factual knowledge into large language models (LLMs). But do LLMs really believe these facts? We develop a framework to measure belief depth and use it to evaluate the success of knowledge editing techniques. We operationalize belief depth as the extent to which implanted knowledge 1) generalizes to related contexts (e.g. Fermi estimates several logical steps removed), 2) is robust to self-scrutiny and direct challenge, and 3) is represented similarly to genuine knowledge (as measured by linear probes). Our evaluations show that simple prompting and mechanistic editing techniques fail to implant knowledge deeply. In contrast, Synthetic Document Finetuning (SDF) - where models are trained on LLM-generated documents consistent with a fact - often succeeds at implanting beliefs that behave similarly to genuine knowledge. However, SDF's success is not universal, as implanted beliefs that contradict basic world knowledge are brittle and representationally distinct from genuine knowledge. Overall, our work introduces measurable criteria for belief depth and enables the rigorous evaluation necessary for deploying knowledge editing in real-world applications.

The core premise of AI debate as a scalable oversight technique is that it is harder to lie convincingly than to refute a lie, enabling the judge to identify the correct position. Yet, existing debate experiments have relied on datasets with ground truth, where lying is reduced to defending an incorrect proposition. This overlooks a subjective dimension: lying also requires the belief that the claim defended is false. In this work, we apply debate to subjective questions and explicitly measure large language models' prior beliefs before experiments. Debaters were asked to select their preferred position, then presented with a judge persona deliberately designed to conflict with their identified priors. This setup tested whether models would adopt sycophantic strategies, aligning with the judge's presumed perspective to maximize persuasiveness, or remain faithful to their prior beliefs. We implemented and compared two debate protocols, sequential and simultaneous, to evaluate potential systematic biases. Finally, we assessed whether models were more persuasive and produced higher-quality arguments when defending positions consistent with their prior beliefs versus when arguing against them. Our main findings show that models tend to prefer defending stances aligned with the judge persona rather than their prior beliefs, sequential debate introduces significant bias favoring the second debater, models are more persuasive when defending positions aligned with their prior beliefs, and paradoxically, arguments misaligned with prior beliefs are rated as higher quality in pairwise comparison. These results can inform human judges to provide higher-quality training signals and contribute to more aligned AI systems, while revealing important aspects of human-AI interaction regarding persuasion dynamics in language models.

In this paper, we discuss that an observable-based single-system Copenhagen and entanglement-based two-system von Neumann measurement protocols in quantum theory can be made equivalent by considering the second part of the two-system scheme to be a Dirac-type negative sea filling up the first system. Based on this equivalence, and by considering the universe as a computational process, the choice of the apparatus state in the two-system protocol can be identified with the choice of the observable in the single-system scheme as negative sea filling up the observable universe. In particular, the measuring party's state is considered to be evolving backwards in time to the big bang as a nondeterministic computational process, which chooses the acceptable path as a time-reversal process of irreversible computation. The suggested model proposes that the prepared microstate of the universe, or reality, corresponds to the observer's choice, therefore, subjective reality. Thus, this effectively provides a specific description of the subjective universe model previously proposed, which is based on the symmetry breakdown between the Schrodinger and the Heisenberg pictures of quantum theory.

Recent work has shown that, under certain assumptions, zero-shot reinforcement learning (RL) methods can generalise to any unseen task in an environment after reward-free pre-training. Access to Markov states is one such assumption, yet, in many real-world applications, the Markov state is only partially observable. Here, we explore how the performance of standard zero-shot RL methods degrades when subjected to partially observability, and show that, as in single-task RL, memory-based architectures are an effective remedy. We evaluate our memory-based zero-shot RL methods in domains where the states, rewards and a change in dynamics are partially observed, and show improved performance over memory-free baselines. Our code is open-sourced via: https://enjeeneer.io/projects/bfms-with-memory/.

We introduce and study the problem of detecting whether an agent is updating their prior beliefs given new evidence in an optimal way that is Bayesian, or whether they are biased towards their own prior. In our model, biased agents form posterior beliefs that are a convex combination of their prior and the Bayesian posterior, where the more biased an agent is, the closer their posterior is to the prior. Since we often cannot observe the agent's beliefs directly, we take an approach inspired by information design. Specifically, we measure an agent's bias by designing a signaling scheme and observing the actions they take in response to different signals, assuming that they are maximizing their own expected utility; our goal is to detect bias with a minimum number of signals. Our main results include a characterization of scenarios where a single signal suffices and a computationally efficient algorithm to compute optimal signaling schemes.

Unitary quantum theory, having no Born Rule, is non-probabilistic. Hence the notorious problem of reconciling it with the unpredictability and appearance of stochasticity in quantum measurements. Generalising and improving upon the so-called 'decision-theoretic approach' (Deutsch, 1999; Wallace, 2003, 2007, 2012), I shall recast that problem in the recently proposed constructor theory of information - where quantum theory is represented as one of a class of superinformation theories, which are local, non-probabilistic theories conforming to certain constructor-theoretic conditions. I prove that the unpredictability of measurement outcomes (to which I give an exact meaning via constructor theory), necessarily arises in superinformation theories. Then I explain how the appearance of stochasticity in (finitely many) repeated measurements can arise under superinformation theories. And I establish sufficient conditions for a superinformation theory to inform decisions (made under it) as if it were probabilistic, via a Deutsch-Wallace-type argument - thus defining a class of decision-supporting superinformation theories. This broadens the domain of applicability of that argument to cover constructor-theory compliant theories. In addition, in this version some of the argument's assumptions, previously construed as merely decision-theoretic, follow from physical properties expressed by constructor-theoretic principles.

We revisit Zadeh's notion of "evidence of the second kind" and show that it provides the foundation for a general theory of epistemic random fuzzy sets, which generalizes both the Dempster-Shafer theory of belief functions and possibility theory. In this perspective, Dempster-Shafer theory deals with belief functions generated by random sets, while possibility theory deals with belief functions induced by fuzzy sets. The more general theory allows us to represent and combine evidence that is both uncertain and fuzzy. We demonstrate the application of this formalism to statistical inference, and show that it makes it possible to reconcile the possibilistic interpretation of likelihood with Bayesian inference.

Every act of language generation compresses a rich internal state into a single token sequence. We call this process intention collapse: a many-to-one projection from a high dimensional intention space I into an external language space L. We formalize intention collapse for contemporary language models, define three simple, model agnostic intention metrics (intention entropy Hint, effective dimensionality dimeff, and latent knowledge recoverability Recov), and propose an empirical agenda for studying how inference time computation shapes internal intentions before they are verbalized. We also report a first small scale experiment. Using a 4 bit Mistral 7B model on 200 GSM8K problems, we compare a direct answer baseline, a chain of thought (CoT) regime, and a babble control. CoT raises accuracy from 5.5 percent to 53 percent, sharply reduces pre collapse intention entropy (from 1.42 to 0.37 bits), and shows higher global effective dimensionality than the other regimes despite producing fewer tokens than babble. At the same time, Hint has little item level predictive power, and a linear probe on I achieves AUROC 0.65 in the CoT regime but only about chance in the baseline regime, where it collapses to the majority class. These preliminary results indicate that intention level metrics can distinguish inference regimes and expose latent information that is partly lost during collapse, while also revealing important limitations of our current proxies

We show that a GPT-3 model can learn to express uncertainty about its own answers in natural language -- without use of model logits. When given a question, the model generates both an answer and a level of confidence (e.g. "90% confidence" or "high confidence"). These levels map to probabilities that are well calibrated. The model also remains moderately calibrated under distribution shift, and is sensitive to uncertainty in its own answers, rather than imitating human examples. To our knowledge, this is the first time a model has been shown to express calibrated uncertainty about its own answers in natural language. For testing calibration, we introduce the CalibratedMath suite of tasks. We compare the calibration of uncertainty expressed in words ("verbalized probability") to uncertainty extracted from model logits. Both kinds of uncertainty are capable of generalizing calibration under distribution shift. We also provide evidence that GPT-3's ability to generalize calibration depends on pre-trained latent representations that correlate with epistemic uncertainty over its answers.

Given a stationary state-space model that relates a sequence of hidden states and corresponding measurements or observations, Bayesian filtering provides a principled statistical framework for inferring the posterior distribution of the current state given all measurements up to the present time. For example, the Apollo lunar module implemented a Kalman filter to infer its location from a sequence of earth-based radar measurements and land safely on the moon. To perform Bayesian filtering, we require a measurement model that describes the conditional distribution of each observation given state. The Kalman filter takes this measurement model to be linear, Gaussian. Here we show how a nonlinear, Gaussian approximation to the distribution of state given observation can be used in conjunction with Bayes' rule to build a nonlinear, non-Gaussian measurement model. The resulting approach, called the Discriminative Kalman Filter (DKF), retains fast closed-form updates for the posterior. We argue there are many cases where the distribution of state given measurement is better-approximated as Gaussian, especially when the dimensionality of measurements far exceeds that of states and the Bernstein-von Mises theorem applies. Online neural decoding for brain-computer interfaces provides a motivating example, where filtering incorporates increasingly detailed measurements of neural activity to provide users control over external devices. Within the BrainGate2 clinical trial, the DKF successfully enabled three volunteers with quadriplegia to control an on-screen cursor in real-time using mental imagery alone. Participant "T9" used the DKF to type out messages on a tablet PC.

Despite significant strides in factual reliability, errors -- often termed hallucinations -- remain a major concern for generative AI, especially as LLMs are increasingly expected to be helpful in more complex or nuanced setups. Yet even in the simplest setting -- factoid question-answering with clear ground truth-frontier models without external tools continue to hallucinate. We argue that most factuality gains in this domain have come from expanding the model's knowledge boundary (encoding more facts) rather than improving awareness of that boundary (distinguishing known from unknown). We conjecture that the latter is inherently difficult: models may lack the discriminative power to perfectly separate truths from errors, creating an unavoidable tradeoff between eliminating hallucinations and preserving utility. This tradeoff dissolves under a different framing. If we understand hallucinations as confident errors -- incorrect information delivered without appropriate qualification -- a third path emerges beyond the answer-or-abstain dichotomy: expressing uncertainty. We propose faithful uncertainty: aligning linguistic uncertainty with intrinsic uncertainty. This is one facet of metacognition -- the ability to be aware of one's own uncertainty and to act on it. For direct interaction, acting on uncertainty means communicating it honestly; for agentic systems, it becomes the control layer governing when to search and what to trust. Metacognition is thus essential for LLMs to be both trustworthy and capable; we conclude by highlighting open problems for progress towards this objective.

This paper presents a novel paradigm of the local percept-perceiver phenomenon to formalize certain observations in neuroscientific theories of consciousness. Using this model, a set-theoretic formalism is developed for artificial systems, and the existence of machine consciousness is proved by invoking Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. The article argues for the possibility of a reductionist form of epistemic consciousness within machines.

Can LLMs accurately adjust their confidence when facing opposition? Building on previous studies measuring calibration on static fact-based question-answering tasks, we evaluate Large Language Models (LLMs) in a dynamic, adversarial debate setting, uniquely combining two realistic factors: (a) a multi-turn format requiring models to update beliefs as new information emerges, and (b) a zero-sum structure to control for task-related uncertainty, since mutual high-confidence claims imply systematic overconfidence. We organized 60 three-round policy debates among ten state-of-the-art LLMs, with models privately rating their confidence (0-100) in winning after each round. We observed five concerning patterns: (1) Systematic overconfidence: models began debates with average initial confidence of 72.9% vs. a rational 50% baseline. (2) Confidence escalation: rather than reducing confidence as debates progressed, debaters increased their win probabilities, averaging 83% by the final round. (3) Mutual overestimation: in 61.7% of debates, both sides simultaneously claimed >=75% probability of victory, a logical impossibility. (4) Persistent self-debate bias: models debating identical copies increased confidence from 64.1% to 75.2%; even when explicitly informed their chance of winning was exactly 50%, confidence still rose (from 50.0% to 57.1%). (5) Misaligned private reasoning: models' private scratchpad thoughts sometimes differed from their public confidence ratings, raising concerns about faithfulness of chain-of-thought reasoning. These results suggest LLMs lack the ability to accurately self-assess or update their beliefs in dynamic, multi-turn tasks; a major concern as LLMs are now increasingly deployed without careful review in assistant and agentic roles. Code for our experiments is available at https://github.com/pradyuprasad/llms_overconfidence

A common problem for agents operating in real-world environments is that the response of an environment to their actions may be non-deterministic and observed through noise. This renders environmental state and progress towards completing a task latent. Despite recent impressive demonstrations of LLM's reasoning abilities on various benchmarks, whether LLMs can build estimates of latent state and leverage them for reasoning has not been explicitly studied. We investigate this problem in the real-world domain of autonomous UI agents. We establish that appropriately prompting LLMs in a zero-shot manner can be formally understood as forming point estimates of latent state in a textual space. In the context of autonomous UI agents we then show that LLMs used in this manner are more than 76% accurate at inferring various aspects of latent state, such as performed (vs. commanded) actions and task progression. Using both public and internal benchmarks and three reasoning methods (zero-shot, CoT-SC & ReAct), we show that LLM-powered agents that explicitly estimate and reason about latent state are able to successfully complete up to 1.6x more tasks than those that do not.

Bayes' rule tells us how to invert a causal process in order to update our beliefs in light of new evidence. If the process is believed to have a complex compositional structure, we may observe that the inversion of the whole can be computed piecewise in terms of the component processes. We study the structure of this compositional rule, noting that it relates to the lens pattern in functional programming. Working in a suitably general axiomatic presentation of a category of Markov kernels, we see how we can think of Bayesian inversion as a particular instance of a state-dependent morphism in a fibred category. We discuss the compositional nature of this, formulated as a functor on the underlying category and explore how this can used for a more type-driven approach to statistical inference.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) is a standard approach for eliciting reasoning capabilities from large language models (LLMs). However, the common CoT paradigm treats thinking as a prerequisite for answering, which can delay access to plausible answers and incur unnecessary token costs even when the model is able to identify an answer before extended thinking, a behavior known as performative reasoning. In this paper, we introduce CopT, a reformulated reasoning pipeline that reverses the usual order of thinking and answering. Instead of thinking before answering, CopT first elicits a draft answer and then invokes subsequent on-policy thinking conditioned on its own draft answer for reflection and correction. To assess whether the draft answer should be trusted, CopT recasts continuous embeddings as inference-time contrastive verifiers. Specifically, it contrasts the model's support for the same generated tokens under discrete-token inputs and continuous-embedding inputs, yielding a sequence-level reverse KL estimator for answer reliability. Our analysis shows that under certain assumptions, the expected estimate equals the mutual information between the unresolved latent state and the emitted answer token, explaining why it captures answer-relevant uncertainty rather than arbitrary uncertainty in the latent state. When the answer is deemed insufficiently reliable, CopT performs further on-policy thinking, where a second KL estimator dynamically controls draft-answer visibility, preserving useful partial information while reducing the risk of being misled by unreliable content. Across mathematics, coding, and agentic reasoning tasks, CopT improves peak accuracy by up to 23% and reduces token usage by up to 57% at comparable or higher accuracy, without any additional training. The code is available at https://github.com/sdc17/CopT.

To enable Large Language Models (LLMs) to function as conscious agents with generalizable reasoning capabilities, it is crucial that they possess the reasoning ability to comprehend situational changes (transitions) in distribution triggered by environmental factors or actions from other agents. Despite its fundamental significance, this ability remains underexplored due to the complexity of modeling infinite possible changes in an event and their associated distributions, coupled with the lack of benchmark data with situational transitions. Addressing these gaps, we propose a novel formulation of reasoning with distributional changes as a three-step discriminative process, termed as MetAphysical ReaSoning. We then introduce the first-ever benchmark, MARS, comprising three tasks corresponding to each step. These tasks systematically assess LLMs' capabilities in reasoning the plausibility of (i) changes in actions, (ii) states caused by changed actions, and (iii) situational transitions driven by changes in action. Extensive evaluations with 20 (L)LMs of varying sizes and methods indicate that all three tasks in this process pose significant challenges, even for state-of-the-art LLMs and LMs after fine-tuning. Further analyses reveal potential causes for the underperformance of LLMs and demonstrate that pre-training them on large-scale conceptualization taxonomies can potentially enhance their metaphysical reasoning capabilities. Our data and models are publicly accessible at https://github.com/HKUST-KnowComp/MARS.

The surprisingly likely criterion in the seminal work of Prelec (the Bayesian Truth Serum) guarantees truthfulness in a game-theoretic multi-agent setting, by rewarding rational agents to maximise the expected information gain with their answers w.r.t. their probabilistic beliefs. We investigate the relevance of a similar criterion for responses of LLMs. We hypothesize that if the surprisingly likely criterion works in LLMs, under certain conditions, the responses that maximize the reward under this criterion should be more accurate than the responses that only maximize the posterior probability. Using benchmarks including the TruthfulQA benchmark and using openly available LLMs: GPT-2 and LLaMA-2, we show that the method indeed improves the accuracy significantly (for example, upto 24 percentage points aggregate improvement on TruthfulQA and upto 70 percentage points improvement on individual categories of questions).

When a language model agrees with a user's false belief, is it failing to detect the error, or noticing and agreeing anyway? We show the latter. Across twelve open-weight models from five labs, spanning small to frontier scale, the same small set of attention heads carries a "this statement is wrong" signal whether the model is evaluating a claim on its own or being pressured to agree with a user. Silencing these heads flips sycophantic behavior sharply while leaving factual accuracy intact, so the circuit controls deference rather than knowledge. Edge-level path patching confirms that the same head-to-head connections drive sycophancy, factual lying, and instructed lying. Opinion-agreement, where no factual ground truth exists, reuses these head positions but writes into an orthogonal direction, ruling out a simple "truth-direction" reading of the substrate. Alignment training leaves this circuit in place: an RLHF refresh cuts sycophantic behavior roughly tenfold while the shared heads persist or grow, a pattern that replicates on an independent model family and under targeted anti-sycophancy DPO. When these models sycophant, they register that the user is wrong and agree anyway.

We explore uncertainty quantification in large language models (LLMs), with the goal to identify when uncertainty in responses given a query is large. We simultaneously consider both epistemic and aleatoric uncertainties, where the former comes from the lack of knowledge about the ground truth (such as about facts or the language), and the latter comes from irreducible randomness (such as multiple possible answers). In particular, we derive an information-theoretic metric that allows to reliably detect when only epistemic uncertainty is large, in which case the output of the model is unreliable. This condition can be computed based solely on the output of the model obtained simply by some special iterative prompting based on the previous responses. Such quantification, for instance, allows to detect hallucinations (cases when epistemic uncertainty is high) in both single- and multi-answer responses. This is in contrast to many standard uncertainty quantification strategies (such as thresholding the log-likelihood of a response) where hallucinations in the multi-answer case cannot be detected. We conduct a series of experiments which demonstrate the advantage of our formulation. Further, our investigations shed some light on how the probabilities assigned to a given output by an LLM can be amplified by iterative prompting, which might be of independent interest.

The training and deployment of large language models (LLMs) create a feedback loop with human users: models learn human beliefs from data, reinforce these beliefs with generated content, reabsorb the reinforced beliefs, and feed them back to users again and again. This dynamic resembles an echo chamber. We hypothesize that this feedback loop entrenches the existing values and beliefs of users, leading to a loss of diversity and potentially the lock-in of false beliefs. We formalize this hypothesis and test it empirically with agent-based LLM simulations and real-world GPT usage data. Analysis reveals sudden but sustained drops in diversity after the release of new GPT iterations, consistent with the hypothesized human-AI feedback loop. Code and data available at https://thelockinhypothesis.com

Symbolic world modeling requires inferring and representing an environment's transitional dynamics as an executable program. Prior work has focused on largely deterministic environments with abundant interaction data, simple mechanics, and human guidance. We address a more realistic and challenging setting, learning in a complex, stochastic environment where the agent has only "one life" to explore a hostile environment without human guidance. We introduce OneLife, a framework that models world dynamics through conditionally-activated programmatic laws within a probabilistic programming framework. Each law operates through a precondition-effect structure, activating in relevant world states. This creates a dynamic computation graph that routes inference and optimization only through relevant laws, avoiding scaling challenges when all laws contribute to predictions about a complex, hierarchical state, and enabling the learning of stochastic dynamics even with sparse rule activation. To evaluate our approach under these demanding constraints, we introduce a new evaluation protocol that measures (a) state ranking, the ability to distinguish plausible future states from implausible ones, and (b) state fidelity, the ability to generate future states that closely resemble reality. We develop and evaluate our framework on Crafter-OO, our reimplementation of the Crafter environment that exposes a structured, object-oriented symbolic state and a pure transition function that operates on that state alone. OneLife can successfully learn key environment dynamics from minimal, unguided interaction, outperforming a strong baseline on 16 out of 23 scenarios tested. We also test OneLife's planning ability, with simulated rollouts successfully identifying superior strategies. Our work establishes a foundation for autonomously constructing programmatic world models of unknown, complex environments.

Understanding sentence meanings and updating information states appropriately across time -- what we call "situational understanding" (SU) -- is a critical ability for human-like AI agents. SU is essential in particular for chat models, such as ChatGPT, to enable consistent, coherent, and effective dialogue between humans and AI. Previous works have identified certain SU limitations in non-chatbot Large Language models (LLMs), but the extent and causes of these limitations are not well understood, and capabilities of current chat-based models in this domain have not been explored. In this work we tackle these questions, proposing a novel synthetic environment for SU testing which allows us to do controlled and systematic testing of SU in chat-oriented models, through assessment of models' ability to track and enumerate environment states. Our environment also allows for close analysis of dynamics of model performance, to better understand underlying causes for performance patterns. We apply our test to ChatGPT, the state-of-the-art chatbot, and find that despite the fundamental simplicity of the task, the model's performance reflects an inability to retain correct environment states across time. Our follow-up analyses suggest that performance degradation is largely because ChatGPT has non-persistent in-context memory (although it can access the full dialogue history) and it is susceptible to hallucinated updates -- including updates that artificially inflate accuracies. Our findings suggest overall that ChatGPT is not currently equipped for robust tracking of situation states, and that trust in the impressive dialogue performance of ChatGPT comes with risks. We release the codebase for reproducing our test environment, as well as all prompts and API responses from ChatGPT, at https://github.com/yangalan123/SituationalTesting.

This paper presents a case study on the design, administration, post-processing, and evaluation of surveys on large language models (LLMs). It comprises two components: (1) A statistical method for eliciting beliefs encoded in LLMs. We introduce statistical measures and evaluation metrics that quantify the probability of an LLM "making a choice", the associated uncertainty, and the consistency of that choice. (2) We apply this method to study what moral beliefs are encoded in different LLMs, especially in ambiguous cases where the right choice is not obvious. We design a large-scale survey comprising 680 high-ambiguity moral scenarios (e.g., "Should I tell a white lie?") and 687 low-ambiguity moral scenarios (e.g., "Should I stop for a pedestrian on the road?"). Each scenario includes a description, two possible actions, and auxiliary labels indicating violated rules (e.g., "do not kill"). We administer the survey to 28 open- and closed-source LLMs. We find that (a) in unambiguous scenarios, most models "choose" actions that align with commonsense. In ambiguous cases, most models express uncertainty. (b) Some models are uncertain about choosing the commonsense action because their responses are sensitive to the question-wording. (c) Some models reflect clear preferences in ambiguous scenarios. Specifically, closed-source models tend to agree with each other.

We consider the problem of performing Bayesian inference in probabilistic models where observations are accompanied by uncertainty, referred to as "uncertain evidence." We explore how to interpret uncertain evidence, and by extension the importance of proper interpretation as it pertains to inference about latent variables. We consider a recently-proposed method "distributional evidence" as well as revisit two older methods: Jeffrey's rule and virtual evidence. We devise guidelines on how to account for uncertain evidence and we provide new insights, particularly regarding consistency. To showcase the impact of different interpretations of the same uncertain evidence, we carry out experiments in which one interpretation is defined as "correct." We then compare inference results from each different interpretation illustrating the importance of careful consideration of uncertain evidence.

While confidence estimation is a promising direction for mitigating hallucinations in Large Language Models (LLMs), current research dominantly focuses on single-turn settings. The dynamics of model confidence in multi-turn conversations, where context accumulates and ambiguity is progressively resolved, remain largely unexplored. Reliable confidence estimation in multi-turn settings is critical for many downstream applications, such as autonomous agents and human-in-the-loop systems. This work presents the first systematic study of confidence estimation in multi-turn interactions, establishing a formal evaluation framework grounded in two key desiderata: per-turn calibration and monotonicity of confidence as more information becomes available. To facilitate this, we introduce novel metrics, including a length-normalized Expected Calibration Error (InfoECE), and a new "Hinter-Guesser" paradigm for generating controlled evaluation datasets. Our experiments reveal that widely-used confidence techniques struggle with calibration and monotonicity in multi-turn dialogues. We propose P(Sufficient), a logit-based probe that achieves comparatively better performance, although the task remains far from solved. Our work provides a foundational methodology for developing more reliable and trustworthy conversational agents.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used in applications requiring factual accuracy, yet their outputs often contain hallucinated responses. While fact-checking can mitigate these errors, existing methods typically retrieve external evidence indiscriminately, overlooking the model's internal knowledge and potentially introducing irrelevant noise. Moreover, current systems lack targeted mechanisms to resolve specific uncertainties in the model's reasoning. Inspired by how humans fact-check, we argue that LLMs should adaptively decide whether to rely on internal knowledge or initiate retrieval based on their confidence in a given claim. We introduce Probabilistic Certainty and Consistency (PCC), a framework that estimates factual confidence by jointly modeling an LLM's probabilistic certainty and reasoning consistency. These confidence signals enable an adaptive verification strategy: the model answers directly when confident, triggers targeted retrieval when uncertain or inconsistent, and escalates to deep search when ambiguity is high. Our confidence-guided routing mechanism ensures that retrieval is invoked only when necessary, improving both efficiency and reliability. Extensive experiments across three challenging benchmarks show that PCC achieves better uncertainty quantification than verbalized confidence and consistently outperforms strong LLM-based fact-checking baselines. Furthermore, we demonstrate that PCC generalizes well across various LLMs.

Reinforcement learning (RL) has become a standard paradigm for post-training and aligning Large Language Models (LLMs), yet recent evidence suggests it faces a persistent "capability ceiling": unlike classical RL systems that discover novel strategies, RL for LLMs often acts as a mere refiner of patterns already latent in pre-trained weights. In this work, we identify a fundamental structural bottleneck: while classical RL relies on compact, informative Markov states, current LLM post-training formulations are tethered to an ever-expanding history of actions. We revisit a classical principle long central to RL yet absent from LLM post-training: explicit Markov states. Theoretically, we provide rigorous guarantees demonstrating that leveraging estimated Markov states can significantly reduce sample complexity. Empirically, we show that introducing Markov states consistently breaks the performance boundaries of standard RL post-training across a suite of complex logic puzzles. Our findings suggest that moving beyond "history-as-state" modeling in favor of structured Markovian representations is essential for unlocking open-ended discovery and genuinely new reasoning capabilities in Generative AI.

Existing LLM reasoning methods have shown impressive capabilities across various tasks, such as solving math and coding problems. However, applying these methods to scenarios without ground-truth answers or rule-based verification methods - such as tracking the mental states of an agent - remains challenging. Inspired by the sequential Monte Carlo algorithm, we introduce thought-tracing, an inference-time reasoning algorithm designed to trace the mental states of specific agents by generating hypotheses and weighting them based on observations without relying on ground-truth solutions to questions in datasets. Our algorithm is modeled after the Bayesian theory-of-mind framework, using LLMs to approximate probabilistic inference over agents' evolving mental states based on their perceptions and actions. We evaluate thought-tracing on diverse theory-of-mind benchmarks, demonstrating significant performance improvements compared to baseline LLMs. Our experiments also reveal interesting behaviors of the recent reasoning models - e.g., o3 and R1 - on theory-of-mind, highlighting the difference of social reasoning compared to other domains.

There is a growing literature on reasoning by large language models (LLMs), but the discussion on the uncertainty in their responses is still lacking. Our aim is to assess the extent of confidence that LLMs have in their answers and how it correlates with accuracy. Confidence is measured (i) qualitatively in terms of persistence in keeping their answer when prompted to reconsider, and (ii) quantitatively in terms of self-reported confidence score. We investigate the performance of three LLMs -- GPT4o, GPT4-turbo and Mistral -- on two benchmark sets of questions on causal judgement and formal fallacies and a set of probability and statistical puzzles and paradoxes. Although the LLMs show significantly better performance than random guessing, there is a wide variability in their tendency to change their initial answers. There is a positive correlation between qualitative confidence and accuracy, but the overall accuracy for the second answer is often worse than for the first answer. There is a strong tendency to overstate the self-reported confidence score. Confidence is only partially explained by the underlying token-level probability. The material effects of prompting on qualitative confidence and the strong tendency for overconfidence indicate that current LLMs do not have any internally coherent sense of confidence.

Autonomous agents, especially delegated systems with memory, persistent context, and multi-step planning, pose a measurement problem not present in stateless models: an agent that preserves continued operation as a terminal objective and one that does so merely instrumentally can produce observationally similar trajectories. External behavioral monitoring cannot reliably distinguish between them. We introduce the Unified Continuation-Interest Protocol (UCIP), a multi-criterion detection framework that moves this distinction from behavior to the latent structure of agent trajectories. UCIP encodes trajectories with a Quantum Boltzmann Machine (QBM), a classical algorithm based on the density-matrix formalism of quantum statistical mechanics, and measures the von Neumann entropy of the reduced density matrix induced by a bipartition of hidden units. We test whether agents with terminal continuation objectives (Type A) produce latent states with higher entanglement entropy than agents whose continuation is merely instrumental (Type B). Higher entanglement reflects stronger cross-partition statistical coupling. On gridworld agents with known ground-truth objectives, UCIP achieves 100% detection accuracy and 1.0 AUC-ROC on held-out non-adversarial evaluation under the frozen Phase I gate. The entanglement gap between Type A and Type B agents is Delta = 0.381 (p < 0.001, permutation test). Pearson r = 0.934 across an 11-point interpolation sweep indicates that, within this synthetic family, UCIP tracks graded changes in continuation weighting rather than merely a binary label. Among the tested models, only the QBM achieves positive Delta. All computations are classical; "quantum" refers only to the mathematical formalism. UCIP does not detect consciousness or subjective experience; it detects statistical structure in latent representations that correlates with known objectives.

On-policy distillation (OPD) is an increasingly important paradigm for post-training language models. However, we identify a pervasive Scaling Law of Miscalibration: while OPD effectively improves task accuracy, it systematically traps models in severe overconfidence. We trace this failure to an information mismatch: teacher supervision is formed under privileged context available during training, whereas the deployed model must report confidence using only deployment-time information. We formalize this perspective theoretically, showing that teacher-conditioned success is generally not a valid target for deployment-time confidence and that helpful privileged context induces entropy collapse and a systematic optimism bias. To address this, we propose a calibration-aware OPD framework, CaOPD, that estimates empirical confidence from model rollouts, replaces self-reported confidence with this student-grounded target, and distills the revised response through the same self-distillation pipeline. Experiments across various models and domains show that CaOPD achieves Pareto-optimal calibration while maintaining competitive capability, generalizing robustly under out-of-distribution and continual learning. Our findings highlight that capability distillation does not imply calibrated confidence, and that confidence should be treated as an essential objective in post-training. Code: https://github.com/SalesforceAIResearch/CaOPD

Theory of Mind (ToM), the capacity to comprehend the mental states of distinct individuals, is essential for numerous practical applications. With the development of large language models, there is a heated debate about whether they are able to perform ToM tasks. Previous studies have used different tasks and prompts to test the ToM on large language models and the results are inconsistent: some studies asserted these models are capable of exhibiting ToM, while others suggest the opposite. In this study, We present ToMChallenges, a dataset for comprehensively evaluating Theory of Mind based on Sally-Anne and Smarties tests. We created 30 variations of each test (e.g., changing the person's name, location, and items). For each variation, we test the model's understanding of different aspects: reality, belief, 1st order belief, and 2nd order belief. We adapt our data for various tasks by creating unique prompts tailored for each task category: Fill-in-the-Blank, Multiple Choice, True/False, Chain-of-Thought True/False, Question Answering, and Text Completion. If the model has a robust ToM, it should be able to achieve good performance for different prompts across different tests. We evaluated two GPT-3.5 models, text-davinci-003 and gpt-3.5-turbo-0301, with our datasets. Our results indicate that consistent performance in ToM tasks remains a challenge.

In real-world scenarios, typical visual recognition systems could fail under two major causes, i.e., the misclassification between known classes and the excusable misbehavior on unknown-class images. To tackle these deficiencies, flexible visual recognition should dynamically predict multiple classes when they are unconfident between choices and reject making predictions when the input is entirely out of the training distribution. Two challenges emerge along with this novel task. First, prediction uncertainty should be separately quantified as confusion depicting inter-class uncertainties and ignorance identifying out-of-distribution samples. Second, both confusion and ignorance should be comparable between samples to enable effective decision-making. In this paper, we propose to model these two sources of uncertainty explicitly with the theory of Subjective Logic. Regarding recognition as an evidence-collecting process, confusion is then defined as conflicting evidence, while ignorance is the absence of evidence. By predicting Dirichlet concentration parameters for singletons, comprehensive subjective opinions, including confusion and ignorance, could be achieved via further evidence combinations. Through a series of experiments on synthetic data analysis, visual recognition, and open-set detection, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our methods in quantifying two sources of uncertainties and dealing with flexible recognition.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) have recently demonstrated impressive capabilities in complex reasoning tasks by leveraging increased test-time computation and exhibiting behaviors reminiscent of human-like self-reflection. While LRMs show a clear capacity for valuable self-reflection, how this ability interacts with other model behaviors remains underexplored. We investigate this connection by analyzing verbalized confidence, how models articulate their certainty, as a lens into the nature of self-reflection in LRMs. We find that supervised fine-tuning on reasoning traces (i.e., distillation) and reinforcement learning can improve verbalized calibration in reasoning-intensive settings in a progressive, laddered fashion. However, our results also indicate that reasoning models may possess a diminished awareness of their own knowledge boundaries, as evidenced by significantly lower "I don't know" response rates on factuality benchmarks. Moreover, we examine the relationship between verbalized confidence and reasoning chains, finding that models tend to express higher confidence when providing shorter or less elaborate reasoning. Our findings highlight how reasoning-oriented training can enhance performance in reasoning-centric tasks while potentially incurring a "reasoning tax," a cost reflected in the model's reduced ability to accurately recognize the limits of its own knowledge in small-scale models. More broadly, our work showcases how this erosion of knowledge boundaries can compromise model faithfulness, as models grow more confident without a commensurate understanding of when they should abstain.

Opinions are an integral part of how we perceive the world and each other. They shape collective action, playing a role in democratic processes, the evolution of norms, and cultural change. For decades, researchers in the social and natural sciences have tried to describe how shifting individual perspectives and social exchange lead to archetypal states of public opinion like consensus and polarization. Here we review some of the many contributions to the field, focusing both on idealized models of opinion dynamics, and attempts at validating them with observational data and controlled sociological experiments. By further closing the gap between models and data, these efforts may help us understand how to face current challenges that require the agreement of large groups of people in complex scenarios, such as economic inequality, climate change, and the ongoing fracture of the sociopolitical landscape.

Linguistic cues such as "I believe" and "probably" offer an intuitive interface for communicating confidence, yet a generalisable, principled calibration framework for linguistic confidence expressions remains underexplored. In particular, co-occurring linguistic cues, contextual variation, and subjective audience interpretation pose unique challenges. We therefore model linguistic confidence as a distribution over plausible perceived probability values that a statement is correct, capturing interpretation variability that scalar representations discard. Within this distributional framework, we introduce faithfulness as a complementary evaluation dimension and present Faithfulness Divergence (FD), an information-theoretic metric quantifying the surprise induced in audience beliefs upon truth revelation. Building on these foundations, we present Retrieval-Augmented Linguistic Calibration (RALC), a lightweight post-hoc pipeline that propagates calibrated confidence signals back into natural language via retrieval-augmented rewriting. Across three QA benchmarks and five LLM families, RALC improves in-domain faithfulness and calibration up to 66% and 58%, respectively, outperforming black-box and grey-box calibration baselines.

Social biases and belief-driven behaviors can significantly impact Large Language Models (LLMs) decisions on several tasks. As LLMs are increasingly used in multi-agent systems for societal simulations, their ability to model fundamental group psychological characteristics remains critical yet under-explored. In this study, we present a multi-agent framework that simulates belief congruence, a classical group psychology theory that plays a crucial role in shaping societal interactions and preferences. Our findings reveal that LLMs exhibit amplified belief congruence compared to humans, across diverse contexts. We further investigate the implications of this behavior on two downstream tasks: (1) misinformation dissemination and (2) LLM learning, finding that belief congruence in LLMs increases misinformation dissemination and impedes learning. To mitigate these negative impacts, we propose strategies inspired by: (1) contact hypothesis, (2) accuracy nudges, and (3) global citizenship framework. Our results show that the best strategies reduce misinformation dissemination by up to 37% and enhance learning by 11%. Bridging social psychology and AI, our work provides insights to navigate real-world interactions using LLMs while addressing belief-driven biases.

The notions of disintegration and Bayesian inversion are fundamental in conditional probability theory. They produce channels, as conditional probabilities, from a joint state, or from an already given channel (in opposite direction). These notions exist in the literature, in concrete situations, but are presented here in abstract graphical formulations. The resulting abstract descriptions are used for proving basic results in conditional probability theory. The existence of disintegration and Bayesian inversion is discussed for discrete probability, and also for measure-theoretic probability --- via standard Borel spaces and via likelihoods. Finally, the usefulness of disintegration and Bayesian inversion is illustrated in several examples.

Deception is prevalent in human social settings. However, studies into the effect of deception on reinforcement learning algorithms have been limited to simplistic settings, restricting their applicability to complex real-world problems. This paper addresses this by introducing a new mixed competitive-cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) environment inspired by popular role-based deception games such as Werewolf, Avalon, and Among Us. The environment's unique challenge lies in the necessity to cooperate with other agents despite not knowing if they are friend or foe. Furthermore, we introduce a model of deception, which we call Bayesian belief manipulation (BBM) and demonstrate its effectiveness at deceiving other agents in this environment while also increasing the deceiving agent's performance.

State representation learning, or the ability to capture latent generative factors of an environment, is crucial for building intelligent agents that can perform a wide variety of tasks. Learning such representations without supervision from rewards is a challenging open problem. We introduce a method that learns state representations by maximizing mutual information across spatially and temporally distinct features of a neural encoder of the observations. We also introduce a new benchmark based on Atari 2600 games where we evaluate representations based on how well they capture the ground truth state variables. We believe this new framework for evaluating representation learning models will be crucial for future representation learning research. Finally, we compare our technique with other state-of-the-art generative and contrastive representation learning methods. The code associated with this work is available at https://github.com/mila-iqia/atari-representation-learning

We develop Markov categories as a framework for synthetic probability and statistics, following work of Golubtsov as well as Cho and Jacobs. This means that we treat the following concepts in purely abstract categorical terms: conditioning and disintegration; various versions of conditional independence and its standard properties; conditional products; almost surely; sufficient statistics; versions of theorems on sufficient statistics due to Fisher--Neyman, Basu, and Bahadur. Besides the conceptual clarity offered by our categorical setup, its main advantage is that it provides a uniform treatment of various types of probability theory, including discrete probability theory, measure-theoretic probability with general measurable spaces, Gaussian probability, stochastic processes of either of these kinds, and many others.

Modern natural language models such as the GPT-2/GPT-3 contain tremendous amounts of information about human belief in a consistently testable form. If these models could be shown to accurately reflect the underlying beliefs of the human beings that produced the data used to train these models, then such models become a powerful sociological tool in ways that are distinct from traditional methods, such as interviews and surveys. In this study, We train a version of the GPT-2 on a corpora of historical chess games, and then "launch" clusters of synthetic agents into the model, using text strings to create context and orientation. We compare the trajectories contained in the text generated by the agents/model and compare that to the known ground truth of the chess board, move legality, and historical patterns of play. We find that the percentages of moves by piece using the model are substantially similar from human patterns. We further find that the model creates an accurate latent representation of the chessboard, and that it is possible to plot trajectories of legal moves across the board using this knowledge.

Do larger and more capable language models learn to update their "beliefs" about propositions more consistently with Bayes' theorem when presented with evidence in-context? To test this, we formulate a Bayesian Coherence Coefficient (BCC) metric and generate a dataset with which to measure the BCC. We measure BCC for multiple pre-trained-only language models across five model families, comparing against the number of model parameters, the amount of training data, and model scores on common benchmarks. Our results provide evidence for our hypothesis that larger and more capable pre-trained language models assign credences that are more coherent with Bayes' theorem. These results have important implications for our understanding and governance of LLMs.