Daily Papers

A core process in human cognition is analogical mapping: the ability to identify a similar relational structure between different situations. We introduce a novel task, Visual Analogies of Situation Recognition, adapting the classical word-analogy task into the visual domain. Given a triplet of images, the task is to select an image candidate B' that completes the analogy (A to A' is like B to what?). Unlike previous work on visual analogy that focused on simple image transformations, we tackle complex analogies requiring understanding of scenes. We leverage situation recognition annotations and the CLIP model to generate a large set of 500k candidate analogies. Crowdsourced annotations for a sample of the data indicate that humans agree with the dataset label ~80% of the time (chance level 25%). Furthermore, we use human annotations to create a gold-standard dataset of 3,820 validated analogies. Our experiments demonstrate that state-of-the-art models do well when distractors are chosen randomly (~86%), but struggle with carefully chosen distractors (~53%, compared to 90% human accuracy). We hope our dataset will encourage the development of new analogy-making models. Website: https://vasr-dataset.github.io/

Analogy-making between narratives is crucial for human reasoning. In this paper, we evaluate the ability to identify and generate analogies by constructing a first-of-its-kind large-scale story-level analogy corpus, StoryAnalogy, which contains 24K story pairs from diverse domains with human annotations on two similarities from the extended Structure-Mapping Theory. We design a set of tests on StoryAnalogy, presenting the first evaluation of story-level analogy identification and generation. Interestingly, we find that the analogy identification tasks are incredibly difficult not only for sentence embedding models but also for the recent large language models (LLMs) such as ChatGPT and LLaMa. ChatGPT, for example, only achieved around 30% accuracy in multiple-choice questions (compared to over 85% accuracy for humans). Furthermore, we observe that the data in StoryAnalogy can improve the quality of analogy generation in LLMs, where a fine-tuned FlanT5-xxl model achieves comparable performance to zero-shot ChatGPT.

Abstract visual reasoning (AVR) encompasses a suite of tasks whose solving requires the ability to discover common concepts underlying the set of pictures through an analogy-making process, similarly to human IQ tests. Bongard Problems (BPs), proposed in 1968, constitute a fundamental challenge in this domain mainly due to their requirement to combine visual reasoning and verbal description. This work poses a question whether multimodal large language models (MLLMs) inherently designed to combine vision and language are capable of tackling BPs. To this end, we propose a set of diverse MLLM-suited strategies to tackle BPs and examine four popular proprietary MLLMs: GPT-4o, GPT-4 Turbo, Gemini 1.5 Pro, and Claude 3.5 Sonnet, and four open models: InternVL2-8B, LLaVa-1.6 Mistral-7B, Phi-3.5-Vision, and Pixtral 12B. The above MLLMs are compared on three BP datasets: a set of original BP instances relying on synthetic, geometry-based images and two recent datasets based on real-world images, i.e., Bongard-HOI and Bongard-OpenWorld. The experiments reveal significant limitations of MLLMs in solving BPs. In particular, the models struggle to solve the classical set of synthetic BPs, despite their visual simplicity. Though their performance ameliorates on real-world concepts expressed in Bongard-HOI and Bongard-OpenWorld, the models still have difficulty in utilizing new information to improve their predictions, as well as utilizing a dialog context window effectively. To capture the reasons of performance discrepancy between synthetic and real-world AVR domains, we propose Bongard-RWR, a new BP dataset consisting of real-world images that translates concepts from hand-crafted synthetic BPs to real-world concepts. The MLLMs' results on Bongard-RWR suggest that their poor performance on classical BPs is not due to domain specificity but rather reflects their general AVR limitations.

Seismic advances in generative AI algorithms for imagery, text, and other data types has led to the temptation to use synthetic data to train next-generation models. Repeating this process creates an autophagous (self-consuming) loop whose properties are poorly understood. We conduct a thorough analytical and empirical analysis using state-of-the-art generative image models of three families of autophagous loops that differ in how fixed or fresh real training data is available through the generations of training and in whether the samples from previous generation models have been biased to trade off data quality versus diversity. Our primary conclusion across all scenarios is that without enough fresh real data in each generation of an autophagous loop, future generative models are doomed to have their quality (precision) or diversity (recall) progressively decrease. We term this condition Model Autophagy Disorder (MAD), making analogy to mad cow disease.

This paper examines the encoding of analogy in large-scale pretrained language models, such as BERT and GPT-2. Existing analogy datasets typically focus on a limited set of analogical relations, with a high similarity of the two domains between which the analogy holds. As a more realistic setup, we introduce the Scientific and Creative Analogy dataset (SCAN), a novel analogy dataset containing systematic mappings of multiple attributes and relational structures across dissimilar domains. Using this dataset, we test the analogical reasoning capabilities of several widely-used pretrained language models (LMs). We find that state-of-the-art LMs achieve low performance on these complex analogy tasks, highlighting the challenges still posed by analogy understanding.

We propose a novel application of prompting Pre-trained Language Models (PLMs) to generate analogies and study how to design effective prompts for two task settings: generating a source concept analogous to a given target concept (aka Analogous Concept Generation or ACG), and generating an explanation of the similarity between a given pair of target concept and source concept (aka Analogous Explanation Generation or AEG). We found that it is feasible to prompt InstructGPT to generate meaningful analogies and the best prompts tend to be precise imperative statements especially with a low temperature setting. We also systematically analyzed the sensitivity of the InstructGPT model to prompt design, temperature, and injected spelling errors, and found that the model is particularly sensitive to certain variations (e.g., questions vs. imperative statements). Further, we conducted human evaluation on 1.4k of the generated analogies and found that the quality of generations varies substantially by model size. The largest InstructGPT model can achieve human-level performance at generating meaningful analogies for a given target while there is still room for improvement on the AEG task.

Large language models have been shown to suffer from reasoning inconsistency issues. That is, they fail more in situations unfamiliar to the training data, even though exact or very similar reasoning paths exist in more common cases that they can successfully solve. Such observations motivate us to propose methods that encourage models to understand the high-level and abstract reasoning processes during training instead of only the final answer. This way, models can transfer the exact solution to similar cases, regardless of their relevance to the pre-training data distribution. In this work, we propose SAL, a self-supervised analogical learning framework. SAL mimics the human analogy process and trains models to explicitly transfer high-quality symbolic solutions from cases that they know how to solve to other rare cases in which they tend to fail more. We show that the resulting models after SAL learning outperform base language models on a wide range of reasoning benchmarks, such as StrategyQA, GSM8K, and HotpotQA, by 2% to 20%. At the same time, we show that our model is more generalizable and controllable through analytical studies.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting for language models demonstrates impressive performance across reasoning tasks, but typically needs labeled exemplars of the reasoning process. In this work, we introduce a new prompting approach, Analogical Prompting, designed to automatically guide the reasoning process of large language models. Inspired by analogical reasoning, a cognitive process in which humans draw from relevant past experiences to tackle new problems, our approach prompts language models to self-generate relevant exemplars or knowledge in the context, before proceeding to solve the given problem. This method presents several advantages: it obviates the need for labeling or retrieving exemplars, offering generality and convenience; it can also tailor the generated exemplars and knowledge to each problem, offering adaptability. Experimental results show that our approach outperforms 0-shot CoT and manual few-shot CoT in a variety of reasoning tasks, including math problem solving in GSM8K and MATH, code generation in Codeforces, and other reasoning tasks in BIG-Bench.

The ability of Large Language Models (LLMs) to encode syntactic and semantic structures of language is well examined in NLP. Additionally, analogy identification, in the form of word analogies are extensively studied in the last decade of language modeling literature. In this work we specifically look at how LLMs' abilities to capture sentence analogies (sentences that convey analogous meaning to each other) vary with LLMs' abilities to encode syntactic and semantic structures of sentences. Through our analysis, we find that LLMs' ability to identify sentence analogies is positively correlated with their ability to encode syntactic and semantic structures of sentences. Specifically, we find that the LLMs which capture syntactic structures better, also have higher abilities in identifying sentence analogies.

The ability to recognize analogies is fundamental to human cognition. Existing benchmarks to test word analogy do not reveal the underneath process of analogical reasoning of neural models. Holding the belief that models capable of reasoning should be right for the right reasons, we propose a first-of-its-kind Explainable Knowledge-intensive Analogical Reasoning benchmark (E-KAR). Our benchmark consists of 1,655 (in Chinese) and 1,251 (in English) problems sourced from the Civil Service Exams, which require intensive background knowledge to solve. More importantly, we design a free-text explanation scheme to explain whether an analogy should be drawn, and manually annotate them for each and every question and candidate answer. Empirical results suggest that this benchmark is very challenging for some state-of-the-art models for both explanation generation and analogical question answering tasks, which invites further research in this area.

Over the past decade, analogies, in the form of word-level analogies, have played a significant role as an intrinsic measure of evaluating the quality of word embedding methods such as word2vec. Modern large language models (LLMs), however, are primarily evaluated on extrinsic measures based on benchmarks such as GLUE and SuperGLUE, and there are only a few investigations on whether LLMs can draw analogies between long texts. In this paper, we present ANALOGICAL, a new benchmark to intrinsically evaluate LLMs across a taxonomy of analogies of long text with six levels of complexity -- (i) word, (ii) word vs. sentence, (iii) syntactic, (iv) negation, (v) entailment, and (vi) metaphor. Using thirteen datasets and three different distance measures, we evaluate the abilities of eight LLMs in identifying analogical pairs in the semantic vector space. Our evaluation finds that it is increasingly challenging for LLMs to identify analogies when going up the analogy taxonomy.

Analogical reasoning is a unique ability of humans to address unfamiliar challenges by transferring strategies from relevant past experiences. One key finding in psychology is that compared with irrelevant past experiences, recalling relevant ones can help humans better handle new tasks. Coincidentally, the NLP community has also recently found that self-generating relevant examples in the context can help large language models (LLMs) better solve a given problem than hand-crafted prompts. However, it is yet not clear whether relevance is the key factor eliciting such capability, i.e., can LLMs benefit more from self-generated relevant examples than irrelevant ones? In this work, we systematically explore whether LLMs can truly perform analogical reasoning on a diverse set of reasoning tasks. With extensive experiments and analysis, we show that self-generated random examples can surprisingly achieve comparable or even better performance, e.g., 4% performance boost on GSM8K with random biological examples. We find that the accuracy of self-generated examples is the key factor and subsequently design two improved methods with significantly reduced inference costs. Overall, we aim to advance a deeper understanding of LLM analogical reasoning and hope this work stimulates further research in the design of self-generated contexts.

Humans regularly engage in analogical thinking, relating personal experiences to current situations (X is analogous to Y because of Z). Analogical thinking allows humans to solve problems in creative ways, grasp difficult concepts, and articulate ideas more effectively. Can language models (LMs) do the same? To answer this question, we propose ANALOBENCH, a benchmark to determine analogical reasoning ability in LMs. Our benchmarking approach focuses on aspects of this ability that are common among humans: (i) recalling related experiences from a large amount of information, and (ii) applying analogical reasoning to complex and lengthy scenarios. We test a broad collection of proprietary models (e.g., GPT family, Claude V2) and open source models such as LLaMA2. As in prior results, scaling up LMs results in some performance boosts. Surprisingly, scale offers minimal gains when, (i) analogies involve lengthy scenarios, or (ii) recalling relevant scenarios from a large pool of information, a process analogous to finding a needle in a haystack. We hope these observations encourage further research in this field.

Analogies test a model's ability to infer implicit relationships between concepts, making them a key benchmark for evaluating reasoning capabilities. While large language models (LLMs) are widely evaluated for reasoning in English, their abilities in Indic languages remain understudied, limiting our understanding of whether these models generalize across languages. To address this gap, we introduce a new Hindi Analogy Test Set (HATS), comprising 405 multiple-choice questions sourced from Indian government exams. We benchmark state-of-the-art multilingual LLMs using various prompting strategies and introduce a grounded Chain of Thought approach that leverages cognitive theories of analogical reasoning. This approach improves model performance on Hindi analogy questions. Our experiments show that models perform best with English prompts, irrespective of the prompting strategy. Our test set addresses the lack of a critical resource to evaluate LLM reasoning capabilities in Hindi.

Large language models (LLMs) are known to struggle with complicated reasoning tasks such as math word problems (MWPs). In this paper, we present how analogy from similarly structured questions can improve LLMs' problem-solving capabilities for MWPs. Specifically, we rely on the retrieval of problems with similar computational graphs to the given question to serve as exemplars in the prompt, providing the correct reasoning path for the generation model to refer to. Empirical results across six math word problem datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed method, which achieves a significant improvement of up to 6.7 percent on average in absolute value, compared to baseline methods. These results highlight our method's potential in addressing the reasoning challenges in current LLMs.

In their recent Nature Human Behaviour paper, "Emergent analogical reasoning in large language models," (Webb, Holyoak, and Lu, 2023) the authors argue that "large language models such as GPT-3 have acquired an emergent ability to find zero-shot solutions to a broad range of analogy problems." In this response, we provide counterexamples of the letter string analogies. In our tests, GPT-3 fails to solve even the easiest variants of the problems presented in the original paper. Zero-shot reasoning is an extraordinary claim that requires extraordinary evidence. We do not see that evidence in our experiments. To strengthen claims of humanlike reasoning such as zero-shot reasoning, it is important that the field develop approaches that rule out data memorization.

In this study, we investigate in-context learning (ICL) in document-level event argument extraction (EAE) to alleviate the dependency on large-scale labeled data for this task. We introduce the Heuristic-Driven Link-of-Analogy (HD-LoA) prompting to address the challenge of example selection and to develop a prompting strategy tailored for EAE. Specifically, we hypothesize and validate that LLMs learn task-specific heuristics from demonstrations via ICL. Building upon this hypothesis, we introduce an explicit heuristic-driven demonstration construction approach, which transforms the haphazard example selection process into a methodical method that emphasizes task heuristics. Additionally, inspired by the analogical reasoning of human, we propose the link-of-analogy prompting, which enables LLMs to process new situations by drawing analogies to known situations, enhancing their performance on unseen classes beyond limited ICL examples. Experiments show that our method outperforms existing prompting methods and few-shot supervised learning methods on document-level EAE datasets. Additionally, the HD-LoA prompting shows effectiveness in diverse tasks like sentiment analysis and natural language inference, demonstrating its broad adaptability.

While static word embedding models are known to represent linguistic analogies as parallel lines in high-dimensional space, the underlying mechanism as to why they result in such geometric structures remains obscure. We find that an elementary contrastive-style method employed over distributional information performs competitively with popular word embedding models on analogy recovery tasks, while achieving dramatic speedups in training time. Further, we demonstrate that a contrastive loss is sufficient to create these parallel structures in word embeddings, and establish a precise relationship between the co-occurrence statistics and the geometric structure of the resulting word embeddings.

The recent advent of large language models has reinvigorated debate over whether human cognitive capacities might emerge in such generic models given sufficient training data. Of particular interest is the ability of these models to reason about novel problems zero-shot, without any direct training. In human cognition, this capacity is closely tied to an ability to reason by analogy. Here, we performed a direct comparison between human reasoners and a large language model (the text-davinci-003 variant of GPT-3) on a range of analogical tasks, including a non-visual matrix reasoning task based on the rule structure of Raven's Standard Progressive Matrices. We found that GPT-3 displayed a surprisingly strong capacity for abstract pattern induction, matching or even surpassing human capabilities in most settings; preliminary tests of GPT-4 indicated even better performance. Our results indicate that large language models such as GPT-3 have acquired an emergent ability to find zero-shot solutions to a broad range of analogy problems.

Analogical reasoning is at the core of human cognition, serving as an important foundation for a variety of intellectual activities. While prior work has shown that LLMs can represent task patterns and surface-level concepts, it remains unclear whether these models can encode high-level relational concepts and apply them to novel situations through structured comparisons. In this work, we explore this fundamental aspect using proportional and story analogies, and identify three key findings. First, LLMs effectively encode the underlying relationships between analogous entities; both attributive and relational information propagate through mid-upper layers in correct cases, whereas reasoning failures reflect missing relational information within these layers. Second, unlike humans, LLMs often struggle not only when relational information is missing, but also when attempting to apply it to new entities. In such cases, strategically patching hidden representations at critical token positions can facilitate information transfer to a certain extent. Lastly, successful analogical reasoning in LLMs is marked by strong structural alignment between analogous situations, whereas failures often reflect degraded or misplaced alignment. Overall, our findings reveal that LLMs exhibit emerging but limited capabilities in encoding and applying high-level relational concepts, highlighting both parallels and gaps with human cognition.

Despite the recent proliferation of large language models (LLMs), their training recipes -- model architecture, pre-training data and optimization algorithm -- are often very similar. This naturally raises the question of the similarity among the resulting models. In this paper, we propose a novel setting, imaginary question answering (IQA), to better understand model similarity. In IQA, we ask one model to generate purely imaginary questions (e.g., on completely made-up concepts in physics) and prompt another model to answer. Surprisingly, despite the total fictionality of these questions, all models can answer each other's questions with remarkable success, suggesting a "shared imagination space" in which these models operate during such hallucinations. We conduct a series of investigations into this phenomenon and discuss implications on model homogeneity, hallucination, and computational creativity.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated promising capabilities in solving mathematical reasoning tasks, leveraging Chain-of-Thought (CoT) data as a vital component in guiding answer generation. Current paradigms typically generate CoT and answers directly for a given problem, diverging from human problem-solving strategies to some extent. Humans often solve problems by recalling analogous cases and leveraging their solutions to reason about the current task. Inspired by this cognitive process, we propose MetaLadder, a novel framework that explicitly prompts LLMs to recall and reflect on meta-problems, those structurally or semantically analogous problems, alongside their CoT solutions before addressing the target problem. Additionally, we introduce a problem-restating mechanism to enhance the model's comprehension of the target problem by regenerating the original question, which further improves reasoning accuracy. Therefore, the model can achieve reasoning transfer from analogical problems, mimicking human-like "learning from examples" and generalization abilities. Extensive experiments on mathematical benchmarks demonstrate that our MetaLadder significantly boosts LLMs' problem-solving accuracy, largely outperforming standard CoT-based methods (10.3\% accuracy gain) and other methods. Our code and data has been released at https://github.com/LHL3341/MetaLadder.

Making analogies is fundamental to cognition. Proportional analogies, which consist of four terms, are often used to assess linguistic and cognitive abilities. For instance, completing analogies like "Oxygen is to Gas as <blank> is to <blank>" requires identifying the semantic relationship (e.g., "type of") between the first pair of terms ("Oxygen" and "Gas") and finding a second pair that shares the same relationship (e.g., "Aluminum" and "Metal"). In this work, we introduce a 15K Multiple-Choice Question Answering (MCQA) dataset for proportional analogy completion and evaluate the performance of contemporary Large Language Models (LLMs) in various knowledge-enhanced prompt settings. Specifically, we augment prompts with three types of knowledge: exemplar, structured, and targeted. Our results show that despite extensive training data, solving proportional analogies remains challenging for current LLMs, with the best model achieving an accuracy of 55%. Notably, we find that providing targeted knowledge can better assist models in completing proportional analogies compared to providing exemplars or collections of structured knowledge.

Modern large language models (LLMs) employ various forms of logical inference, both implicitly and explicitly, when addressing reasoning tasks. Understanding how to optimally leverage these inference paradigms is critical for advancing LLMs' reasoning capabilities. This paper adopts an exploratory approach by introducing a controlled evaluation environment for analogical reasoning -- a fundamental cognitive task -- that is systematically parameterized across three dimensions: modality (textual, visual, symbolic), difficulty (easy, medium, hard), and task format (multiple-choice or free-text generation). We analyze the comparative dynamics of inductive, abductive, and deductive inference pipelines across these dimensions, and demonstrate that our findings generalize to broader in-context learning tasks. Additionally, we investigate advanced paradigms such as hypothesis selection, verification, and refinement, revealing their potential to scale up logical inference in LLM reasoning. This exploratory study provides a foundation for future research in enhancing LLM reasoning through systematic logical inference strategies.

Historical analogies, which compare known past events with contemporary but unfamiliar events, are important abilities that help people make decisions and understand the world. However, research in applied history suggests that people have difficulty finding appropriate analogies. And previous studies in the AI community have also overlooked historical analogies. To fill this gap, in this paper, we focus on the historical analogy acquisition task, which aims to acquire analogous historical events for a given event. We explore retrieval and generation methods for acquiring historical analogies based on different large language models (LLMs). Furthermore, we propose a self-reflection method to mitigate hallucinations and stereotypes when LLMs generate historical analogies. Through human evaluations and our specially designed automatic multi-dimensional assessment, we find that LLMs generally have a good potential for historical analogies. And the performance of the models can be further improved by using our self-reflection method.

Human languages are full of metaphorical expressions. Metaphors help people understand the world by connecting new concepts and domains to more familiar ones. Large pre-trained language models (PLMs) are therefore assumed to encode metaphorical knowledge useful for NLP systems. In this paper, we investigate this hypothesis for PLMs, by probing metaphoricity information in their encodings, and by measuring the cross-lingual and cross-dataset generalization of this information. We present studies in multiple metaphor detection datasets and in four languages (i.e., English, Spanish, Russian, and Farsi). Our extensive experiments suggest that contextual representations in PLMs do encode metaphorical knowledge, and mostly in their middle layers. The knowledge is transferable between languages and datasets, especially when the annotation is consistent across training and testing sets. Our findings give helpful insights for both cognitive and NLP scientists.

Large language models (LLMs) have a substantial capacity for high-level analogical reasoning: reproducing patterns in linear text that occur in their training data (zero-shot evaluation) or in the provided context (few-shot in-context learning). However, recent studies show that even the more advanced LLMs fail in scenarios that require reasoning over multiple objects or facts and making sequences of logical deductions. We propose a two-stage probabilistic inference paradigm, ThinkSum, which reasons over sets of objects or facts in a structured manner. In the first stage (Think - retrieval of associations), a LLM is queried in parallel over a set of phrases extracted from the prompt or an auxiliary model call. In the second stage (Sum - probabilistic inference or reasoning), the results of these queries are aggregated to make the final prediction. We demonstrate the possibilities and advantages of ThinkSum on the BIG-bench suite of LLM evaluation tasks, achieving improvements over the state of the art using GPT-family models on thirteen difficult tasks, often with far smaller model variants. We also compare and contrast ThinkSum with other proposed modifications to direct prompting of LLMs, such as variants of chain-of-thought prompting. Our results suggest that because the probabilistic inference in ThinkSum is performed outside of calls to the LLM, ThinkSum is less sensitive to prompt design, yields more interpretable predictions, and can be flexibly combined with latent variable models to extract structured knowledge from LLMs. Overall, our proposed paradigm represents a promising approach for enhancing the reasoning capabilities of LLMs.

Artificial intelligence (AI) systems, and Large Language Models (LLMs) in particular, are increasingly employed for creative tasks like scientific idea generation, constituting a form of generalization from training data unaddressed by existing conceptual frameworks. Despite its similarities to compositional generalization (CG), combinatorial creativity (CC) is an open-ended ability. Instead of evaluating for accuracy or correctness against fixed targets, which would contradict the open-ended nature of CC, we propose a theoretical framework and algorithmic task for evaluating outputs by their degrees of novelty and utility. From here, we make several important empirical contributions: (1) We obtain the first insights into the scaling behavior of creativity for LLMs. (2) We discover that, for fixed compute budgets, there exist optimal model depths and widths for creative ability. (3) We find that the ideation-execution gap, whereby LLMs excel at generating novel scientific ideas but struggle to ensure their practical feasibility, may be explained by a more fundamental novelty-utility tradeoff characteristic of creativity algorithms in general. Importantly, this tradeoff remains persistent even at scale, casting doubt on the long-term creative potential of LLMs in their current form. Together, our conceptual framework and empirical findings provide a foundation for understanding and improving creativity in modern AI models, bridging the gap between human and machine intelligence.

Integer sequences are of central importance to the modeling of concepts admitting complete finitary descriptions. We introduce a novel view on the learning of such concepts and lay down a set of benchmarking tasks aimed at conceptual understanding by machine learning models. These tasks indirectly assess model ability to abstract, and challenge them to reason both interpolatively and extrapolatively from the knowledge gained by observing representative examples. To further aid research in knowledge representation and reasoning, we present FACT, the Finitary Abstraction Comprehension Toolkit. The toolkit surrounds a large dataset of integer sequences comprising both organic and synthetic entries, a library for data pre-processing and generation, a set of model performance evaluation tools, and a collection of baseline model implementations, enabling the making of the future advancements with ease.

Certain statistical models are capable of interpreting input strings as instructions, or prompts, and carry out tasks based on them. Many approaches to prompting and pre-training these models involve the automated generation of these prompts. We call these approaches meta-prompting, or prompting to obtain prompts. We propose a theoretical framework based on category theory to generalize and describe them. This framework is flexible enough to account for LLM stochasticity; and allows us to obtain formal results around task agnosticity and equivalence of various meta-prompting approaches. We experiment with meta-prompting in two active areas of model research: creativity and ideation. We find that user preference favors (p < 0.01) the prompts generated under meta-prompting, as well as their corresponding outputs, over a series of hardcoded baseline prompts that include the original task prompt. Using our framework, we argue that meta-prompting is more effective than basic prompting at generating desirable outputs.

Analogical reasoning is fundamental to human cognition and holds an important place in various fields. However, previous studies mainly focus on single-modal analogical reasoning and ignore taking advantage of structure knowledge. Notably, the research in cognitive psychology has demonstrated that information from multimodal sources always brings more powerful cognitive transfer than single modality sources. To this end, we introduce the new task of multimodal analogical reasoning over knowledge graphs, which requires multimodal reasoning ability with the help of background knowledge. Specifically, we construct a Multimodal Analogical Reasoning dataSet (MARS) and a multimodal knowledge graph MarKG. We evaluate with multimodal knowledge graph embedding and pre-trained Transformer baselines, illustrating the potential challenges of the proposed task. We further propose a novel model-agnostic Multimodal analogical reasoning framework with Transformer (MarT) motivated by the structure mapping theory, which can obtain better performance. Code and datasets are available in https://github.com/zjunlp/MKG_Analogy.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable success in reasoning tasks with the development of prompting methods. However, existing prompting approaches cannot reuse insights of solving similar problems and suffer from accumulated errors in multi-step reasoning, since they prompt LLMs to reason from scratch. To address these issues, we propose \textit{Thought Propagation (TP)}, which explores the analogous problems and leverages their solutions to enhance the complex reasoning ability of LLMs. These analogous problems are related to the input one, with reusable solutions and problem-solving strategies. Thus, it is promising to propagate insights of solving previous analogous problems to inspire new problem-solving. To achieve this, TP first prompts LLMs to propose and solve a set of analogous problems that are related to the input one. Then, TP reuses the results of analogous problems to directly yield a new solution or derive a knowledge-intensive plan for execution to amend the initial solution obtained from scratch. TP is compatible with existing prompting approaches, allowing plug-and-play generalization and enhancement in a wide range of tasks without much labor in task-specific prompt engineering. Experiments across three challenging tasks demonstrate TP enjoys a substantial improvement over the baselines by an average of 12\% absolute increase in finding the optimal solutions in Shortest-path Reasoning, 13\% improvement of human preference in Creative Writing, and 15\% enhancement in the task completion rate of LLM-Agent Planning.

When faced with novel situations, people are able to marshal relevant considerations from a wide range of background knowledge and put these to use in inferences and predictions. What permits us to draw in globally relevant information and reason over it coherently? Here, we explore the hypothesis that people use a combination of distributed and symbolic representations to construct bespoke mental models tailored to novel situations. We propose a computational implementation of this idea -- a ``Model Synthesis Architecture'' (MSA) -- using language models to implement global relevance-based retrieval and model synthesis and probabilistic programs to implement bespoke, coherent world models. We evaluate our MSA as a model of human judgments on a novel reasoning dataset. The dataset -- built around a `Model Olympics` domain of sports vignettes -- tests models' capacity for human-like, open-ended reasoning by requiring (i) judgments about novel causal structures described in language; (ii) drawing on large bodies of background knowledge; and (iii) doing both in light of observations that introduce arbitrary novel variables. Our MSA approach captures human judgments better than language model-only baselines, under both direct and chain-of-thought generations from the LM that supports model synthesis. These results suggest that MSAs can be implemented in a way that mirrors people's ability to deliver locally coherent reasoning over globally relevant variables, offering a path to understanding and replicating human reasoning in open-ended domains.

Complex hierarchical structures composed of simple nanoscale building blocks form the basis of most biological materials. Here we demonstrate how analogies between seemingly different fields enable the understanding of general principles by which functional properties in hierarchical systems emerge, similar to an analogy learning process. Specifically, natural hierarchical materials like spider silk exhibit properties comparable to classical music in terms of their hierarchical structure and function. As a comparative tool here we apply hierarchical ontology logs (olog) that follow a rigorous mathematical formulation based on category theory to provide an insightful system representation by expressing knowledge in a conceptual map. We explain the process of analogy creation, draw connections at several levels of hierarchy and identify similar patterns that govern the structure of the hierarchical systems silk and music and discuss the impact of the derived analogy for nanotechnology.

In this paper, we explore a new way for user targeting, where non-expert marketers could select their target users solely given demands in natural language form. The key to this issue is how to transform natural languages into practical structured logical languages, i.e., the structured understanding of marketer demands. Considering the impressive natural language processing ability of large language models (LLMs), we try to leverage LLMs to solve this issue. Past research indicates that the reasoning ability of LLMs can be effectively enhanced through chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting. But existing methods still have some limitations: (1) Previous methods either use simple "Let's think step by step" spells or provide fixed examples in demonstrations without considering compatibility between prompts and questions, making LLMs ineffective in some complex reasoning tasks such as structured language transformation. (2) Previous methods are often implemented in closed-source models or excessively large models, which is not suitable in industrial practical scenarios. Based on these, we propose ARALLM (i.e., Analogical Reasoning Augmented Large Language Models) consisting of two modules: Analogical Reasoning based Prompting and Reasoning-Augmented Multi-Task Model Distillation.

Many methods now exist for conditioning model outputs on task instructions, retrieved documents, and user-provided explanations and feedback. Rather than relying solely on examples of task inputs and outputs, these approaches use valuable additional data for improving model correctness and aligning learned models with human priors. Meanwhile, a growing body of evidence suggests that some language models can (1) store a large amount of knowledge in their parameters, and (2) perform inference over tasks in textual inputs at test time. These results raise the possibility that, for some tasks, humans cannot explain to a model any more about the task than it already knows or could infer on its own. In this paper, we study the circumstances under which explanations of individual data points can (or cannot) improve modeling performance. In order to carefully control important properties of the data and explanations, we introduce a synthetic dataset for experiments, and we also make use of three existing datasets with explanations: e-SNLI, TACRED, and SemEval. We first give a formal framework for the available modeling approaches, in which explanation data can be used as model inputs, as targets, or as a prior. After arguing that the most promising role for explanation data is as model inputs, we propose to use a retrieval-based method and show that it solves our synthetic task with accuracies upwards of 95%, while baselines without explanation data achieve below 65% accuracy. We then identify properties of datasets for which retrieval-based modeling fails. With the three existing datasets, we find no improvements from explanation retrieval. Drawing on findings from our synthetic task, we suggest that at least one of six preconditions for successful modeling fails to hold with these datasets. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/peterbhase/ExplanationRoles

Large language models can perform various reasoning tasks by using chain-of-thought prompting, which guides them to find answers through step-by-step demonstrations. However, the quality of the prompts depends on the demonstrations given to the models, and creating many of them by hand is costly. We introduce Synthetic prompting, a method that leverages a few handcrafted examples to prompt the model to generate more examples by itself, and selects effective demonstrations to elicit better reasoning. Our method alternates between a backward and forward process to generate new examples. The backward process generates a question that match a sampled reasoning chain, so that the question is solvable and clear. The forward process produces a more detailed reasoning chain for the question, improving the quality of the example. We evaluate our method on numerical, symbolic, and algorithmic reasoning tasks, and show that it outperforms existing prompting techniques.

This study focuses on improving the performance of lightweight Large Language Models (LLMs) in mathematical reasoning tasks. We introduce a novel method for measuring mathematical logic similarity and design an automatic screening mechanism to construct a set of reference problems that integrate both semantic and logical similarity. By employing carefully crafted positive and negative example prompts, we guide the model towards adopting sound reasoning logic. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to utilize retrieval-enhanced generation for mathematical problem-solving. Experimental results demonstrate that our method achieves a 15.8% improvement over the Chain of Thought approach on the SVAMP dataset and a 21.5 % improvement on the GSM8K dataset. Further application of this method to a large-scale model with 175 billion parameters yields performance comparable to the best results on both aforementioned datasets. Finally, we conduct an analysis of errors during the reasoning process, providing valuable insights and directions for future research on reasoning tasks using large language models.

This study addresses the gap in the literature concerning the comparative performance of LLMs in interpreting different types of figurative language across multiple languages. By evaluating LLMs using two multilingual datasets on simile and idiom interpretation, we explore the effectiveness of various prompt engineering strategies, including chain-of-thought, few-shot, and English translation prompts. We extend the language of these datasets to Persian as well by building two new evaluation sets. Our comprehensive assessment involves both closed-source (GPT-3.5, GPT-4o mini, Gemini 1.5), and open-source models (Llama 3.1, Qwen2), highlighting significant differences in performance across languages and figurative types. Our findings reveal that while prompt engineering methods are generally effective, their success varies by figurative type, language, and model. We also observe that open-source models struggle particularly with low-resource languages in similes. Additionally, idiom interpretation is nearing saturation for many languages, necessitating more challenging evaluations.

Accuracy remains a standard metric for evaluating AI systems, but it offers limited insight into how models arrive at their solutions. In this work, we introduce a benchmark based on brainteasers written in long narrative form to probe more deeply into the types of reasoning strategies that models use. Brainteasers are well-suited for this goal because they can be solved with multiple approaches, such as a few-step solution that uses a creative insight or a longer solution that uses more brute force. We investigate large language models (LLMs) across multiple layers of reasoning, focusing not only on correctness but also on the quality and creativity of their solutions. We investigate many aspects of the reasoning process: (1) semantic parsing of the brainteasers into precise mathematical competition style formats; (2) generating solutions from these mathematical forms; (3) self-correcting solutions based on gold solutions; (4) producing step-by-step sketches of solutions; and (5) making use of hints. We find that LLMs are in many cases able to find creative, insightful solutions to brainteasers, suggesting that they capture some of the capacities needed to solve novel problems in creative ways. Nonetheless, there also remain situations where they rely on brute force despite the availability of more efficient, creative solutions, highlighting a potential direction for improvement in the reasoning abilities of LLMs.

Recent works have shown that chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting can elicit language models to solve complex reasoning tasks, step-by-step. However, prompt-based CoT methods are dependent on very large models such as GPT-3 175B which are prohibitive to deploy at scale. In this paper, we use these large models as reasoning teachers to enable complex reasoning in smaller models and reduce model size requirements by several orders of magnitude. We propose Fine-tune-CoT, a method that generates reasoning samples from very large teacher models to fine-tune smaller models. We evaluate our method on a wide range of public models and complex tasks. We find that Fine-tune-CoT enables substantial reasoning capability in small models, far outperforming prompt-based baselines and even the teacher model in many tasks. Additionally, we extend our method by leveraging the teacher model's ability to generate multiple distinct rationales for each original sample. Enriching the fine-tuning data with such diverse reasoning results in a substantial performance boost across datasets, even for very small models. We conduct ablations and sample studies to understand the emergence of reasoning capabilities of student models. Our code implementation and data are available at https://github.com/itsnamgyu/reasoning-teacher.

What mechanisms underlie linguistic generalization in large language models (LLMs)? This question has attracted considerable attention, with most studies analyzing the extent to which the language skills of LLMs resemble rules. As of yet, it is not known whether linguistic generalization in LLMs could equally well be explained as the result of analogical processes, which can be formalized as similarity operations on stored exemplars. A key shortcoming of prior research is its focus on linguistic phenomena with a high degree of regularity, for which rule-based and analogical approaches make the same predictions. Here, we instead examine derivational morphology, specifically English adjective nominalization, which displays notable variability. We introduce a new method for investigating linguistic generalization in LLMs: focusing on GPT-J, we fit cognitive models that instantiate rule-based and analogical learning to the LLM training data and compare their predictions on a set of nonce adjectives with those of the LLM, allowing us to draw direct conclusions regarding underlying mechanisms. As expected, rule-based and analogical models explain the predictions of GPT-J equally well for adjectives with regular nominalization patterns. However, for adjectives with variable nominalization patterns, the analogical model provides a much better match. Furthermore, GPT-J's behavior is sensitive to the individual word frequencies, even for regular forms, a behavior that is consistent with an analogical account of regular forms but not a rule-based one. These findings refute the hypothesis that GPT-J's linguistic generalization on adjective nominalization involves rules, suggesting similarity operations on stored exemplars as the underlying mechanism. Overall, our study suggests that analogical processes play a bigger role in the linguistic generalization of LLMs than previously thought.

Large language models increasingly expose reasoning traces, yet their underlying cognitive structure and steps remain difficult to identify and analyze beyond surface-level statistics. We adopt Schoenfeld's Episode Theory as an inductive, intermediate-scale lens and introduce ThinkARM (Anatomy of Reasoning in Models), a scalable framework that explicitly abstracts reasoning traces into functional reasoning steps such as Analysis, Explore, Implement, Verify, etc. When applied to mathematical problem solving by diverse models, this abstraction reveals reproducible thinking dynamics and structural differences between reasoning and non-reasoning models, which are not apparent from token-level views. We further present two diagnostic case studies showing that exploration functions as a critical branching step associated with correctness, and that efficiency-oriented methods selectively suppress evaluative feedback steps rather than uniformly shortening responses. Together, our results demonstrate that episode-level representations make reasoning steps explicit, enabling systematic analysis of how reasoning is structured, stabilized, and altered in modern language models.

The ability to derive underlying principles from a handful of observations and then generalize to novel situations -- known as inductive reasoning -- is central to human intelligence. Prior work suggests that language models (LMs) often fall short on inductive reasoning, despite achieving impressive success on research benchmarks. In this work, we conduct a systematic study of the inductive reasoning capabilities of LMs through iterative hypothesis refinement, a technique that more closely mirrors the human inductive process than standard input-output prompting. Iterative hypothesis refinement employs a three-step process: proposing, selecting, and refining hypotheses in the form of textual rules. By examining the intermediate rules, we observe that LMs are phenomenal hypothesis proposers (i.e., generating candidate rules), and when coupled with a (task-specific) symbolic interpreter that is able to systematically filter the proposed set of rules, this hybrid approach achieves strong results across inductive reasoning benchmarks that require inducing causal relations, language-like instructions, and symbolic concepts. However, they also behave as puzzling inductive reasoners, showing notable performance gaps between rule induction (i.e., identifying plausible rules) and rule application (i.e., applying proposed rules to instances), suggesting that LMs are proposing hypotheses without being able to actually apply the rules. Through empirical and human analyses, we further reveal several discrepancies between the inductive reasoning processes of LMs and humans, shedding light on both the potentials and limitations of using LMs in inductive reasoning tasks.

Pre-trained language models have been found to capture a surprisingly rich amount of lexical knowledge, ranging from commonsense properties of everyday concepts to detailed factual knowledge about named entities. Among others, this makes it possible to distill high-quality word vectors from pre-trained language models. However, it is currently unclear to what extent it is possible to distill relation embeddings, i.e. vectors that characterize the relationship between two words. Such relation embeddings are appealing because they can, in principle, encode relational knowledge in a more fine-grained way than is possible with knowledge graphs. To obtain relation embeddings from a pre-trained language model, we encode word pairs using a (manually or automatically generated) prompt, and we fine-tune the language model such that relationally similar word pairs yield similar output vectors. We find that the resulting relation embeddings are highly competitive on analogy (unsupervised) and relation classification (supervised) benchmarks, even without any task-specific fine-tuning. Source code to reproduce our experimental results and the model checkpoints are available in the following repository: https://github.com/asahi417/relbert

Despite the success of chain of thought in enhancing language model reasoning, the underlying process remains less well understood. Although logically sound reasoning appears inherently crucial for chain of thought, prior studies surprisingly reveal minimal impact when using invalid demonstrations instead. Furthermore, the conventional chain of thought does not inform language models on what mistakes to avoid, which potentially leads to more errors. Hence, inspired by how humans can learn from both positive and negative examples, we propose contrastive chain of thought to enhance language model reasoning. Compared to the conventional chain of thought, our approach provides both valid and invalid reasoning demonstrations, to guide the model to reason step-by-step while reducing reasoning mistakes. To improve generalization, we introduce an automatic method to construct contrastive demonstrations. Our experiments on reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that contrastive chain of thought can serve as a general enhancement of chain-of-thought prompting.

Current large language models can perform reasonably well on complex tasks that require step-by-step reasoning with few-shot learning. Are these models applying reasoning skills they have learnt during pre-training and reason outside of their training context, or are they simply memorizing their training corpus at finer granularity and have learnt to better understand their context? To tease apart these possibilities, we introduce ALERT, a benchmark and suite of analyses for assessing language models' reasoning ability comparing pre-trained and finetuned models on complex tasks that require reasoning skills to solve. ALERT provides a test bed to asses any language model on fine-grained reasoning skills, which spans over 20 datasets and covers 10 different reasoning skills. We leverage ALERT to further investigate the role of finetuning. With extensive empirical analysis we find that language models learn more reasoning skills such as textual entailment, abductive reasoning, and analogical reasoning during finetuning stage compared to pretraining state. We also find that when language models are finetuned they tend to overfit to the prompt template, which hurts the robustness of models causing generalization problems.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in language generation, understanding, and few-shot learning in recent years. An extensive body of work has explored how their performance may be further improved through the tools of prompting, ranging from verification, self-consistency, or intermediate scratchpads. In this paper, we present a complementary approach to improve language responses where multiple language model instances propose and debate their individual responses and reasoning processes over multiple rounds to arrive at a common final answer. Our findings indicate that this approach significantly enhances mathematical and strategic reasoning across a number of tasks. We also demonstrate that our approach improves the factual validity of generated content, reducing fallacious answers and hallucinations that contemporary models are prone to. Our approach may be directly applied to existing black-box models and uses identical procedure and prompts for all tasks we investigate. Overall, our findings suggest that such "society of minds" approach has the potential to significantly advance the capabilities of LLMs and pave the way for further breakthroughs in language generation and understanding.

We study why Tool-Integrated Reasoning (TIR) makes Large Language Models (LLMs) more capable. While LLMs integrated with tools like Python code interpreters show great promise, a principled theory explaining why this paradigm is effective has been missing. This work provides the first formal proof that TIR fundamentally expands an LLM's capabilities. We demonstrate that tools enable a strict expansion of the model's empirical and feasible support, breaking the capability ceiling of pure-text models by unlocking problem-solving strategies that are otherwise impossible or intractably verbose. To guide model behavior without compromising training stability and performance, we also introduce Advantage Shaping Policy Optimization (ASPO), a novel algorithm that directly modifies the advantage function to guide the policy behavior. We conduct comprehensive experiments on challenging mathematical benchmarks, leveraging a Python interpreter as the external tool. Our results show that the TIR model decisively outperforms its pure-text counterpart on the pass@k metric. Crucially, this advantage is not confined to computationally-intensive problems but extends to those requiring significant abstract insight. We further identify the emergent cognitive patterns that illustrate how models learn to think with tools. Finally, we report improved tool usage behavior with early code invocation and much more interactive turns with ASPO. Overall, our work provides the first principled explanation for TIR's success, shifting the focus from the mere fact that tools work to why and how they enable more powerful reasoning.

Specialized reasoning language models (RLMs) have demonstrated that scaling test-time computation through detailed reasoning traces significantly enhances performance. Although these traces effectively facilitate knowledge distillation into smaller, instruction-tuned models, the precise nature of transferred reasoning remains unclear. In this study, we investigate to what extent distilled models internalize replicated stylistic patterns during reasoning. To this end, we systematically analyze reasoning traces, identifying structural and lexical patterns that characterize successful reasoning. We then introduce two new datasets -- a dataset of emergent reasoning traces and a synthetic dataset explicitly constructed to replicate these stylistic patterns -- to precisely examine their influence on distilled models' reasoning capabilities. We find that models trained on the synthetic traces achieve comparable performance, indicating that distilled reasoning abilities rely significantly on surface-level patterns. Surprisingly, we observe an increase in performance even when the synthetic traces are altered to lead to the wrong answer. Our findings highlight how stylistic patterns can be leveraged to efficiently enhance LM reasoning across diverse model families.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are transforming scientific hypothesis generation and validation by enabling information synthesis, latent relationship discovery, and reasoning augmentation. This survey provides a structured overview of LLM-driven approaches, including symbolic frameworks, generative models, hybrid systems, and multi-agent architectures. We examine techniques such as retrieval-augmented generation, knowledge-graph completion, simulation, causal inference, and tool-assisted reasoning, highlighting trade-offs in interpretability, novelty, and domain alignment. We contrast early symbolic discovery systems (e.g., BACON, KEKADA) with modern LLM pipelines that leverage in-context learning and domain adaptation via fine-tuning, retrieval, and symbolic grounding. For validation, we review simulation, human-AI collaboration, causal modeling, and uncertainty quantification, emphasizing iterative assessment in open-world contexts. The survey maps datasets across biomedicine, materials science, environmental science, and social science, introducing new resources like AHTech and CSKG-600. Finally, we outline a roadmap emphasizing novelty-aware generation, multimodal-symbolic integration, human-in-the-loop systems, and ethical safeguards, positioning LLMs as agents for principled, scalable scientific discovery.

We propose the Neuro-Symbolic Concept Learner (NS-CL), a model that learns visual concepts, words, and semantic parsing of sentences without explicit supervision on any of them; instead, our model learns by simply looking at images and reading paired questions and answers. Our model builds an object-based scene representation and translates sentences into executable, symbolic programs. To bridge the learning of two modules, we use a neuro-symbolic reasoning module that executes these programs on the latent scene representation. Analogical to human concept learning, the perception module learns visual concepts based on the language description of the object being referred to. Meanwhile, the learned visual concepts facilitate learning new words and parsing new sentences. We use curriculum learning to guide the searching over the large compositional space of images and language. Extensive experiments demonstrate the accuracy and efficiency of our model on learning visual concepts, word representations, and semantic parsing of sentences. Further, our method allows easy generalization to new object attributes, compositions, language concepts, scenes and questions, and even new program domains. It also empowers applications including visual question answering and bidirectional image-text retrieval.

There has been a surge of interest in harnessing the reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) to accelerate scientific discovery. While existing approaches rely on grounding the discovery process within the relevant literature, effectiveness varies significantly with the quality and nature of the retrieved literature. We address the challenge of retrieving prior work whose concepts can inspire solutions for a given research problem, a task we define as Methodology Inspiration Retrieval (MIR). We construct a novel dataset tailored for training and evaluating retrievers on MIR, and establish baselines. To address MIR, we build the Methodology Adjacency Graph (MAG); capturing methodological lineage through citation relationships. We leverage MAG to embed an "intuitive prior" into dense retrievers for identifying patterns of methodological inspiration beyond superficial semantic similarity. This achieves significant gains of +5.4 in Recall@3 and +7.8 in Mean Average Precision (mAP) over strong baselines. Further, we adapt LLM-based re-ranking strategies to MIR, yielding additional improvements of +4.5 in Recall@3 and +4.8 in mAP. Through extensive ablation studies and qualitative analyses, we exhibit the promise of MIR in enhancing automated scientific discovery and outline avenues for advancing inspiration-driven retrieval.

Pragmatics and non-literal language understanding are essential to human communication, and present a long-standing challenge for artificial language models. We perform a fine-grained comparison of language models and humans on seven pragmatic phenomena, using zero-shot prompting on an expert-curated set of English materials. We ask whether models (1) select pragmatic interpretations of speaker utterances, (2) make similar error patterns as humans, and (3) use similar linguistic cues as humans to solve the tasks. We find that the largest models achieve high accuracy and match human error patterns: within incorrect responses, models favor literal interpretations over heuristic-based distractors. We also find preliminary evidence that models and humans are sensitive to similar linguistic cues. Our results suggest that pragmatic behaviors can emerge in models without explicitly constructed representations of mental states. However, models tend to struggle with phenomena relying on social expectation violations.

Recently, there have been notable advancements in large language models (LLMs), demonstrating their growing abilities in complex reasoning. However, existing research largely overlooks a thorough and systematic comparison of these models' reasoning processes and outputs, particularly regarding their self-reflection pattern (also termed "Aha moment") and the interconnections across diverse domains. This paper proposes a novel framework for analyzing the reasoning characteristics of four cutting-edge large reasoning models (GPT-o1, DeepSeek-R1, Kimi-k1.5, and Grok-3) using keywords statistic and LLM-as-a-judge paradigm. Our approach connects their internal thinking processes with their final outputs. A diverse dataset consists of real-world scenario-based questions covering logical deduction, causal inference, and multi-step problem-solving. Additionally, a set of metrics is put forward to assess both the coherence of reasoning and the accuracy of the outputs. The research results uncover various patterns of how these models balance exploration and exploitation, deal with problems, and reach conclusions during the reasoning process. Through quantitative and qualitative comparisons, disparities among these models are identified in aspects such as the depth of reasoning, the reliance on intermediate steps, and the degree of similarity between their thinking processes and output patterns and those of GPT-o1. This work offers valuable insights into the trade-off between computational efficiency and reasoning robustness and provides practical recommendations for enhancing model design and evaluation in practical applications. We publicly release our project at: https://github.com/ChangWenhan/FromThinking2Output

A visual metaphor constitutes a high-order form of human creativity, employing cross-domain semantic fusion to transform abstract concepts into impactful visual rhetoric. Despite the remarkable progress of generative AI, existing models remain largely confined to pixel-level instruction alignment and surface-level appearance preservation, failing to capture the underlying abstract logic necessary for genuine metaphorical generation. To bridge this gap, we introduce the task of Visual Metaphor Transfer (VMT), which challenges models to autonomously decouple the "creative essence" from a reference image and re-materialize that abstract logic onto a user-specified target subject. We propose a cognitive-inspired, multi-agent framework that operationalizes Conceptual Blending Theory (CBT) through a novel Schema Grammar ("G"). This structured representation decouples relational invariants from specific visual entities, providing a rigorous foundation for cross-domain logic re-instantiation. Our pipeline executes VMT through a collaborative system of specialized agents: a perception agent that distills the reference into a schema, a transfer agent that maintains generic space invariance to discover apt carriers, a generation agent for high-fidelity synthesis and a hierarchical diagnostic agent that mimics a professional critic, performing closed-loop backtracking to identify and rectify errors across abstract logic, component selection, and prompt encoding. Extensive experiments and human evaluations demonstrate that our method significantly outperforms SOTA baselines in metaphor consistency, analogy appropriateness, and visual creativity, paving the way for automated high-impact creative applications in advertising and media. Source code will be made publicly available.

This paper revisits Ramon Llull's Ars combinatoria - a medieval framework for generating knowledge through symbolic recombination - as a conceptual foundation for building a modern Llull's thinking machine for research ideation. Our approach defines three compositional axes: Theme (e.g., efficiency, adaptivity), Domain (e.g., question answering, machine translation), and Method (e.g., adversarial training, linear attention). These elements represent high-level abstractions common in scientific work - motivations, problem settings, and technical approaches - and serve as building blocks for LLM-driven exploration. We mine elements from human experts or conference papers and show that prompting LLMs with curated combinations produces research ideas that are diverse, relevant, and grounded in current literature. This modern thinking machine offers a lightweight, interpretable tool for augmenting scientific creativity and suggests a path toward collaborative ideation between humans and AI.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have succeeded remarkably in various natural language processing (NLP) tasks, yet their reasoning capabilities remain a fundamental challenge. While LLMs exhibit impressive fluency and factual recall, their ability to perform complex reasoning-spanning logical deduction, mathematical problem-solving, commonsense inference, and multi-step reasoning-often falls short of human expectations. This survey provides a comprehensive review of emerging techniques enhancing reasoning in LLMs. We categorize existing methods into key approaches, including prompting strategies (e.g., Chain-of-Thought reasoning, Self-Consistency, and Tree-of-Thought reasoning), architectural innovations (e.g., retrieval-augmented models, modular reasoning networks, and neuro-symbolic integration), and learning paradigms (e.g., fine-tuning with reasoning-specific datasets, reinforcement learning, and self-supervised reasoning objectives). Additionally, we explore evaluation frameworks used to assess reasoning in LLMs and highlight open challenges, such as hallucinations, robustness, and reasoning generalization across diverse tasks. By synthesizing recent advancements, this survey aims to provide insights into promising directions for future research and practical applications of reasoning-augmented LLMs.

Recent developments, particularly OpenAI's O1 model, have demonstrated the remarkable potential of Large Language Models (LLMs) for complex reasoning tasks. Through analysis of O1's outputs and provided sample Chain-of-Thought (CoT) demonstrations, we observe that it approaches problem-solving in a distinctly human-like manner, systematically brainstorming ideas, testing hypotheses, verifying results, and planning comprehensive solutions. These sophisticated reasoning capabilities remain notably absent in other state-of-the-art language models. In this paper, we hypothesize that this performance gap stems from the limited availability of high-quality reasoning process data in current training sets. We demonstrate that by constructing a specialized dataset focused on explicit problem-solving workflows ("worked solutions"), we can elicit substantially improved planning capabilities from existing models. Additionally, we propose the Reasoning Enhancement Loop (REL), a method for generating synthetic worked solutions.

Probabilistic models of language understanding are valuable tools for investigating human language use. However, they need to be hand-designed for a particular domain. In contrast, large language models (LLMs) are trained on text that spans a wide array of domains, but they lack the structure and interpretability of probabilistic models. In this paper, we use chain-of-thought prompts to introduce structures from probabilistic models into LLMs. We explore this approach in the case of metaphor understanding. Our chain-of-thought prompts lead language models to infer latent variables and reason about their relationships in order to choose appropriate paraphrases for metaphors. The latent variables and relationships chosen are informed by theories of metaphor understanding from cognitive psychology. We apply these prompts to the two largest versions of GPT-3 and show that they can improve performance in a paraphrase selection task.

We are born with the ability to learn concepts by comparing diverse observations. This helps us to understand the new world in a compositional manner and facilitates extrapolation, as objects naturally consist of multiple concepts. In this work, we argue that the cognitive mechanism of comparison, fundamental to human learning, is also vital for machines to recover true concepts underlying the data. This offers correctness guarantees for the field of concept learning, which, despite its impressive empirical successes, still lacks general theoretical support. Specifically, we aim to develop a theoretical framework for the identifiability of concepts with multiple classes of observations. We show that with sufficient diversity across classes, hidden concepts can be identified without assuming specific concept types, functional relations, or parametric generative models. Interestingly, even when conditions are not globally satisfied, we can still provide alternative guarantees for as many concepts as possible based on local comparisons, thereby extending the applicability of our theory to more flexible scenarios. Moreover, the hidden structure between classes and concepts can also be identified nonparametrically. We validate our theoretical results in both synthetic and real-world settings.

Reasoning requires going beyond pattern matching or memorization of solutions to identify and implement "algorithmic procedures" that can be used to deduce answers to hard problems. Doing so requires realizing the most relevant primitives, intermediate results, or shared procedures, and building upon them. While RL post-training on long chains of thought ultimately aims to uncover this kind of algorithmic behavior, most reasoning traces learned by large models fail to consistently capture or reuse procedures, instead drifting into verbose and degenerate exploration. To address more effective reasoning, we introduce reasoning abstractions: concise natural language descriptions of procedural and factual knowledge that guide the model toward learning successful reasoning. We train models to be capable of proposing multiple abstractions given a problem, followed by RL that incentivizes building a solution while using the information provided by these abstractions. This results in a two-player RL training paradigm, abbreviated as RLAD, that jointly trains an abstraction generator and a solution generator. This setup effectively enables structured exploration, decouples learning signals of abstraction proposal and solution generation, and improves generalization to harder problems. We also show that allocating more test-time compute to generating abstractions is more beneficial for performance than generating more solutions at large test budgets, illustrating the role of abstractions in guiding meaningful exploration.

Recent Large Language Models (LLMs) have reported high accuracy on reasoning benchmarks. However, it is still unclear whether the observed results arise from true reasoning or from statistical recall of the training set. Inspired by the ladder of causation (Pearl, 2009) and its three levels (associations, interventions and counterfactuals), this paper introduces RE-IMAGINE, a framework to characterize a hierarchy of reasoning ability in LLMs, alongside an automated pipeline to generate problem variations at different levels of the hierarchy. By altering problems in an intermediate symbolic representation, RE-IMAGINE generates arbitrarily many problems that are not solvable using memorization alone. Moreover, the framework is general and can work across reasoning domains, including math, code, and logic. We demonstrate our framework on four widely-used benchmarks to evaluate several families of LLMs, and observe reductions in performance when the models are queried with problem variations. These assessments indicate a degree of reliance on statistical recall for past performance, and open the door to further research targeting skills across the reasoning hierarchy.

There is growing excitement about the potential of Language Models (LMs) to accelerate scientific discovery. Falsifying hypotheses is key to scientific progress, as it allows claims to be iteratively refined over time. This process requires significant researcher effort, reasoning, and ingenuity. Yet current benchmarks for LMs predominantly assess their ability to generate solutions rather than challenge them. We advocate for developing benchmarks that evaluate this inverse capability - creating counterexamples for subtly incorrect solutions. To demonstrate this approach, we start with the domain of algorithmic problem solving, where counterexamples can be evaluated automatically using code execution. Specifically, we introduce REFUTE, a dynamically updating benchmark that includes recent problems and incorrect submissions from programming competitions, where human experts successfully identified counterexamples. Our analysis finds that the best reasoning agents, even OpenAI o3-mini (high) with code execution feedback, can create counterexamples for only <9% of incorrect solutions in REFUTE, even though ratings indicate its ability to solve up to 48% of these problems from scratch. We hope our work spurs progress in evaluating and enhancing LMs' ability to falsify incorrect solutions - a capability that is crucial for both accelerating research and making models self-improve through reliable reflective reasoning.

Figurative language is ubiquitous in English. Yet, the vast majority of NLP research focuses on literal language. Existing text representations by design rely on compositionality, while figurative language is often non-compositional. In this paper, we study the interpretation of two non-compositional figurative languages (idioms and similes). We collected datasets of fictional narratives containing a figurative expression along with crowd-sourced plausible and implausible continuations relying on the correct interpretation of the expression. We then trained models to choose or generate the plausible continuation. Our experiments show that models based solely on pre-trained language models perform substantially worse than humans on these tasks. We additionally propose knowledge-enhanced models, adopting human strategies for interpreting figurative language types : inferring meaning from the context and relying on the constituent words' literal meanings. The knowledge-enhanced models improve the performance on both the discriminative and generative tasks, further bridging the gap from human performance.

Human reasoning relies on constructing and manipulating mental models-simplified internal representations of situations that we use to understand and solve problems. Conceptual diagrams (for example, sketches drawn by humans to aid reasoning) externalize these mental models, abstracting irrelevant details to efficiently capture relational and spatial information. In contrast, Large Language Models (LLMs) and Large Multimodal Models (LMMs) predominantly reason through textual representations, limiting their effectiveness in complex multi-step combinatorial and planning tasks. In this paper, we propose a zero-shot fully automatic framework that enables LMMs to reason through multiple chains of self-generated intermediate conceptual diagrams, significantly enhancing their combinatorial planning capabilities. Our approach does not require any human initialization beyond a natural language description of the task. It integrates both textual and diagrammatic reasoning within an optimized graph-of-thought inference framework, enhanced by beam search and depth-wise backtracking. Evaluated on multiple challenging PDDL planning domains, our method substantially improves GPT-4o's performance (for example, from 35.5% to 90.2% in Blocksworld). On more difficult planning domains with solution depths up to 40, our approach outperforms even the o1-preview reasoning model (for example, over 13% improvement in Parking). These results highlight the value of conceptual diagrams as a complementary reasoning medium in LMMs.

Recent supervised fine-tuning (SFT) approaches have significantly improved language models' performance on mathematical reasoning tasks, even when models are trained at a small scale. However, the specific capabilities enhanced through such fine-tuning remain poorly understood. In this paper, we conduct a detailed analysis of model performance on the AIME24 dataset to understand how reasoning capabilities evolve. We discover a ladder-like structure in problem difficulty, categorize questions into four tiers (Easy, Medium, Hard, and Extremely Hard (Exh)), and identify the specific requirements for advancing between tiers. We find that progression from Easy to Medium tier requires adopting an R1 reasoning style with minimal SFT (500-1K instances), while Hard-level questions suffer from frequent model's errors at each step of the reasoning chain, with accuracy plateauing at around 65% despite logarithmic scaling. Exh-level questions present a fundamentally different challenge; they require unconventional problem-solving skills that current models uniformly struggle with. Additional findings reveal that carefully curated small-scale datasets offer limited advantage-scaling dataset size proves far more effective. Our analysis provides a clearer roadmap for advancing language model capabilities in mathematical reasoning.

Recent research has focused on enhancing the capability of smaller models through imitation learning, drawing on the outputs generated by large foundation models (LFMs). A number of issues impact the quality of these models, ranging from limited imitation signals from shallow LFM outputs; small scale homogeneous training data; and most notably a lack of rigorous evaluation resulting in overestimating the small model's capability as they tend to learn to imitate the style, but not the reasoning process of LFMs. To address these challenges, we develop Orca (We are working with our legal team to publicly release a diff of the model weights in accordance with LLaMA's release policy to be published at https://aka.ms/orca-lm), a 13-billion parameter model that learns to imitate the reasoning process of LFMs. Orca learns from rich signals from GPT-4 including explanation traces; step-by-step thought processes; and other complex instructions, guided by teacher assistance from ChatGPT. To promote this progressive learning, we tap into large-scale and diverse imitation data with judicious sampling and selection. Orca surpasses conventional state-of-the-art instruction-tuned models such as Vicuna-13B by more than 100% in complex zero-shot reasoning benchmarks like Big-Bench Hard (BBH) and 42% on AGIEval. Moreover, Orca reaches parity with ChatGPT on the BBH benchmark and shows competitive performance (4 pts gap with optimized system message) in professional and academic examinations like the SAT, LSAT, GRE, and GMAT, both in zero-shot settings without CoT; while trailing behind GPT-4. Our research indicates that learning from step-by-step explanations, whether these are generated by humans or more advanced AI models, is a promising direction to improve model capabilities and skills.

Large language models (LLMs) solve complex problems yet fail on simpler variants, suggesting they achieve correct outputs through mechanisms fundamentally different from human reasoning. To understand this gap, we synthesize cognitive science research into a taxonomy of 28 cognitive elements spanning reasoning invariants, meta-cognitive controls, representations for organizing reasoning & knowledge, and transformation operations. We introduce a fine-grained evaluation framework and conduct the first large-scale empirical analysis of 192K traces from 18 models across text, vision, and audio, complemented by 54 human think-aloud traces, which we make publicly available. We find that models under-utilize cognitive elements correlated with success, narrowing to rigid sequential processing on ill-structured problems where diverse representations and meta-cognitive monitoring are critical. Human traces show more abstraction and conceptual processing, while models default to surface-level enumeration. Meta-analysis of 1.6K LLM reasoning papers reveals the research community concentrates on easily quantifiable elements (sequential organization: 55%, decomposition: 60%) but neglecting meta-cognitive controls (self-awareness: 16%) that correlate with success. Models possess behavioral repertoires associated with success but fail to deploy them spontaneously. Leveraging these patterns, we develop test-time reasoning guidance that automatically scaffold successful structures, improving performance by up to 66.7% on complex problems. By establishing a shared vocabulary between cognitive science and LLM research, our framework enables systematic diagnosis of reasoning failures and principled development of models that reason through robust cognitive mechanisms rather than spurious shortcuts, while providing tools to test theories of human cognition at scale.

The ability of language models to learn a task from a few examples in context has generated substantial interest. Here, we provide a perspective that situates this type of supervised few-shot learning within a much broader spectrum of meta-learned in-context learning. Indeed, we suggest that any distribution of sequences in which context non-trivially decreases loss on subsequent predictions can be interpreted as eliciting a kind of in-context learning. We suggest that this perspective helps to unify the broad set of in-context abilities that language models exhibit x2014 such as adapting to tasks from instructions or role play, or extrapolating time series. This perspective also sheds light on potential roots of in-context learning in lower-level processing of linguistic dependencies (e.g. coreference or parallel structures). Finally, taking this perspective highlights the importance of generalization, which we suggest can be studied along several dimensions: not only the ability to learn something novel, but also flexibility in learning from different presentations, and in applying what is learned. We discuss broader connections to past literature in meta-learning and goal-conditioned agents, and other perspectives on learning and adaptation. We close by suggesting that research on in-context learning should consider this broader spectrum of in-context capabilities and types of generalization.

Scientific idea generation lies at the heart of scientific discovery and has driven human progress-whether by solving unsolved problems or proposing novel hypotheses to explain unknown phenomena. Unlike standard scientific reasoning or general creative generation, idea generation in science is a multi-objective and open-ended task, where the novelty of a contribution is as essential as its empirical soundness. Large language models (LLMs) have recently emerged as promising generators of scientific ideas, capable of producing coherent and factual outputs with surprising intuition and acceptable reasoning, yet their creative capacity remains inconsistent and poorly understood. This survey provides a structured synthesis of methods for LLM-driven scientific ideation, examining how different approaches balance creativity with scientific soundness. We categorize existing methods into five complementary families: External knowledge augmentation, Prompt-based distributional steering, Inference-time scaling, Multi-agent collaboration, and Parameter-level adaptation. To interpret their contributions, we employ two complementary frameworks: Boden's taxonomy of Combinatorial, Exploratory and Transformational creativity to characterize the level of ideas each family expected to generate, and Rhodes' 4Ps framework-Person, Process, Press, and Product-to locate the aspect or source of creativity that each method emphasizes. By aligning methodological advances with creativity frameworks, this survey clarifies the state of the field and outlines key directions toward reliable, systematic, and transformative applications of LLMs in scientific discovery.

Large language models are powerful systems that excel at many tasks, ranging from translation to mathematical reasoning. Yet, at the same time, these models often show unhuman-like characteristics. In the present paper, we address this gap and ask whether large language models can be turned into cognitive models. We find that -- after finetuning them on data from psychological experiments -- these models offer accurate representations of human behavior, even outperforming traditional cognitive models in two decision-making domains. In addition, we show that their representations contain the information necessary to model behavior on the level of individual subjects. Finally, we demonstrate that finetuning on multiple tasks enables large language models to predict human behavior in a previously unseen task. Taken together, these results suggest that large, pre-trained models can be adapted to become generalist cognitive models, thereby opening up new research directions that could transform cognitive psychology and the behavioral sciences as a whole.

We present ScienceWorld, a benchmark to test agents' scientific reasoning abilities in a new interactive text environment at the level of a standard elementary school science curriculum. Despite the transformer-based progress seen in question-answering and scientific text processing, we find that current models cannot reason about or explain learned science concepts in novel contexts. For instance, models can easily answer what the conductivity of a known material is but struggle when asked how they would conduct an experiment in a grounded environment to find the conductivity of an unknown material. This begs the question of whether current models are simply retrieving answers by way of seeing a large number of similar examples or if they have learned to reason about concepts in a reusable manner. We hypothesize that agents need to be grounded in interactive environments to achieve such reasoning capabilities. Our experiments provide empirical evidence supporting this hypothesis -- showing that a 1.5 million parameter agent trained interactively for 100k steps outperforms a 11 billion parameter model statically trained for scientific question-answering and reasoning from millions of expert demonstrations.

Why do thinking language models like DeepSeek R1 outperform their base counterparts? Despite consistent performance gains, it remains unclear to what extent thinking models learn entirely new reasoning capabilities or repurpose pre-existing base model ones. In this work, we propose a hybrid model where we activate reasoning mechanisms in base models at the right time to elicit thinking-model-level reasoning chains, implying that thinking models exploit already existing capabilities. To ground our analysis, we introduce an unsupervised, bottom-up approach for uncovering human-interpretable reasoning behaviors in thinking models. This approach provides an unbiased method to discover reasoning behaviors without imposing manual or LLM-derived assumptions. Across three base and four thinking models, using GSM8K and MATH500, our hybrid model recovers up to 91% of the performance gap to thinking models without any weight updates while steering only 12% of tokens. Concretely, our empirical setup provides a simple, causal way to test the effectiveness of existing reasoning mechanisms in base models by invoking them directly and measuring the resulting task performance. More broadly, these results reframe our understanding of how thinking models are trained: pre-training is when models acquire most of their reasoning mechanisms, and post-training teaches efficient deployment of these mechanisms at the right time, enabling efficient use of their inference-time compute.

We present the surprising finding that a language model's reasoning capabilities can be improved by training on synthetic datasets of chain-of-thought (CoT) traces from more capable models, even when all of those traces lead to an incorrect final answer. Our experiments show this approach can yield better performance on reasoning tasks than training on human-annotated datasets. We hypothesize that two key factors explain this phenomenon: first, the distribution of synthetic data is inherently closer to the language model's own distribution, making it more amenable to learning. Second, these `incorrect' traces are often only partially flawed and contain valid reasoning steps from which the model can learn. To further test the first hypothesis, we use a language model to paraphrase human-annotated traces -- shifting their distribution closer to the model's own distribution -- and show that this improves performance. For the second hypothesis, we introduce increasingly flawed CoT traces and study to what extent models are tolerant to these flaws. We demonstrate our findings across various reasoning domains like math, algorithmic reasoning and code generation using MATH, GSM8K, Countdown and MBPP datasets on various language models ranging from 1.5B to 9B across Qwen, Llama, and Gemma models. Our study shows that curating datasets that are closer to the model's distribution is a critical aspect to consider. We also show that a correct final answer is not always a reliable indicator of a faithful reasoning process.

Abstract reasoning, the ability to reason from the abstract essence of a problem, serves as a key to generalization in human reasoning. However, eliciting language models to perform reasoning with abstraction remains unexplored. This paper seeks to bridge this gap by introducing a novel structured reasoning format called Abstraction-of-Thought (AoT). The uniqueness of AoT lies in its explicit requirement for varying levels of abstraction within the reasoning process. This approach could elicit language models to first contemplate on the abstract level before incorporating concrete details, which is overlooked by the prevailing step-by-step Chain-of-Thought (CoT) method. To align models with the AoT format, we present AoT Collection, a generic finetuning dataset consisting of 348k high-quality samples with AoT reasoning processes, collected via an automated and scalable pipeline. We finetune a wide range of language models with AoT Collection and conduct extensive evaluations on 23 unseen tasks from the challenging benchmark Big-Bench Hard. Experimental results indicate that models aligned to AoT reasoning format substantially outperform those aligned to CoT in many reasoning tasks.

The emergence of reasoning models and their integration into practical AI chat bots has led to breakthroughs in solving advanced math, deep search, and extractive question answering problems that requires a complex and multi-step thought process. Yet, a complete understanding of why these models hallucinate more than general purpose language models is missing. In this investigative study, we systematicallyexplore reasoning failures of contemporary language models on multi-hop question answering tasks. We introduce a novel, nuanced error categorization framework that examines failures across three critical dimensions: the diversity and uniqueness of source documents involved ("hops"), completeness in capturing relevant information ("coverage"), and cognitive inefficiency ("overthinking"). Through rigorous hu-man annotation, supported by complementary automated metrics, our exploration uncovers intricate error patterns often hidden by accuracy-centric evaluations. This investigative approach provides deeper insights into the cognitive limitations of current models and offers actionable guidance toward enhancing reasoning fidelity, transparency, and robustness in future language modeling efforts.

The pursuit of automated scientific discovery has fueled progress from symbolic logic to modern AI, forging new frontiers in reasoning and pattern recognition. Transformers function as potential systems, where every possible relationship remains latent potentiality until tasks impose constraints, akin to measurement. Yet, refining their sampling requires more than probabilistic selection: solutions must conform to specific structures or rules, ensuring consistency and the invocation of general principles. We present Graph-PReFLexOR (Graph-based Preference-based Recursive Language Modeling for Exploratory Optimization of Reasoning), a framework that combines graph reasoning with symbolic abstraction to dynamically expand domain knowledge. Inspired by reinforcement learning, Graph-PReFLexOR defines reasoning as a structured mapping, where tasks yield knowledge graphs, abstract patterns, and ultimately, final answers. Inspired by category theory, it encodes concepts as nodes and their relationships as edges, supporting hierarchical inference and adaptive learning through isomorphic representations. Demonstrations include hypothesis generation, materials design, and creative reasoning, such as discovering relationships between mythological concepts like 'thin places' with materials science. We propose a 'knowledge garden growth' strategy that integrates insights across domains, promoting interdisciplinary connections. Results with a 3-billion-parameter Graph-PReFLexOR model show superior reasoning depth and adaptability, underscoring the potential for transparent, multidisciplinary AI-driven discovery. It lays the groundwork for general autonomous reasoning solutions.

When robots learn reward functions using high capacity models that take raw state directly as input, they need to both learn a representation for what matters in the task -- the task ``features" -- as well as how to combine these features into a single objective. If they try to do both at once from input designed to teach the full reward function, it is easy to end up with a representation that contains spurious correlations in the data, which fails to generalize to new settings. Instead, our ultimate goal is to enable robots to identify and isolate the causal features that people actually care about and use when they represent states and behavior. Our idea is that we can tune into this representation by asking users what behaviors they consider similar: behaviors will be similar if the features that matter are similar, even if low-level behavior is different; conversely, behaviors will be different if even one of the features that matter differs. This, in turn, is what enables the robot to disambiguate between what needs to go into the representation versus what is spurious, as well as what aspects of behavior can be compressed together versus not. The notion of learning representations based on similarity has a nice parallel in contrastive learning, a self-supervised representation learning technique that maps visually similar data points to similar embeddings, where similarity is defined by a designer through data augmentation heuristics. By contrast, in order to learn the representations that people use, so we can learn their preferences and objectives, we use their definition of similarity. In simulation as well as in a user study, we show that learning through such similarity queries leads to representations that, while far from perfect, are indeed more generalizable than self-supervised and task-input alternatives.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have shown impressive capabilities in complex problem-solving, often benefiting from training on difficult mathematical problems that stimulate intricate reasoning. Recent efforts have explored automated synthesis of mathematical problems by prompting proprietary models or large-scale open-source models from seed data or inherent mathematical concepts. However, scaling up these methods remains challenging due to their high computational/API cost, complexity of prompting, and limited difficulty level of the generated problems. To overcome these limitations, we propose ScaleDiff, a simple yet effective pipeline designed to scale the creation of difficult problems. We efficiently identify difficult problems from existing datasets with only a single forward pass using an adaptive thinking model, which can perceive problem difficulty and automatically switch between "Thinking" and "NoThinking" modes. We then train a specialized difficult problem generator (DiffGen-8B) on this filtered difficult data, which can produce new difficult problems in large scale, eliminating the need for complex, per-instance prompting and its associated high API costs. Fine-tuning Qwen2.5-Math-7B-Instruct on the ScaleDiff-Math dataset yields a substantial performance increase of 11.3% compared to the original dataset and achieves a 65.9% average accuracy on AIME'24, AIME'25, HMMT-Feb'25, BRUMO'25, and MATH500, outperforming recent strong LRMs like OpenThinker3. Notably, this performance is achieved using the cost-efficient Qwen3-8B model as a teacher, demonstrating that our pipeline can effectively transfer advanced reasoning capabilities without relying on larger, more expensive teacher models. Furthermore, we observe a clear scaling phenomenon in model performance on difficult benchmarks as the quantity of difficult problems increases. Code: https://github.com/QizhiPei/ScaleDiff.

The inherent capabilities of a language model (LM) and the reasoning strategies it employs jointly determine its performance in reasoning tasks. While test-time scaling is regarded as an effective approach to tackling complex reasoning tasks, it incurs substantial computational costs and often leads to "overthinking", where models become trapped in "thought pitfalls". To address this challenge, we propose Route-To-Reason (RTR), a novel unified routing framework that dynamically allocates both LMs and reasoning strategies according to task difficulty under budget constraints. RTR learns compressed representations of both expert models and reasoning strategies, enabling their joint and adaptive selection at inference time. This method is low-cost, highly flexible, and can be seamlessly extended to arbitrary black-box or white-box models and strategies, achieving true plug-and-play functionality. Extensive experiments across seven open source models and four reasoning strategies demonstrate that RTR achieves an optimal trade-off between accuracy and computational efficiency among all baselines, achieving higher accuracy than the best single model while reducing token usage by over 60%.

Recent progress in using machine learning models for reasoning tasks has been driven by novel model architectures, large-scale pre-training protocols, and dedicated reasoning datasets for fine-tuning. In this work, to further pursue these advances, we introduce a new data generator for machine reasoning that integrates with an embodied agent. The generated data consists of templated text queries and answers, matched with world-states encoded into a database. The world-states are a result of both world dynamics and the actions of the agent. We show the results of several baseline models on instantiations of train sets. These include pre-trained language models fine-tuned on a text-formatted representation of the database, and graph-structured Transformers operating on a knowledge-graph representation of the database. We find that these models can answer some questions about the world-state, but struggle with others. These results hint at new research directions in designing neural reasoning models and database representations. Code to generate the data will be released at github.com/facebookresearch/neuralmemory

We construct evaluation tasks where extending the reasoning length of Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) deteriorates performance, exhibiting an inverse scaling relationship between test-time compute and accuracy. Our evaluation tasks span four categories: simple counting tasks with distractors, regression tasks with spurious features, deduction tasks with constraint tracking, and advanced AI risks. We identify five distinct failure modes when models reason for longer: 1) Claude models become increasingly distracted by irrelevant information; 2) OpenAI o-series models resist distractors but overfit to problem framings; 3) models shift from reasonable priors to spurious correlations; 4) all models show difficulties in maintaining focus on complex deductive tasks; and 5) extended reasoning may amplify concerning behaviors, with Claude Sonnet 4 showing increased expressions of self-preservation. These findings suggest that while test-time compute scaling remains promising for improving model capabilities, it may inadvertently reinforce problematic reasoning patterns. Our results demonstrate the importance of evaluating models across diverse reasoning lengths to identify and address these failure modes in LRMs.

Recent large language models (LLMs) have shown indications of mathematical reasoning ability. However it has not been clear how they would fare on more challenging competition-level problems. And while self-generated verbalizations of intermediate reasoning steps (i.e., chain-of-thought prompting) have been shown to be helpful, whether LLMs can make use of helpful side information such as problem-specific hints has not been investigated before. In this paper, we propose a challenging benchmark dataset for enabling such analyses. The Concept and Hint-Annotated Math Problems (CHAMP) consists of high school math competition problems, annotated with concepts, or general math facts, and hints, or problem-specific tricks. These annotations allow us to explore the effects of additional information, such as relevant hints, misleading concepts, or related problems. This benchmark is difficult, with the best model only scoring 58.1% in standard settings. With concepts and hints, performance sometimes improves, indicating that some models can make use of such side information. We further annotate model-generated solutions for their correctness. Using this corpus, we find that models often arrive at the correct final answer through wrong reasoning steps. In addition, we test whether models are able to verify these solutions, and find that most models struggle. The dataset and code are available on the project website.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown remarkable improvements in reasoning and many existing benchmarks have been addressed by models such as o1 and o3 either fully or partially. However, a majority of these benchmarks emphasize deductive reasoning, including mathematical and coding tasks in which rules such as mathematical axioms or programming syntax are clearly defined, based on which LLMs can plan and apply these rules to arrive at a solution. In contrast, inductive reasoning, where one infers the underlying rules from observed data, remains less explored. Such inductive processes lie at the heart of scientific discovery, as they enable researchers to extract general principles from empirical observations. To assess whether LLMs possess this capacity, we introduce InductionBench, a new benchmark designed to evaluate the inductive reasoning ability of LLMs. Our experimental findings reveal that even the most advanced models available struggle to master the simplest complexity classes within the subregular hierarchy of functions, highlighting a notable deficiency in current LLMs' inductive reasoning capabilities. Coda and data are available https://github.com/Wenyueh/inductive_reasoning_benchmark.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have opened new avenues for accelerating scientific research. While models are increasingly capable of assisting with routine tasks, their ability to contribute to novel, expert-level mathematical discovery is less understood. We present a collection of case studies demonstrating how researchers have successfully collaborated with advanced AI models, specifically Google's Gemini-based models (in particular Gemini Deep Think and its advanced variants), to solve open problems, refute conjectures, and generate new proofs across diverse areas in theoretical computer science, as well as other areas such as economics, optimization, and physics. Based on these experiences, we extract common techniques for effective human-AI collaboration in theoretical research, such as iterative refinement, problem decomposition, and cross-disciplinary knowledge transfer. While the majority of our results stem from this interactive, conversational methodology, we also highlight specific instances that push beyond standard chat interfaces. These include deploying the model as a rigorous adversarial reviewer to detect subtle flaws in existing proofs, and embedding it within a "neuro-symbolic" loop that autonomously writes and executes code to verify complex derivations. Together, these examples highlight the potential of AI not just as a tool for automation, but as a versatile, genuine partner in the creative process of scientific discovery.

Solving math word problems depends on how to articulate the problems, the lens through which models view human linguistic expressions. Real-world settings count on such a method even more due to the diverse practices of the same mathematical operations. Earlier works constrain available thinking processes by limited prediction strategies without considering their significance in acquiring mathematical knowledge. We introduce Attention-based THought Expansion Network Architecture (ATHENA) to tackle the challenges of real-world practices by mimicking human thought expansion mechanisms in the form of neural network propagation. A thought expansion recurrently generates the candidates carrying the thoughts of possible math expressions driven from the previous step and yields reasonable thoughts by selecting the valid pathways to the goal. Our experiments show that ATHENA achieves a new state-of-the-art stage toward the ideal model that is compelling in variant questions even when the informativeness in training examples is restricted.

We present Hermes 4, a family of hybrid reasoning models that combine structured, multi-turn reasoning with broad instruction-following ability. We describe the challenges encountered during data curation, synthesis, training, and evaluation, and outline the solutions employed to address these challenges at scale. We comprehensively evaluate across mathematical reasoning, coding, knowledge, comprehension, and alignment benchmarks, and we report both quantitative performance and qualitative behavioral analysis. To support open research, all model weights are published publicly at https://huggingface.co/collections/NousResearch/hermes-4-collection-68a731bfd452e20816725728

Studies have underscored how, regardless of the recent breakthrough and swift advances in AI research, even state-of-the-art Large Language models (LLMs) continue to struggle when performing logical and mathematical reasoning. The results seem to suggest that LLMs still work as (highly advanced) data pattern identifiers, scoring poorly when attempting to generalise and solve reasoning problems the models have never previously seen or that are not close to samples presented in their training data. To address this compelling concern, this paper makes use of the notion of critical questions from the literature on argumentation theory, focusing in particular on Toulmin's model of argumentation. We show that employing these critical questions can improve the reasoning capabilities of LLMs. By probing the rationale behind the models' reasoning process, the LLM can assess whether some logical mistake is occurring and correct it before providing the final reply to the user prompt. The underlying idea is drawn from the gold standard of any valid argumentative procedure: the conclusion is valid if it is entailed by accepted premises. Or, to paraphrase such Aristotelian principle in a real-world approximation, characterised by incomplete information and presumptive logic, the conclusion is valid if not proved otherwise. This approach successfully steers the models' output through a reasoning pipeline, resulting in better performance against the baseline and its Chain-of-Thought (CoT) implementation. To this end, an extensive evaluation of the proposed approach on the MT-Bench Reasoning and Math tasks across a range of LLMs is provided.

Large language models (LLMs) are revolutionizing education, with LLM-based agents playing a key role in simulating student behavior. A major challenge in student simulation is modeling the diverse learning patterns of students at various cognitive levels. However, current LLMs, typically trained as ``helpful assistants'', target at generating perfect responses. As a result, they struggle to simulate students with diverse cognitive abilities, as they often produce overly advanced answers, missing the natural imperfections that characterize student learning and resulting in unrealistic simulations. To address this issue, we propose a training-free framework for student simulation. We begin by constructing a cognitive prototype for each student using a knowledge graph, which captures their understanding of concepts from past learning records. This prototype is then mapped to new tasks to predict student performance. Next, we simulate student solutions based on these predictions and iteratively refine them using a beam search method to better replicate realistic mistakes. To validate our approach, we construct the Student\_100 dataset, consisting of 100 students working on Python programming and 5,000 learning records. Experimental results show that our method consistently outperforms baseline models, achieving 100% improvement in simulation accuracy.

Programming-by-example is the task of synthesizing a program that is consistent with a set of user-provided input-output examples. As examples are often an under-specification of one's intent, a good synthesizer must choose the intended program from the many that are consistent with the given set of examples. Prior work frames program synthesis as a cooperative game between a listener (that synthesizes programs) and a speaker (a user choosing examples), and shows that models of computational pragmatic inference are effective in choosing the user intended programs. However, these models require counterfactual reasoning over a large set of programs and examples, which is infeasible in realistic program spaces. In this paper, we propose a novel way to amortize this search with neural networks. We sample pairs of programs and examples via self-play between listener and speaker models, and use pragmatic inference to choose informative training examples from this sample.We then use the informative dataset to train models to improve the synthesizer's ability to disambiguate user-provided examples without human supervision. We validate our method on the challenging task of synthesizing regular expressions from example strings, and find that our method (1) outperforms models trained without choosing pragmatic examples by 23% (a 51% relative increase) (2) matches the performance of supervised learning on a dataset of pragmatic examples provided by humans, despite using no human data in training.

Mathematical reasoning has long represented one of the most fundamental and challenging frontiers in artificial intelligence research. In recent years, large language models (LLMs) have achieved significant advances in this area. This survey examines the development of mathematical reasoning abilities in LLMs through two high-level cognitive phases: comprehension, where models gain mathematical understanding via diverse pretraining strategies, and answer generation, which has progressed from direct prediction to step-by-step Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning. We review methods for enhancing mathematical reasoning, ranging from training-free prompting to fine-tuning approaches such as supervised fine-tuning and reinforcement learning, and discuss recent work on extended CoT and "test-time scaling". Despite notable progress, fundamental challenges remain in terms of capacity, efficiency, and generalization. To address these issues, we highlight promising research directions, including advanced pretraining and knowledge augmentation techniques, formal reasoning frameworks, and meta-generalization through principled learning paradigms. This survey tries to provide some insights for researchers interested in enhancing reasoning capabilities of LLMs and for those seeking to apply these techniques to other domains.

Recently, large language models (LLMs) have shown promising abilities to generate novel research ideas in science, a direction which coincides with many foundational principles in computational creativity (CC). In light of these developments, we present an idea generation system named Spark that couples retrieval-augmented idea generation using LLMs with a reviewer model named Judge trained on 600K scientific reviews from OpenReview. Our work is both a system demonstration and intended to inspire other CC researchers to explore grounding the generation and evaluation of scientific ideas within foundational CC principles. To this end, we release the annotated dataset used to train Judge, inviting other researchers to explore the use of LLMs for idea generation and creative evaluations.

Recent research has shown that smaller language models can acquire substantial reasoning abilities when fine-tuned with reasoning exemplars crafted by a significantly larger teacher model. We explore this paradigm for the financial domain, focusing on the challenge of answering questions that require multi-hop numerical reasoning over financial texts. We assess the performance of several smaller models that have been fine-tuned to generate programs that encode the required financial reasoning and calculations. Our findings demonstrate that these fine-tuned smaller models approach the performance of the teacher model. To provide a granular analysis of model performance, we propose an approach to investigate the specific student model capabilities that are enhanced by fine-tuning. Our empirical analysis indicates that fine-tuning refines the student models ability to express and apply the required financial concepts along with adapting the entity extraction for the specific data format. In addition, we hypothesize and demonstrate that comparable financial reasoning capability can be induced using relatively smaller datasets.

Modern language models can imitate complex patterns through few-shot learning, enabling them to complete challenging tasks without fine-tuning. However, imitation can also lead models to reproduce inaccuracies or harmful content if present in the context. We study harmful imitation through the lens of a model's internal representations, and identify two related phenomena: "overthinking" and "false induction heads". The first phenomenon, overthinking, appears when we decode predictions from intermediate layers, given correct vs. incorrect few-shot demonstrations. At early layers, both demonstrations induce similar model behavior, but the behavior diverges sharply at some "critical layer", after which the accuracy given incorrect demonstrations progressively decreases. The second phenomenon, false induction heads, are a possible mechanistic cause of overthinking: these are heads in late layers that attend to and copy false information from previous demonstrations, and whose ablation reduces overthinking. Beyond scientific understanding, our results suggest that studying intermediate model computations could be a promising avenue for understanding and guarding against harmful model behaviors.

Whether neural networks can learn abstract reasoning or whether they merely rely on superficial statistics is a topic of recent debate. Here, we propose a dataset and challenge designed to probe abstract reasoning, inspired by a well-known human IQ test. To succeed at this challenge, models must cope with various generalisation `regimes' in which the training and test data differ in clearly-defined ways. We show that popular models such as ResNets perform poorly, even when the training and test sets differ only minimally, and we present a novel architecture, with a structure designed to encourage reasoning, that does significantly better. When we vary the way in which the test questions and training data differ, we find that our model is notably proficient at certain forms of generalisation, but notably weak at others. We further show that the model's ability to generalise improves markedly if it is trained to predict symbolic explanations for its answers. Altogether, we introduce and explore ways to both measure and induce stronger abstract reasoning in neural networks. Our freely-available dataset should motivate further progress in this direction.

Recently, slow-thinking reasoning systems, such as o1, have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in solving complex reasoning tasks. These systems typically engage in an extended thinking process before responding to a query, allowing them to generate more thorough, accurate, and well-reasoned solutions. These systems are primarily developed and maintained by industry, with their core techniques not publicly disclosed. In response, an increasing number of studies from the research community aim to explore the technical foundations underlying these powerful reasoning systems. Building on these prior efforts, this paper presents a reproduction report on implementing o1-like reasoning systems. We introduce an "imitate, explore, and self-improve" framework as our primary technical approach to train the reasoning model. In the initial phase, we use distilled long-form thought data to fine-tune the reasoning model, enabling it to invoke a slow-thinking mode. The model is then encouraged to explore challenging problems by generating multiple rollouts, which can result in increasingly more high-quality trajectories that lead to correct answers. Furthermore, the model undergoes self-improvement by iteratively refining its training dataset. To verify the effectiveness of this approach, we conduct extensive experiments on three challenging benchmarks. The experimental results demonstrate that our approach achieves competitive performance compared to industry-level reasoning systems on these benchmarks.

Large language models (LLMs) are becoming increasingly important for machine learning applications. However, it can be challenging to align LLMs with our intent, particularly when we want to generate content that is preferable over others or when we want the LLM to respond in a certain style or tone that is hard to describe. To address this challenge, we propose an approach that uses contrastive examples to better describe our intent. This involves providing positive examples that illustrate the true intent, along with negative examples that show what characteristics we want LLMs to avoid. The negative examples can be retrieved from labeled data, written by a human, or generated by the LLM itself. Before generating an answer, we ask the model to analyze the examples to teach itself what to avoid. This reasoning step provides the model with the appropriate articulation of the user's need and guides it towards generting a better answer. We tested our approach on both synthesized and real-world datasets, including StackExchange and Reddit, and found that it significantly improves performance compared to standard few-shot prompting

This paper investigates the mathematical reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs) using 50 newly constructed high-school-level word problems. Unlike prior studies that focus solely on answer correctness, we rigorously analyze both final answers and solution steps to identify reasoning failures. Evaluating eight state-of-the-art models - including Mixtral, Llama, Gemini, GPT-4o, and OpenAI's o1 variants - we find that while newer models (e.g., o3-mini, deepseek-r1) achieve higher accuracy, all models exhibit errors in spatial reasoning, strategic planning, and arithmetic, sometimes producing correct answers through flawed logic. Common failure modes include unwarranted assumptions, over-reliance on numerical patterns, and difficulty translating physical intuition into mathematical steps. Manual analysis reveals that models struggle with problems requiring multi-step deduction or real-world knowledge, despite possessing broad mathematical knowledge. Our results underscore the importance of evaluating reasoning processes, not just answers, and caution against overestimating LLMs' problem-solving proficiency. The study highlights persistent gaps in LLMs' generalization abilities, emphasizing the need for targeted improvements in structured reasoning and constraint handling.

Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit impressive reasoning abilities, yet their reliance on structured step-by-step processing reveals a critical limitation. While human cognition fluidly adapts between intuitive, heuristic (System 1) and analytical, deliberative (System 2) reasoning depending on the context, LLMs lack this dynamic flexibility. This rigidity can lead to brittle and unreliable performance when faced with tasks that deviate from their trained patterns. To address this, we create a dataset of 2,000 samples with valid System 1 and System 2 answers, explicitly align LLMs with these reasoning styles, and evaluate their performance across reasoning benchmarks. Our results reveal an accuracy-efficiency trade-off: System 2-aligned models excel in arithmetic and symbolic reasoning, while System 1-aligned models perform better in commonsense tasks. A mechanistic analysis of model responses shows that System 1 models employ more definitive answers, whereas System 2 models demonstrate greater uncertainty. Interpolating between these extremes produces a monotonic transition in reasoning accuracy, preserving coherence. This work challenges the assumption that step-by-step reasoning is always optimal and highlights the need for adapting reasoning strategies based on task demands.

Scaling model size and training data has led to great advances in the performance of Large Language Models (LLMs). However, the diminishing returns of this approach necessitate alternative methods to improve model capabilities, particularly in tasks requiring advanced reasoning. Large reasoning models, which leverage long chain-of-thoughts, bring unprecedented breakthroughs in problem-solving capabilities but at a substantial deployment cost associated to longer generations. Reducing inference costs is crucial for the economic feasibility, user experience, and environmental sustainability of these models. In this work, we propose to train large reasoning models to reason efficiently. More precisely, we use reinforcement learning (RL) to train reasoning models to dynamically allocate inference-time compute based on task complexity. Our method incentivizes models to minimize unnecessary computational overhead while maintaining accuracy, thereby achieving substantial efficiency gains. It enables the derivation of a family of reasoning models with varying efficiency levels, controlled via a single hyperparameter. Experiments on two open-weight large reasoning models demonstrate significant reductions in inference cost while preserving most of the accuracy.

Despite the rapid progress in the capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs), they continue to have difficulty following relatively simple, unambiguous instructions, especially when compositions are involved. In this paper, we take inspiration from recent work that suggests that models may follow instructions better when they are expressed in pseudo-code. However, writing pseudo-code programs can be tedious and using few-shot demonstrations to craft code representations for use in inference can be unnatural for non-expert users of LLMs. To overcome these limitations, we propose fine-tuning LLMs with instruction-tuning data that additionally includes instructions re-expressed in pseudo-code along with the final response. We evaluate models trained using our method on 11 publicly available benchmarks comprising of tasks related to instruction-following, mathematics, and common-sense reasoning. We conduct rigorous experiments with 5 different models and find that not only do models follow instructions better when trained with pseudo-code, they also retain their capabilities on the other tasks related to mathematical and common sense reasoning. Specifically, we observe a relative gain of 3--19% on instruction-following benchmark, and an average gain of upto 14% across all tasks.

Driven by vast and diverse textual data, large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive performance across numerous natural language processing (NLP) tasks. Yet, a critical question persists: does their generalization arise from mere memorization of training data or from deep semantic understanding? To investigate this, we propose a bi-perspective evaluation framework to assess LLMs' scenario cognition - the ability to link semantic scenario elements with their arguments in context. Specifically, we introduce a novel scenario-based dataset comprising diverse textual descriptions of fictional facts, annotated with scenario elements. LLMs are evaluated through their capacity to answer scenario-related questions (model output perspective) and via probing their internal representations for encoded scenario elements-argument associations (internal representation perspective). Our experiments reveal that current LLMs predominantly rely on superficial memorization, failing to achieve robust semantic scenario cognition, even in simple cases. These findings expose critical limitations in LLMs' semantic understanding and offer cognitive insights for advancing their capabilities.

This paper takes a first step towards a critical thinking curriculum for neural auto-regressive language models. We introduce a synthetic corpus of deductively valid arguments, and generate artificial argumentative texts to train and evaluate GPT-2. Significant transfer learning effects can be observed: Training a model on three simple core schemes allows it to accurately complete conclusions of different, and more complex types of arguments, too. The language models generalize the core argument schemes in a correct way. Moreover, we obtain consistent and promising results for NLU benchmarks. In particular, pre-training on the argument schemes raises zero-shot accuracy on the GLUE diagnostics by up to 15 percentage points. The findings suggest that intermediary pre-training on texts that exemplify basic reasoning abilities (such as typically covered in critical thinking textbooks) might help language models to acquire a broad range of reasoning skills. The synthetic argumentative texts presented in this paper are a promising starting point for building such a "critical thinking curriculum for language models."

No two authors write alike. Personal flourishes invoked in written narratives, from lexicon to rhetorical devices, imply a particular author--what literary theorists label the implied or virtual author; distinct from the real author or narrator of a text. Early large language models trained on unfiltered training sets drawn from a variety of discordant sources yielded incoherent personalities, problematic for conversational tasks but proving useful for sampling literature from multiple perspectives. Successes in alignment research in recent years have allowed researchers to impose subjectively consistent personae on language models via instruction tuning and reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF), but whether aligned models retain the ability to model an arbitrary virtual author has received little scrutiny. By studying 4,374 stories sampled from three OpenAI language models, we show successive versions of GPT-3 suffer from increasing degrees of "mode collapse" whereby overfitting the model during alignment constrains it from generalizing over authorship: models suffering from mode collapse become unable to assume a multiplicity of perspectives. Our method and results are significant for researchers seeking to employ language models in sociological simulations.

We investigate the generalization capabilities of small language models under two popular adaptation paradigms: few-shot prompting and supervised fine-tuning. While prompting is often favored for its parameter efficiency and flexibility, it remains unclear how robust this approach is in low-resource settings and under distributional shifts. This paper presents a comparative study of prompting and fine-tuning across task formats, prompt styles, and model scales, with a focus on their behavior in both in-distribution and out-of-distribution (OOD) settings. Beyond accuracy, we analyze the internal representations learned by each approach to assess the stability and abstraction of task-specific features. Our findings highlight critical differences in how small models internalize and generalize knowledge under different adaptation strategies. This work offers practical guidance for model selection in low-data regimes and contributes empirical insight into the ongoing debate over prompting versus fine-tuning. Code for the experiments is available at the following

While large language models (LLMs) have been thoroughly evaluated for deductive and inductive reasoning, their proficiency in abductive reasoning and holistic rule learning in interactive environments remains less explored. This work introduces RULEARN, a novel benchmark specifically designed to assess the rule-learning ability of LLMs in interactive settings. In RULEARN, agents interact with the environment to gather observations and discern patterns, using these insights to solve problems. To further enhance the rule-learning capabilities of LLM agents within this benchmark, we propose IDEA agent, which integrates Induction, Deduction, and Abduction processes. IDEA agent refines this approach by leveraging a structured reasoning sequence: generating hypotheses through abduction, testing them via deduction, and refining them based on feedback from induction. This sequence enables agents to dynamically establish and apply rules, mimicking human-like reasoning processes. Our evaluation of five representative LLMs indicates that while these models can generate plausible initial hypotheses, they often struggle with strategic interaction within the environment, effective incorporation of feedback, and adaptive refinement of their hypotheses. IDEA agent demonstrates significantly improved performance on the RULEARN benchmark, offering valuable insights for the development of agents capable of human-like rule-learning in real-world scenarios. We will release our code and data.

This paper presents a novel framework for enhancing reasoning capabilities in large language models (LLMs) by leveraging iterative reasoning and feedback-driven methodologies. Building on the limitations identified in the SimpleBench benchmark, a dataset designed to evaluate logical coherence and real-world reasoning, we propose a multi-step prompting strategy coupled with global consistency checks to improve model accuracy and robustness. Through comparative analysis of state-of-the-art models, including Claude 3 Opus, Claude 3.5, GPT- 4o, and o1-preview, we demonstrate that iterative reasoning significantly enhances model performance, with improvements observed in both standard accuracy metrics (AVG@5) and a newly introduced metric, Extreme Averaging (EAG@5). Our results reveal model-specific strengths: Claude excels in maintaining logical consistency, while GPT-4o exhibits exploratory creativity but struggles with ambiguous prompts. By analyzing case studies and identifying gaps in spatial and temporal reasoning, we highlight areas for further refinement. The findings underscore the potential of structured reasoning frameworks to address inherent model limitations, irrespective of pretraining methodologies. This study lays the groundwork for integrating dynamic feedback mechanisms, adaptive restart strategies, and diverse evaluation metrics to advance LLM reasoning capabilities across complex and multi-domain problem spaces.

Figurative language (e.g., "he flew like the wind") is challenging to understand, as it is hard to tell what implicit information is being conveyed from the surface form alone. We hypothesize that to perform this task well, the reader needs to mentally elaborate the scene being described to identify a sensible meaning of the language. We present DREAM-FLUTE, a figurative language understanding system that does this, first forming a "mental model" of situations described in a premise and hypothesis before making an entailment/contradiction decision and generating an explanation. DREAM-FLUTE uses an existing scene elaboration model, DREAM, for constructing its "mental model." In the FigLang2022 Shared Task evaluation, DREAM-FLUTE achieved (joint) first place (Acc@60=63.3%), and can perform even better with ensemble techniques, demonstrating the effectiveness of this approach. More generally, this work suggests that adding a reflective component to pretrained language models can improve their performance beyond standard fine-tuning (3.3% improvement in Acc@60).

Hypothetical induction is recognized as the main reasoning type when scientists make observations about the world and try to propose hypotheses to explain those observations. Past research on hypothetical induction is under a constrained setting: (1) the observation annotations in the dataset are carefully manually handpicked sentences (resulting in a close-domain setting); and (2) the ground truth hypotheses are mostly commonsense knowledge, making the task less challenging. In this work, we tackle these problems by proposing the first dataset for social science academic hypotheses discovery, with the final goal to create systems that automatically generate valid, novel, and helpful scientific hypotheses, given only a pile of raw web corpus. Unlike previous settings, the new dataset requires (1) using open-domain data (raw web corpus) as observations; and (2) proposing hypotheses even new to humanity. A multi-module framework is developed for the task, including three different feedback mechanisms to boost performance, which exhibits superior performance in terms of both GPT-4 based and expert-based evaluation. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work showing that LLMs are able to generate novel (''not existing in literature'') and valid (''reflecting reality'') scientific hypotheses.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive reasoning abilities through test-time computation (TTC) techniques such as chain-of-thought prompting and tree-based reasoning. However, we argue that current reasoning LLMs (RLLMs) lack the ability to systematically explore the solution space. This paper formalizes what constitutes systematic problem solving and identifies common failure modes that reveal reasoning LLMs to be wanderers rather than systematic explorers. Through qualitative and quantitative analysis across multiple state-of-the-art LLMs, we uncover persistent issues: invalid reasoning steps, redundant explorations, hallucinated or unfaithful conclusions, and so on. Our findings suggest that current models' performance can appear to be competent on simple tasks yet degrade sharply as complexity increases. Based on the findings, we advocate for new metrics and tools that evaluate not just final outputs but the structure of the reasoning process itself.

We study whether language models can evaluate the validity of their own claims and predict which questions they will be able to answer correctly. We first show that larger models are well-calibrated on diverse multiple choice and true/false questions when they are provided in the right format. Thus we can approach self-evaluation on open-ended sampling tasks by asking models to first propose answers, and then to evaluate the probability "P(True)" that their answers are correct. We find encouraging performance, calibration, and scaling for P(True) on a diverse array of tasks. Performance at self-evaluation further improves when we allow models to consider many of their own samples before predicting the validity of one specific possibility. Next, we investigate whether models can be trained to predict "P(IK)", the probability that "I know" the answer to a question, without reference to any particular proposed answer. Models perform well at predicting P(IK) and partially generalize across tasks, though they struggle with calibration of P(IK) on new tasks. The predicted P(IK) probabilities also increase appropriately in the presence of relevant source materials in the context, and in the presence of hints towards the solution of mathematical word problems. We hope these observations lay the groundwork for training more honest models, and for investigating how honesty generalizes to cases where models are trained on objectives other than the imitation of human writing.

Chain-of-thought emerges as a promising technique for eliciting reasoning capabilities from Large Language Models (LLMs). However, it does not always improve task performance or accurately represent reasoning processes, leaving unresolved questions about its usage. In this paper, we diagnose the underlying mechanism by comparing the reasoning process of LLMs with humans, using causal analysis to understand the relationships between the problem instruction, reasoning, and the answer in LLMs. Our empirical study reveals that LLMs often deviate from the ideal causal chain, resulting in spurious correlations and potential consistency errors (inconsistent reasoning and answers). We also examine various factors influencing the causal structure, finding that in-context learning with examples strengthens it, while post-training techniques like supervised fine-tuning and reinforcement learning on human feedback weaken it. To our surprise, the causal structure cannot be strengthened by enlarging the model size only, urging research on new techniques. We hope that this preliminary study will shed light on understanding and improving the reasoning process in LLM.

Figures of speech such as metaphors, similes, and idioms allow language to be expressive, invoke emotion, and communicate abstract ideas that might otherwise be difficult to visualize. These figurative forms are often conveyed through multiple modes, such as text and images, and frequently appear in advertising, news, social media, etc. Understanding multimodal figurative language is an essential component of human communication, and it plays a significant role in our daily interactions. While humans can intuitively understand multimodal figurative language, this poses a challenging task for machines that requires the cognitive ability to map between domains, abstraction, commonsense, and profound language and cultural knowledge. In this work, we propose the Image Recognition of Figurative Language dataset to examine vision and language models' understanding of figurative language. We leverage human annotation and an automatic pipeline we created to generate a multimodal dataset and introduce two novel tasks as a benchmark for multimodal figurative understanding. We experiment with several baseline models and find that all perform substantially worse than humans. We hope our dataset and benchmark will drive the development of models that will better understand figurative language.

We explore how generating a chain of thought -- a series of intermediate reasoning steps -- significantly improves the ability of large language models to perform complex reasoning. In particular, we show how such reasoning abilities emerge naturally in sufficiently large language models via a simple method called chain of thought prompting, where a few chain of thought demonstrations are provided as exemplars in prompting. Experiments on three large language models show that chain of thought prompting improves performance on a range of arithmetic, commonsense, and symbolic reasoning tasks. The empirical gains can be striking. For instance, prompting a 540B-parameter language model with just eight chain of thought exemplars achieves state of the art accuracy on the GSM8K benchmark of math word problems, surpassing even finetuned GPT-3 with a verifier.

Stepwise inference protocols, such as scratchpads and chain-of-thought, help language models solve complex problems by decomposing them into a sequence of simpler subproblems. Despite the significant gain in performance achieved via these protocols, the underlying mechanisms of stepwise inference have remained elusive. To address this, we propose to study autoregressive Transformer models on a synthetic task that embodies the multi-step nature of problems where stepwise inference is generally most useful. Specifically, we define a graph navigation problem wherein a model is tasked with traversing a path from a start to a goal node on the graph. Despite is simplicity, we find we can empirically reproduce and analyze several phenomena observed at scale: (i) the stepwise inference reasoning gap, the cause of which we find in the structure of the training data; (ii) a diversity-accuracy tradeoff in model generations as sampling temperature varies; (iii) a simplicity bias in the model's output; and (iv) compositional generalization and a primacy bias with in-context exemplars. Overall, our work introduces a grounded, synthetic framework for studying stepwise inference and offers mechanistic hypotheses that can lay the foundation for a deeper understanding of this phenomenon.

Cognitive textual and visual reasoning tasks, such as puzzles, series, and analogies, demand the ability to quickly reason, decipher, and evaluate patterns both textually and spatially. While LLMs and VLMs, through extensive training on large amounts of human-curated data, have attained a high level of pseudo-human intelligence in some common sense reasoning tasks, they still struggle with more complex reasoning tasks that require cognitive understanding. In this work, we introduce a new dataset, NTSEBench, designed to evaluate the cognitive multi-modal reasoning and problem-solving skills of large models. The dataset comprises 2,728 multiple-choice questions comprising of a total of 4,642 images across 26 categories sampled from the NTSE examination conducted nationwide in India, featuring both visual and textual general aptitude questions that do not rely on rote learning. We establish baselines on the dataset using state-of-the-art LLMs and VLMs. To facilitate a comparison between open source and propriety models, we propose four distinct modeling strategies to handle different modalities (text and images) in the dataset instances.

Despite their tremendous success in many applications, large language models often fall short of consistent reasoning and planning in various (language, embodied, and social) scenarios, due to inherent limitations in their inference, learning, and modeling capabilities. In this position paper, we present a new perspective of machine reasoning, LAW, that connects the concepts of Language models, Agent models, and World models, for more robust and versatile reasoning capabilities. In particular, we propose that world and agent models are a better abstraction of reasoning, that introduces the crucial elements of deliberate human-like reasoning, including beliefs about the world and other agents, anticipation of consequences, goals/rewards, and strategic planning. Crucially, language models in LAW serve as a backend to implement the system or its elements and hence provide the computational power and adaptability. We review the recent studies that have made relevant progress and discuss future research directions towards operationalizing the LAW framework.

The output quality of large language models (LLMs) can be improved via "reasoning": generating segments of chain-of-thought (CoT) content to further condition the model prior to producing user-facing output. While these chains contain valuable information, they are verbose and lack explicit organization, making them tedious to review. Moreover, they lack opportunities for user feedback, such as to remove unwanted considerations, add desired ones, or clarify unclear assumptions. We introduce Interactive Reasoning, an interaction design that visualizes chain-of-thought outputs as a hierarchy of topics and enables user review and modification. We implement interactive reasoning in Hippo, a prototype for AI-assisted decision making in the face of uncertain trade-offs. In a user study with 16 participants, we find that interactive reasoning in Hippo allows users to quickly identify and interrupt erroneous generations, efficiently steer the model towards customized responses, and better understand both model reasoning and model outputs. Our work contributes to a new paradigm that incorporates user oversight into LLM reasoning processes.

The observed similarities in the behavior of humans and Large Language Models (LLMs) have prompted researchers to consider the potential of using LLMs as models of human cognition. However, several significant challenges must be addressed before LLMs can be legitimately regarded as cognitive models. For instance, LLMs are trained on far more data than humans typically encounter, and may have been directly trained on human data in specific cognitive tasks or aligned with human preferences. Consequently, the origins of these behavioral similarities are not well understood. In this paper, we propose a novel way to enhance the utility of LLMs as cognitive models. This approach involves (i) leveraging computationally equivalent tasks that both an LLM and a rational agent need to master for solving a cognitive problem and (ii) examining the specific task distributions required for an LLM to exhibit human-like behaviors. We apply this approach to decision-making -- specifically risky and intertemporal choice -- where the key computationally equivalent task is the arithmetic of expected value calculations. We show that an LLM pretrained on an ecologically valid arithmetic dataset, which we call Arithmetic-GPT, predicts human behavior better than many traditional cognitive models. Pretraining LLMs on ecologically valid arithmetic datasets is sufficient to produce a strong correspondence between these models and human decision-making. Our results also suggest that LLMs used as cognitive models should be carefully investigated via ablation studies of the pretraining data.